Jacob Mezey
Introduction
The purpose and composition of the United States’ homeland and regional missile defenses has long been the subject of a divisive public debate. In 1973, just a year after the landmark Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed, noted strategic forces scholars Bernard and Fawn Brodie wrote that the “whole ABM question touched off so intense and emotional a debate in this country as to be virtually without precedent on any issue of weaponry.1 This debate continued through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the passage of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act, the George W. Bush administration’s subsequent withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and has now received renewed attention in the recently released report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.2
The primary point of contention in this debate—besides the cost and effectiveness of missile defense programs—has been the reaction of the United States’ main nuclear-armed strategic rivals, Russia and China. Critics have argued that US defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could generate an arms-race dynamic either by forcing adversaries to increase their nuclear arsenals or by engendering fears of a US preemptive first strike, which could indirectly create crises.3 Similar statements have been expressed by Russian and Chinese officials, who have leveraged complaints that US ballistic missile defenses undermine the efficacy of their states’ nuclear deterrents and therefore their security.4
No comments:
Post a Comment