Indian Strategic Studies: October 2024

31 October 2024

Oversight Committee Releases Report Exposing the CCP’s Destructive Political Warfare and Influence Operations

House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Chairman James Comer (R-Ky.) released a staff report today titled “CCP Political Warfare: Federal Agencies Urgently Need a Government-Wide Strategy.” The report, which includes information obtained during the Committee’s government-wide investigation into 25 federal sectors, details how the Biden-Harris Administration is dangerously behind in implementing measures to combat the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) influence and infiltration campaign. The Oversight Committee conducted multiple hearings, held dozens of briefings, and found that most agencies’ solutions and policies either ignore, placate, or only weakly address the CCP’s efforts to influence and infiltrate the United States. To counter CCP political warfare, the report offers recommendations for federal agencies to use existing resources to defend America and critical U.S. industries.

“The House Oversight Committee has exposed the CCP’s political warfare and is working to ensure the federal government formulates a cohesive strategy to combat CCP threats and protect all Americans. The CCP is successfully infiltrating and influencing communities and critical sectors across this nation and the Biden-Harris Administration is asleep at the wheel. Today’s report details how federal agencies have failed to understand, acknowledge, or develop a plan to combat CCP political warfare and Americans are left to fend for themselves. It is past time for federal agencies to take this threat seriously and fulfill their responsibilities to the American people. Our report offers several solutions federal agencies can implement now with existing resources to address the CCP threat and protect the American people,” said Chairman James Comer (R-Ky.).

The key takeaways from Israel’s strikes on Iran - analysis

SETH J. FRANTZMAN

Israel carried out long-awaited airstrikes on Iran, on Friday night, on precise and targeted military targets. These were aimed at “thwarting immediate threats to the State of Israel,” the IDF said.

Despite the much-anticipated attack, Israel reported they finished the attack before the sun rose in Tehran.

The strikes were designed to retaliate for Iran’s ballistic missile attacks on Israel on October 1.

So, what are the developments since the strikes, and what can the strikes tell us about the new situation in the region?

Iran downplays strikes

Iranian state media overnight portrayed the country as unaffected by the attacks. Pro-Iran Telegram channels put up videos of people on the roof of a building, mocking the Israeli attack.

Behind the scenes of Israeli attack: Over 100 aircraft and a 2,000 km journey to Iran

AMIR BOHBOT

Over 100 planes were involved in the attack on Iran on Saturday, including the cutting-edge F-35.

Israel’s preliminary strike on radar targets in Syria was aimed at “blinding” Iran’s capabilities, quickly escalating into an offensive targeting Tehran and Karaj, Iran’s capital and another strategic location.

The IDF confirmed the operation focused strictly on military targets, steering clear of nuclear and oil facilities to prevent wider conflict escalation. High alert remains as Israel anticipates potential retaliation, not only from Iran.

This large-scale assault involved over 100 aircraft, including F-35 “Adir” stealth fighters, traveling approximately 2,000 kilometers. According to foreign reports, strikes focused on Tehran and Karaj, with the IDF stating that each wave targeted military sites exclusively, mitigating further conflict risks.

An operation of this scope likely began with initial waves attacking radar and air defense systems, clearing the path for subsequent strikes on military bases. Earlier, a coordinated strike in Syria neutralized similar threats, preventing Iran from building situational awareness of Israel’s plans.

The Dilemma Iran’s Leader Faces - Opinio

Karim Sadjadpour

If a person is fortunate enough to live into his ninth decade, life often turns toward quiet reflection, relaxation and the comforts of family and community. Not for the 85-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The sunset years of Iran’s supreme leader have been defined by a series of daunting challenges: regional humiliations, domestic uprisings, the looming threat of war with Israel and a pivotal decision on whether to pursue nuclear weapons — a choice with profound implications for his political legacy and the country he has ruled for 35 years.

In the past 100 days, Mr. Khamenei has endured devastating losses. Israel struck decisive blows against Iran’s so-called axis of resistance, including the assassination of the Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Yahya Sinwar in Gaza and the elimination of Mr. Khamenei’s most important ally, the Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Additionally, on Oct. 16, the United States sent B-2 stealth bombers — $2 billion aircraft capable of delivering 30,000-pound bunker-busting bombs — to destroy weapons depots in Yemen linked to Iran’s Houthi allies. It was another blow to Iran’s proxy armies and a clear signal to Tehran that its underground nuclear sites are within reach.

Iran Has Every Reason Now to Go Nuclear

Ellie Geranmayeh

The recent conflicts in the Middle East have ignited open debate among Iran’s political elite over whether the country should weaponize its vast nuclear program. The rationale for doing so, from Iranian leadership’s perspective, appears more convincing than ever.

Above all, Iran needs to reestablish deterrence equilibrium with its longtime foes Israel and the United States. Traditionally, to deter its adversaries from attacking or implementing regime change, Tehran relied on a three-pronged approach focused on missiles, militias, and a nuclear program.

Where Is the Massive Hezbollah Response to Israel’s Attacks?

Daniel Byman

The feared Israel-Hezbollah war is happening, but it is remarkably one-sided so far. In September, Israel detonated thousands of Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies. It then commenced large-scale bombing of over 1,000 targets in Lebanon and stepped up its military campaign against Hezbollah leaders, culminating in the killing of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Israeli forces have also crossed into Lebanon, destroying Hezbollah tunnels and other infrastructure, and pushing its fighters away from the border.

Hezbollah has fought back. The militant group has launched drone attacks into Israel, including one on an Israeli military base that killed four people and another on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s holiday home in Caesarea. Along the border, its fighters have reportedly killed over 20 Israelis in October so far. The group has also launched thousands of rockets and missiles on Israel in recent weeks.

Iranian hacker group aims at US election websites and media before vote, Microsoft says

Christopher Bing and A.J. Vicens

An Iranian hacking group is actively scouting U.S. election-related websites and American media outlets as Election Day nears, with activity suggesting preparations for more "direct influence operations," according to a Microsoft blog published on Wednesday.

The hackers – dubbed Cotton Sandstorm by Microsoft and linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – performed reconnaissance and limited probing of multiple "election-related websites" in several unnamed battleground states, the report said. In May, they also scanned an unidentified U.S. news outlet to understand its vulnerabilities.

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate, faces Republican rival Donald Trump in the Nov. 5 presidential election, which polls suggest is an extremely tight race.

"Cotton Sandstorm will increase its activity as the election nears given the group's operational tempo and history of election interference," researchers wrote. The development is particularly concerning because of the group's past efforts, they said.

A spokesperson for Iran's mission to the United Nations said that "such allegations are fundamentally unfounded, and wholly inadmissible."

Iran left reeling from Netanyahu’s calculated revenge mission

Neil Johnston

They had boasted of Israeli “weakness” but when the cruise missiles first struck just after 2.15am on Saturday, the Iranians appeared completely unprepared.

As the regime scrambled aircraft and sought to stop the Israeli onslaught with outdated air defences, it was only a few minutes before plumes of smoke were rising around Tehran.

In a humiliating admission, Iran acknowledged that its capital had been struck during a swift four-hour IDF operation, which saw key nuclear and oil targets overlooked by Israel, under pressure from the US to avoid an escalation of the Middle East conflicts.

After weeks of speculation, leaks and fierce battles against Iran’s proxies on its borders, Israel finally launched its retaliation against Tehran’s missile barrage last month.

Codenamed “Days of Repentance”, Israel declared the “mission completed” after bombing strategic military targets across the Islamic Republic and triggering panic in Iranian cities by the time fighter jets returned home.

Israel, Hezbollah, and Arab Hostility

Amir Asmar

Israel is conducting extensive attacks against Lebanon—for the sixth time in their shared history—after months of a military back-and-forth with the Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah. In late September, Israel assassinated Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hasan Nasrallah, as part of a systematic offensive against dozens of Hezbollah military sites in Lebanon, reportedly to “preempt” Hezbollah’s retaliation for Israel’s July assassination of another senior leader, Fouad Shukr. Despite Israeli promises of a limited incursion, the escalation in the military pas-de-deux both have been engaged in since the Gaza war began on October 7 last year is expected to have severe humanitarian consequences in affected areas and beyond and to promote economic and political instability. Apart from the combat, the conflict highlights not only the enduring hostility between Hezbollah and Israel but also the limitations of relying on military force to secure Israel’s long-term position in the region.

Israel’s conflict with Lebanon is unique among those with the Arab states because Lebanon is unique. It has always been fundamentally unstable, having been created as a beachhead for French imperialism, with weak nationalist credentials. Due to its social, political, and military weaknesses, Lebanon suffered the consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict, specifically Palestinian displacement, more deeply than others. Lebanon’s weak sectarian government and ineffectual military unraveled in 1975 under the pressure of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict being fought on its territory, inaugurating a 16-year civil war. Despite its weakness, however, Lebanon has consistently frustrated Israeli designs to pacify the country.

A Sobering Moment in the Ukraine War

Doug Livermore

As the war in Ukraine continues well into its second year, both Ukraine and Russia are grappling with the realities of prolonged, large-scale conflict. Russia’s relentless advances in several regions, particularly in Eastern Ukraine, have significantly strained Ukraine’s defenses despite the latter’s efforts to advertise and implement its “Victory Plan.”

This plan, which hinged on securing greater military aid, loosening restrictions on Western-donated weaponry, and mounting a decisive counteroffensive, has thus far failed to achieve its primary objective of securing Western support.

Yet at the core of Ukraine’s difficulties is the ongoing manpower struggle, exacerbated by Russia’s ability to continually draw upon not only its own vast resources but also those of allies, such as (it seems) North Korean troops. Meanwhile, the West’s hesitation to provide unrestricted access to and use of the most advanced weaponry, coupled with growing donor fatigue, has left Kyiv in a precarious position.

The US must prepare for a multi-front war

Jane Harman

The “elimination” of Yahya Sinwar in a tunnel in southern Gaza was a bit of serendipity. An Israeli patrol reportedly saw three people running and opened fire. They were surprised to find Sinwar — and the best news is that there were no hostages near enough to be harmed.

How ironic that the deaths of so many terrorist leaders — Moammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Hassan Nasrallah and now Sinwar — seem banal and yet so brutal.

So now what? Will this death prove an inflection point or yet another chapter in Israel’s long wars against Iran and Iran’s proxies? Could momentum build now for a resolution that pulls the region together and isolates Iran — or better yet, changes it?

What world will we face next Oct. 7? It could well be even more dangerous. This is not just because by then, the U.S. will have a new president, nor because of the tactical playout in the region. Other countries are watching the chaos in the Middle East and the turmoil in America’s politics. And the ones that would seek to do harm to us, our friends and our interests are showing increasing willingness to cooperate and be opportunistic. Nothing spells opportunity like chaos.

Fighting underground: The US military must learn from Israel’s experience

David Perkins and Ari Cicurelon

As Israel conducts limited ground operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, it already has encountered tunnels similar to the dangerous unseen combat it has fought for a year beneath Gaza.

Not for the first time, Israel is engaged in a new kind of fight that the United States will face in its future conflicts.

Just as the United States has learned from Israel’s wars in the past, the risks of tunnel warfare and how Israel is overcoming those challenges through coordinated troop maneuvers and technological adaptations should drive a shift in the US approach to subterranean combat.

The United States has a long history of learning from Israel’s wars. The 1973 Yom Kippur War had such a transformational effect that the US Army made the largest change to its doctrine since World War II. The Egyptian and Syrian armies’ use of new Soviet weapons and tactics that were more lethal and rapid, the ability of anti-tank weapons to neutralize more tanks in the first six days of the war than the United States had deployed throughout all of Europe, and tank battles occurring at much greater ranges than ever before shocked American defense planners preparing for a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.

Drones Have Not Yet Killed Armored Warfare

Julian Spencer-Churchill, Ulysse Oliveira Baptista & Maximilien Hachiya

The last two years of fighting in Ukraine have humbled the overly confident and shown that, without countermeasures and with optimal flying conditions, an attack drone can disable any tanks through a shaped charge, top-attack, or mobility kill, including the Leopard II, M1 Abrams, or Challenger II, and even armored helicopters. However, assessing a weapon’s ability to inflict losses does not have the same effect as shifting warfare to defense dominance and the attendant requirement of attrition to achieve victory. Once the net effect of drones and their countermeasures, as well as precision artillery and anti-tank missiles, are accounted for, tanks remain the most powerful single combat system on the battlefield. Eventually, the Ukrainians should be able to resume concentrated offensive armored attacks.

Thoughtful tactical and operational analyses from the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps intellectuals, U.S. Special Forces members, CSIS, IISS, and the Institute for the Study of War all agree (with some variations) that drones are having a transformational impact on the war, especially on the attacker. The offensive is required for eventual victory, and the Ukrainians are in serious need of retraining if they are to apply the necessary combined arms tactics for any phase of the war. These analyses mostly reflect on the failure of the NATO-trained and equipped Ukrainian army in its summer 2023 attempt to conduct an armored offensive to the Sea of Azov. Due to deep Russian defense and flexible reserves, Ukraine could never achieve the concentration of force necessary to realize a breakthrough. Fortunately, Ukraine’s deliberate control over its operations ensured that losses were moderate and reflected a normal exchange rate of attrition.

Israel’s Unmistakable Escalation Dominance

Sahar Soleimany

In the wake of Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile strike on Israel—the largest such attack in history—there has been a deepening sense of fear within the White House that Israel’s much-anticipated retaliation will instigate a wider regional war. President Joe Biden has repeatedly cautioned Israel, both publicly and privately, against taking “escalatory” measures, proposing that strikes on Iran’s oil fields and nuclear facilities should be off the table. While the nature of Israel’s response is still anybody’s guess, one thing’s for certain: Iran is not interested in a broader war. The administration’s fears reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the Islamic Republic’s strategic calculus.

Iran knows that it does not have the capabilities to fight a conventional war with either the United States or Israel, which is why it has always favored acting through its proxies. For the last year, the regime has had Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias all throw their punches against Israel while safely watching from the sidelines, interjecting with empty threats of direct “retaliation” and “revenge” each time the IDF successfully eliminated a senior commander.

And when Iran finally did respond with a large-scale missile and drone attack in April of 2024, the result was a humiliating failure that inflicted almost no damage on the Jewish State. The regime didn’t even try to avenge the subsequent assassinations of Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, despite concerns, once again from the administration, that Israel had created a situation ripe for escalation.

Death of Sinwar Is an Opportunity for the U.S. And Israel

Alexander J. Langlois

Israel confirmed it killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 17 – just over one year since the group launched a major attack on Israel. His death marks a major moment for the war and the Middle East, with serious geopolitical implications that could reshape the Israel-Palestine conflict and broader regional rivalry between Iran and Israel. That should start with an effort to achieve a real ceasefire and hostage exchange in Gaza, alongside an end to the broader regional war currently underway.

Benjamin Netanyahu hailed Sinwar’s killing as a triumph, exclaiming “Today we have settled the score. Today evil has been dealt a blow but our task has still not been complete.” Indeed, given Netanyahu’s reputation within Israel as a self-interested politician, it is unsurprising that he seeks to use this moment to further revive his image.

That point deserves attention, alongside his cryptic warning that Israel’s operations are incomplete. While referring in part to the 97 hostages still held in Gaza, Netanyahu is hinting at a continuation of the war, especially given his lack of a “day after” plan. Indeed, he has remained vague about what comes after Hamas’s defeat – spurring concerns of a long-term Israeli occupation in Gaza.

Ukraine Is Evolving Into a Proxy Battlefield for Korean Peninsula Tensions

Darcie Draudt-Véjares

Recent intelligence reports from the United States and its partners indicate the war in Ukraine has entered a hazardous new phase: North Korean troops have arrived in Russia, possibly to train to fight in Ukraine. On Monday, South Korea summoned the Russian ambassador and urged the immediate withdrawal of North Korean soldiers from Russia, though the Kremlin has consistently denied their presence. This potential deployment of third-party ground forces risks transforming the conflict between Russia and Ukraine into even more of a global security crisis, with particularly stark implications for the Korean Peninsula.

The scope of Russo-North Korean military cooperation has expanded dramatically since Vladimir Putin visited Kim Jong Un in North Korea and signed a comprehensive defense treaty in June. What started with North Korea supplying ammunition to Russia has evolved into a more sustained partnership. Even before the latest reports emerged, the top South Korean intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), has identified dozens of North Korean officers and one prominent missile development expert, Kim Jong-sik, at Russian frontline positions providing direct guidance on using Pyongyang’s weaponry to Moscow’s forces. These personnel aren’t merely observers, and their presence marks North Korea’s significant shift from arms supplier to active participant.

Lebanon: Satellite imagery reveals intensity of Israeli bombing

Ahmed Nour & Erwan Rivault

Israel's intensified bombing campaign of Lebanon has caused more damage to buildings in two weeks than occurred during a year of cross-border fighting with Hezbollah, according to satellite-based radar data assessed by the BBC.

Data shows that more than 3,600 buildings in Lebanon appear to have been damaged or destroyed between 2 and 14 October 2024. This represents about 54% of the total estimated damage since cross-border hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah broke out just over a year ago.

The damage data was gathered by Corey Scher of City University of New York and Jamon Van Den Hoek of Oregon State University. They compared radar satellite images to reveal sudden changes in the height or structure of buildings which indicate damage.

Wim Zwijnenburg, an environmental expert from the Pax for Peace organisation, reviewed the satellite-based radar data and warned of the impact of Israel’s bombing.

A Western Victory Plan for Ukraine

Robin Niblett

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to Western capitals this month to drum up support for his “victory plan.” The plan’s central planks, which Zelensky outlined to Ukraine’s parliament last week, are simple. Ukraine’s allies should formally invite it to join NATO and provide more weapons to push back the Russian assault. Only then will Russian President Vladimir Putin come to the negotiating table.

Meanwhile, Putin is following his own victory plan. With his forces suffering their highest casualty rates of the war in September, he recently ordered the conscription of 133,000 new servicemembers in the autumn draft starting Oct. 1 and announced a 25 percent increase in defense spending, which will account for a staggering total of 32 percent of the Russia’s 2025 federal budget.

Why This Year’s Nobel in Economics Is So Controversial

Howard W. French

When the Nobel economics prize is awarded most years, I imagine the news-following public to simply nod in silent acknowledgment over their morning coffee as they listen to the radio or read the headlines. Economists speak in their own language, they figure, and the substance of their work is just too narrow or arcane to justify questioning the judgment of the Swedish Academy.

This year’s prize-winning work is different. The research of the three scholars who share the award—Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson—readily lends itself to boiling down. Indeed, the title of Acemoglu and Robinson’s 2012 book, which partly earned them the award, is Why Nations Fail. (Johnson did not cowrite the book, but the three are frequent collaborators.)

The Rise of Russia’s Shadow Fleet

For decades, Russian exports centered on raw materials, primarily oil and gas, with the European Union as the key buyer. Oil revenues directly funded Moscow’s budget, making the halting of exports a potential pressure point on the Kremlin. The West attempted to exploit this after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by imposing a price cap (above which Western insurers were banned from providing their services) and an embargo on Russian oil, all aimed at cutting off funds for Russia’s military.

However, ongoing demand for Russian oil and Moscow’s ability to maintain supply pushed part of the business into the shadows. Europe’s reliance on Russian energy, particularly gas, meant an immediate halt to the relationship was unfeasible, and Russia wasn’t willing to sacrifice revenue or market share. This led to the rise of a “shadow fleet” to keep oil flowing. By early 2024, Russia had acquired more than 600 old tankers to continue these operations. Market dynamics in the region have been slow to change, but the shadow fleet remains vulnerable to further sanctions, especially by the U.S.

The Nuclear Brain Trust Presidents Shouldn’t Make the Biggest Decision by Themselves

Anthony Lake and Steven Andreasen

In the decades since their invention, nuclear weapons have become much more lethal. Blasts once measured in kilotons are now measured in megatons, and warheads once dropped by slow-flying bombers are now delivered by fast-flying and deadly accurate ballistic missiles. Over the same period, the number of nuclear-armed states has grown from one to nine. Roughly half of today’s global nuclear inventory lies in the hands of Russia, China, and North Korea, all of which represent threats to the United States. Nuclear risks have multiplied, and the scenarios for the use of such weapons have grown ever more complex.

Yet today, as in past decades, U.S. presidents have the sole authority to make the most consequential decision the country may ever face. Not only might any president be overwhelmed by the gravity of a nuclear threat (or the appearance of one); even when facing no imminent threat, a president of unreliable temperament might choose to unilaterally launch a nuclear attack with huge and deadly consequences. Without consulting any other official, presidents can order a nuclear strike against another country, even if that country has not threatened or attacked the United States. In reality, the only checks on this singular power of the president are the military officers charged with transmitting and executing the president’s order. They could decide to disobey the command on the grounds that it violates U.S. or international law. But it is hard to imagine an officer doing so. In a moment of acute crisis, the fate of the world could rest solely on the shoulders of the president. Expecting one fallible human being to bear the burden of such power and responsibility is dangerous and unnecessary.

Open-Access AI: Lessons From Open-Source Software

Parth Nobel, Alan Z. Rozenshtein & Chinmayi Sharma

In light of the explosive growth of generative AI, which the general public has adopted at a faster rate than personal computers or the Internet, it is natural to worry about who controls this technology. Most of the major industry players—including leading AI labs such as OpenAI (makers of ChatGPT), Anthropic (Claude), and Google (Gemini)—rely on closed models whose details are kept private and whose operation is entirely dependent on the whims of these (increasingly profit-hungry) private companies.

A notable exception to this trend of closed AI models is Meta, whose advanced foundation model, Llama, has publicly available parameters. Meta has gone all-in on what it calls “open-source AI”—what we, for reasons explained below, call “open-access AI”—going so far as to argue that such models are not only as good as but are indeed superior to closed models. Indeed, while open-access models have traditionally lagged behind their closed counterparts in performance, Meta, along with other makers of open-access foundational models such as IBM and AI chip giant Nvidia, has largely closed the gap. Although competition between closed and open-access models will no doubt continue, it is plausible that, going forward, there will not be a meaningful capability gap between open and closed models.

Meta’s argument in favor of openness in AI models relies heavily on analogy to open-source software. In a statement accompanying one of the Llama releases, Meta founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg made a direct analogy to what is arguably open-source software’s greatest triumph: the development of the Linux operating system that runs a majority of the world’s computers, including most phones (Android being a fork of Linux) and web servers. He is not alone.

The strategic and moral shock of war in the modern age

Michael Pezzullo

In his first autobiography, My Early Life: A Roving Commission, Winston Churchill set down a timeless formula for thinking about war odds: however sure one might be of victory, there would not be a war ‘if the other man did not think that he also has a chance’.

Churchill’s lesson for us is that war is an intrinsic and unrelished feature of the human condition. Therefore, we are faced with the grim burden of calculating the chance of war realistically, no matter how much we might naturally yearn for peace. Preparations for war have to be made as those calculations dictate, recognising that we still always have to deal with what Churchill called the ‘unforeseeable and uncontrollable events’ of war.

Churchill did not believe that war should be avoided ‘at all costs’. Likewise, Carl von Clausewitz did not counsel the reflexive avoidance of war. In the continuation of policy by other means that he described in On War, wars are fought in the pursuit of objectives that cannot otherwise be attained. He cautioned us to look beyond the emotional dimension of war, but rather to treat it as an instrument of policy—a risky, chance-determined one.

Soldiers in Army basic training now knocking down drones

Todd South

Brand-new recruits are now training how to counter enemy drones as they learn how to march and fire their rifles.

New soldiers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, are conducting counter-drone drills during “The Forge,” the capstone field exercise in basic training, according to an Army release.

The post houses the service’s Fires Center of Excellence, Air Defense Artillery School and the Joint Counter small-Unmanned Aerial Systems University.

The move mirrors wide-ranging efforts in all the military services to beat back the aerial threat by adding counter-drone training, manning and equipment to troops’ arsenal.

The Forge, which has been part of Army basic training for several years, puts new soldiers through a three-day field training exercise that concludes with a 10-mile ruck march.

“What’s different this year is the inclusion of live [drone] assets, something these trainees will encounter in future conflicts,” said Capt. Malachi Leece, commander of Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 40th Field Artillery. “It improves their reaction time, and that could save lives in a real combat scenario.”

30 October 2024

From Chits to Chatbots: Cheating in India’s Education System

Naresh Singh

In June 2024, a video clip of mass cheating during MA and MBA exams conducted by the Indira Gandhi National Open University in Bihar raised serious questions about the state’s education system. It was the latest in a string of such incidents in Bihar.

In February 2023, a video clip surfaced in Bihar’s Samastipur district, which showed family members of Class X students passing chits to their wards through window grills and telling or showing them answers to questions at an examination center.

Five years before this video went viral, young men, again in Bihar, were photographed climbing up buildings and passing handwritten chits to students so they could cheat during an exam.

Regrettably, such instances of traditional forms of cheating regularly occur in states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. A combination of factors — lack of political will to stop adoption of unfair means, poor in-school learning and a lack of sufficiently qualified teachers — push desperate students to cheat in exams, particularly in these two states.

But now a new form of cheating appears to be gaining ground across India’s education system, especially in higher education. Students and researchers are turning to artificial intelligence-driven technology to help them cheat, which makes detection of their wrongdoing difficult if not impossible.

Why Modi’s shifting India away from US toward China

Bhim Bhurtel

India and China have recently agreed to disengage from their prolonged border standoff in the western sector of the India-China Himalayan border on the sidelines of 16th BRICS summit. Tensions have simmered since June 15, 2020, after 20 Indian and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers were killed in a high-mountain clash.

China’s main grievance with India emerged after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power and began strengthening ties with the United States. India started signing agreements that effectively designated it as a US partner and ally in South Asia.

China perceived this as part of Washington’s broader “China containment policy,” which was central to former President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy during his second term. In response, China sought to pressure India, aiming to keep it from becoming too closely aligned with the US.

On August 29, 2016, India signed an adapted version of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US. In response, China ramped up pressure on India, particularly at the Doklam tri-junction, where the borders of Bhutan, China and India converge.

In an effort to ease tensions, India’s then-foreign secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, visited Beijing and assured his Chinese counterparts that India was committed to resolving differences through a high-level mechanism.

The U.S.–India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) from 2022 to 2025: Assessment, Learnings, and the Way Forward

Rudra Chaudhuri & Konark Bhandari

Introduction

“The mood was great,” is how a senior official described interactions in June 2024 between U.S. and Indian counterparts during the second round of review meetings of the U.S.–India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET).1 The U.S. National Security Advisor (NSA) Jake Sullivan traveled to New Delhi with a notable delegation of officials.

The strategic directive from the White House was clear: India, as a U.S. official put it to us, “is a critical part of the growing complexities in a substantively different geopolitical world.”2 There is an unmistakable imperative on the part of the White House to further deepen strategic ties with India, as also underlined to us by U.S. officials over the last two years. As far as officials are concerned, this is a “good bet.”3 This line of thinking is not new—it can be traced back to the early part of this century when both India and the United States decided to reshape strategic relations.

Yet, two decades ago, India did not have the wide range of strategic capabilities it does now—in space, defense, opportunities in manufacturing critical technologies, assembling and testing emerging technologies, some aspects of artificial intelligence (AI), low-cost and scalable solutions in biotechnologies, and a lot else. These varied competencies, if they can be called that, provide a new basis to further forge ties between these two outsized democracies.

New Gwadar International Airport: An Asset for Pakistan or Another Economic Burden for China?

Mariyam Suleman Anees

On the sidelines of the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Islamabad, Pakistan and China signed 13 agreements, covering a range of sectors including security, livelihood, education, agriculture, human resources development, and science and technology. However, the highlight of the meeting was the virtual inauguration by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang of the New Gwadar International Airport.

Built at a cost of $230 million, the airport is one of the projects under the $50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It extends over an area of 17 square kilometers and is touted to be Pakistan’s second largest airport, designed to accommodate some of the world’s largest aircraft, including the ATR 72, Airbus A-300), Boeing 737, and Boeing 747. The airport is expected to create around 3,000 jobs.

However, the airport’s location in the sparsely populated province of Balochistan, particularly in Gwadar district, which has a population of just over 100,000, raises several questions regarding the airport’s ability to attract passengers and cargo traffic. Without sufficient demand, the airport risks becoming another underutilized airport similar to the Chinese-funded Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport in Sri Lanka. Given these concerns, it is essential to first assess how this project fits into the broader CPEC.

‘Culture Of Mobocracy’ Through Post-Hasina Student Protests Engulfs Bangladesh’s Interim Govt – Analysis

Kamran Reza Chowdhury

The students who drove Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from office through protests are wielding power through on-going street demonstrations to pressure the interim government and courts to give in to their demands to clean house, observers say.

Student leaders who spearheaded massive protests in July and August, which brought about Hasina’s ouster, are serving in the interim government. But in the streets, students have been carrying on with protests, with the transitional administration headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus giving in to them on multiple occasions, potentially derailing its own authority and reform efforts, one analyst warned.

“It seems this interim government is performing according to the desire of the students. The students are the main force of this government. Questions remain whether it can use its authority without the influence of the students,” Nizam Uddin Ahmed, a political analyst and retired professor of public administration, told BenarNews.

“The government should change course and execute policies independently because leading a movement and leading a government are not the same,” he said.

The Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia Alliance: A Strategic Counterbalance to Ethiopia

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh

On October 10, 2024, the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia solidified their regional alliance, with a focus on countering Ethiopia’s influence in the Horn of Africa. The trilateral summit marked a significant development in the geopolitics of Eastern Africa, particularly in light of Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive actions in the region, such as its recent naval port deal with Somaliland in January 2024. The establishment of what appears to be an anti-Ethiopian alliance will have critical implications for the region’s security landscape, where the three nations are seeking to leverage their combined diplomatic and military efforts to curb Ethiopia’s ambitions.

These ambitions center around an interest in increasing its naval capabilities and, critically, Ethiopia gaining direct access to the Red Sea – a prospect that has long been a source of concern for Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea, all of which have tended to view Ethiopia’s economic and military developments through a national security lens influenced by their own circumstance.

For Egypt, the overriding bilateral concern is a water conflict centered on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a mega-project that has an almost existential significance for Cairo in that it risks disrupting the Nile River’s flow and negatively impacting Egyptian agriculture and freshwater resources.

Israel Shouldn’t Suffer from the UN’s Failure in Lebanon

Enia Krivine & L Ben Cohen

Israel revealed earlier this month that its troops had uncovered Hezbollah preparations for an October 7-style invasion and massacre in Israel’s northern communities. The Iran-backed terror organization has spent years building the infrastructure necessary to carry out such an attack under the nose of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon.

Having failed to prevent Hezbollah from establishing military capabilities on Israel’s border, the 10,000-strong force is now complaining that it’s caught in the crossfire as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attempt to defang the terror organization.

In recent weeks, the IDF has stepped up its operations in Lebanon with the primary goal of safely returning the over 60,000 Israelis displaced from their homes in northern Israel by Hezbollah’s missile barrages. During its operations in southern Lebanon, the IDF has discovered a network of terror tunnels, Hezbollah weapons caches, and evidence of Hezbollah’s plans to invade the Jewish state.

China’s Agents of Chaos The Military Logic of Beijing’s Growing Partnership

Oriana Skylar Mastro

At a joint press conference in June 2024, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg fretted over the strengthening ties between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. They are hardly the only politicians to have done so. The informal pact between these four autocracies has become a major focus in Washington, described by both Democratic and Republican officials as a new “axis of evil.” These countries, analysts point out, coordinate military and diplomatic activity. They have similar rhetoric and common interests. And they seem to share one aim above all: weakening the United States.

Each of these countries, by itself, has formidable capabilities. But China is the bloc’s central player. It has the biggest population and economy, and it doles out the most aid. Beijing is North Korea’s primary trade ally and benefactor. It has helped Iran contend with international sanctions, signing a “comprehensive strategic partnership” agreement with Tehran in 2021. And China has provided Russia with over $9 billion in dual-use items—goods with both commercial and military applications—since the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. This support has kept Russia’s economy from collapsing, despite Western sanctions aimed at crippling the country’s war effort. (Chinese goods now make up 38 percent of all imports into Russia.)

How to End the Democratic Recession

Larry Diamond

On August 5, following weeks of mass student protests, a dictator fell in the world’s eighth most populous country. Amid wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the escalating danger of a wider conflict in the Middle East, and the twists and turns of the U.S. presidential race, the sudden resignation and flight into exile of Bangladesh’s prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, drew slight global attention. But the significance of her ouster could prove substantial.

The Populist Phantom

Larry M. Bartels

Many countries have been roiled in recent years by what is often called a “populist wave.” In the Anglophone world, this new era began in 2016 with the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Media and political elites shocked by these events tied themselves in knots trying to figure out what had happened and why. According to the most popular strand of this thinking, the Brexit vote and Trump’s victory were the reverberations of a profound economic and social transformation. Globalization and technological change had shattered the livelihoods of working-class people and eviscerated their communities, provoking a groundswell of anger and resentment, a populist rejection of the status quo and the political establishment. Since then, observers have been quick to find further evidence of the surging force of populism in an ever-lengthening list of countries, including Brazil, Hungary, India, Italy, and Sweden. An electoral surge for a supposedly populist party anywhere in the world renews the drumbeat of alarm that populism is submerging established party systems and, ominously, democracy itself.

And yet for all the alarm that populism has generated, its nature and political significance are widely misunderstood. The metaphor of a “populist wave” reflects this error. It exaggerates the electoral success of populism around the world, which has been rather more modest than it sometimes appears. It also exaggerates the coherence of populism as a political tendency, overlooking the extent to which ostensibly populist entrepreneurs in different times and places have appealed to distinct grievances. Even more important, the metaphor overstates the implications of populist parties’ electoral successes for policymaking and for democratic stability.

Whose Ronald Reagan?

Susan B. Glasser

When the party of Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and two George Bushes met in Milwaukee this summer to renominate former President Donald Trump, it was the first time Republicans had chosen the same candidate in three elections since Richard Nixon and the first time since the GOP’s founding in the nineteenth century that it had ever done so in three consecutive races. A large percentage of Republicans—around half of them, according to surveys conducted during Trump’s presidency—now consider themselves more supporters of him personally than of the party generally. They have followed Trump to places once unthinkable in American politics, from going along with his assault on the legitimacy of the 2020 election to the abandonment of what were until recently core GOP principles, such as support for free trade. The current Republican Party is in essence the Trump Party, a takeover made all the more remarkable considering Trump’s past as a party-switching political chameleon, with little discernible ideology beyond a relentless focus on self-promotion, and a lifelong suspicion that the United States has been a perpetual mark on the world stage, getting ripped off by grasping allies and adversaries alike.

Trump’s current political dominance of his party, however, coexists with a somewhat more complicated reality. When the Pew Research Center asked Americans last year to name the best presidents of recent decades, Republicans and Republican-leaning independents were almost evenly divided, between the 37 percent who favored Trump and the 41 percent who continued to believe that the honor should remain with Ronald Reagan, whose conservative revolution at the end of the Cold War reshaped Washington and his own party for a generation. The Trump takeover, it turns out, is not entirely complete.

US Navy Carriers Now Have “Unmanned Air Warfare Centers” to Launch Drones & CCAs

Kris Osborn

The US Navy plans to fly “Combat Collaborative Aircraft” drones from its aircraft carriers in coming years, a possibility now within sight given the Navy’s successful operation of a first-of-its-kind carrier-integrated Unmanned Air Warfare Center.

The first operational Unmanned Air Warfare Center built into an aircraft carrier is, in the near term, intended to launch and operate the emerging MQ-25 Stingray refeuler drone, yet the service is also looking toward future missions for the UAWC.

‘These systems will initially support the MQ-25 but also future unmanned systems such as Collaborative Combat Aircraft that comprise the Air Wing of the Future,” Unmanned Carrier Aviation (PMA-268) Program Manager Capt. Daniel Fucito,” said in an interesting essay from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).

The arrival of the MQ-25 Stingray is both anticipated and significant, given the way it can massively extend the combat reach of carrier-launched fighter jets; yet beyond this, the prospect of launching Combat Collaborative Aircraft from carriers is forward-thinking and arguably more significant because it means carrier-launched drones can perform a much wider range of missions beyond refueling to include forward surveillance, aerial “node” relay sensing, ammunition and supply delivery across domains in high-threat environments and even strike missions when directed by a human in a manned jet or ship-based command and control center.

West needs to realize Ukraine cannot defeat Russia

Frank Ledwidge

A friend of mine, usually an intensely optimistic pro-Ukraine analyst, returned from Ukraine last week and told me: “It’s like the German Army in January 1945.”

The Ukrainians are being driven back on all fronts – including in the Kursk province of Russia, which they had opened with much hope and fanfare in August. More importantly, they are running out of soldiers.

For most of 2024, Ukraine has been losing ground. This week, the town of Selidove in the western Donetsk region is being surrounded and, like Vuhledar earlier this month, is likely to fall in the next week or so – the only variable being how many Ukrainians will be lost in the process. Over the winter, the terrible prospect of a major battle to hold the strategically significant industrial town of Pokrovsk beckons.

Ultimately, this is not a war of territory but of attrition. The only resource that counts is soldiers – and here the calculus for Ukraine is not positive.

Ukraine claims to have “liquidated” nearly 700,000 Russian soldiers – with more than 120,000 killed and upwards of 500,000 injured. Its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, admitted in February this year to 31,000 Ukrainian fatalities, with no figure given for injured.