George Friedman
The ground war in Ukraine appears to have come to a halt. There is, of course, continued movement at the tactical level, but a definitive outcome is not in the offing. The gridlock has made the air war all the more important.
In some ways, it is a logical evolution. The war began as a ground war, with Russia engaging but failing to break Ukrainian forces. Kyiv responded with ground operations designed to disrupt Russian movements, essentially throwing them off balance. There was little doubt in the minds of many that Russia had the manpower and the capability to take key cities, and that over time it would win the war. But in war, little doubt is a dubious foundation. For over a year, Ukrainian troops resisted the Russian advance. Yet in spite of all this – not to mention the political crisis and attempted coup in Moscow, the mounting casualties, and a declining enthusiasm in Russia for the war – it was still assumed that Russia would ultimately win the conflict.
Many wars have bogged down to a bloody grind. All too often, the country that won was the one that had more blood to spare. In World War II, the ground war was indeed bloody, but it was met by the relatively new concept of mechanized air power. Air power had three strategic goals: to add firepower to offensive operations; to directly attack vital military installations without ground forces; and to undermine the morale of civilian populations through the loss of non-combatants and infrastructure. Except for the one time when it was decisive in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, air power, disruptive and devastating as it can be, has never really decided the outcome of a war.
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