Emile Hokayem
Over the past few days, the conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hizbullah has grown considerably in scale and intensity. While Israel is still debating the merits of a ground campaign, its decision to step up its air attacks against the Lebanese militant organisation has opened a new phase in what can now be called a war.
Hizbullah joined the fight against Israel out of solidarity with Hamas after the latter’s large-scale 7 October 2023 attacks against Israel. Hizbullah remained unwilling to risk an all-out war, however, calibrating its military response – by primarily firing rockets at Israeli military facilities in limited quantity – to an explicit goal of forcing a ceasefire in Gaza before agreeing to one in Lebanon. This, Hizbullah hoped, would allow it to claim a victory and to present itself as the chief defender of the Palestinians.
Things have not gone Hizbullah’s way. Driven by the fear of a repeat of the 7 October attacks on its northern border and intent on returning Israeli civilians driven out of their homes, Israel has outmatched Hizbullah’s firepower even as it first focused its efforts on Gaza. It has gradually intensified an attritional air campaign to degrade Hizbullah’s rocket and missile arsenal and debilitate its command-and-control. Instead of the controlled and regulated escalation Hizbullah leaders counted on, Israel has made full use of its intelligence and air dominance. Between October and August, Israel mounted four times as many attacks on Lebanon as Hizbullah did on Israel.
No comments:
Post a Comment