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8 September 2024

No One Should Think the War Will Be Short

Commander Justin Cobb

It is prudent to consider how a conflict over Taiwan might unfold. Within military circles, there is growing fatalism and an almost dogmatic certainty that China will strike first and target both U.S. and Taiwanese forces simultaneously in a Pearl Harbor–style surprise attack, but is that the most likely or most dangerous possibility?1

Chinese revisionism and designs for Taiwan could spur conflict that ranges from economic and political gray zone contests at one end to a massive preemptive conventional assault on the other.2

Across the range of possibilities, if conventional war breaks out between the United States and China, any notion of a short war with defined off-ramps fought solely over Taiwan’s independence seems naïve.3 The Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy on reunification and stated it would “pay any price,” which points to the unlikely availability of off-ramps.4 Several recent articles have pointedly noted that a fixation among the United States and its allies and partners on a “short, sharp war” could have disastrous consequences.5 A reflexive desire to immediately surge forces into combat and win a rapid victory also is misaligned with current capabilities, risk tolerances, and escalation management principles.6 Worse still, short-war thinking encourages misaligned force design decisions prior to conflict and risk management decisions during it. Stunning an enemy and killing him are two different things, and both the United States and China must consider what comes next after a first, violent clash.7 Ample research suggests surprise attacks and/or large-scale aggression are highly likely to invoke the human psychology for revenge, leaving rational cost-based analysis by the wayside as the desire to strike back at all costs takes the forefront.

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