Stephen Blank
On September 15, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov announced that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian would attend the BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit in Kazan, Tatarstan, on October 22–24. Additionally, Pezeshkian plans to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss strengthening political, economic, and military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran (TASS, September 15). The strategic partnership between Iran and Russia has solidified since the beginning of Moscow’s war against Ukraine and has significantly progressed as tensions in the Middle East are rising, largely due to the war in Gaza. The partnership itself, however, comes at a high price for Russia. The Kremlin’s previous Middle Eastern strategy aimed to position Russia as a valuable interlocutor with every regional government while not taking sides in their myriad conflicts. Today, that tactic is no longer feasible. Moscow’s need for an uninterrupted flow of Iranian drones and missiles, plus the reorientation of Russian trade to the south and east to combat Western sanctions, appear to be the driving actors of this transformation (see EDM, March 6, July 29, September 5, 17).
Russian-Iranian cooperation in the Middle East has been steadily growing. In Syria, reports show that Iran is increasingly using Russian facilities to build a naval base, including the use of the Russian air base in Khmeimim as a terminus for deliveries there. Tehran’s use of Russian facilities is meant to contribute to the Iranian domination of Syria with Moscow’s help (MEMRI, August 12). Similarly, in Iraq, the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram project is holding meetings with Iranian officials, supporting their efforts to gain greater control over Iran’s media and information space (T.me/rybar, August 28). Likewise, Russian state-owned news agency TASS is opening an office in Tehran, displaying the two sides’ increasing media cooperation (TASS, August 28).
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