John P. Connor
It is extremely difficult, though not entirely impossible, for counterinsurgency (COIN) to achieve political success within the contemporary Western model. It is more possible, though still difficult, for alternative approaches to succeed politically – specifically through combining an enemy-centric strategy with the effective use of local allies. However, even the most sophisticated counterinsurgent will not necessarily be able to overcome barriers such as those posed by difficult terrain and cross-border support.
What does it mean for counterinsurgency to be “politically possible”? War, as Clausewitz observed, is the continuation of politics by other means.[i] In COIN, the goal is not merely to militarily defeat the insurgent, but to prevent the emergence of another insurgency – as demonstrated by modern COIN’s roots in the 19th century concept of “pacification” (discussed by theorists from the French Marshalls Bugot and Lyotet to British writers such as C.E. Callwell). For COIN to be politically possible, it must achieve a permanent political resolution to the conflict.
However, Western and Non-Western conceptions of COIN differ considerably in their approaches to both the military and political aspects of COIN. While Western COIN typically adopts a minimalist use of force while prioritizing a political solution through “hearts and minds”, non-Western COIN often uses a force-maximalist approach, believing that physical security must first be achieved for a political solution to occur.
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