R.D. Hooker, Jr.
After 75 years, it is time. The U.S. Army needs its own airplanes for sound reasons that deserve careful consideration. This bold assertion should draw a strong reaction from Airmen, but the simple truth is that close air support (CAS) for the Army runs counter to everything an independent, strategic air force stands for. In war after war, bitter inter-Service rivalry recurs over the use of airpower. In the end, the Army needs fixed-wing combat aircraft for the same reasons that the Navy and Marine Corps do. Moreover, the Army cannot get reliable CAS from the Air Force, and its unique needs are Service-specific.
Make no mistake. Airpower is the crown jewel of the U.S. military; it can move faster, strike harder, and generate greater effects than all other forms of military power. In theory, we operate as a joint force, synergistically applying military capabilities in all domains to achieve effects greater than the sum of the parts. In practice, we are far from this ideal.
This claim is most apparent in airpower doctrine. Close air support has occupied the lowest priority for the Air Force since its inception in 1947; almost the first act of the newly independent Air Force was to disestablish the Tactical Air Command.2 From the beginning, Air Force leadership argued that “centralized planning and decentralized execution” represented the best way to apply airpower.3 While “strategic” missions maximize the employment of Air Force assets under Air Force commanders, CAS requires close coordination and integration with ground commanders, violating the tenets deemed essential for the optimum employment of airpower.4 Conflict over the use of airpower in what the Army calls the “close” fight (that is, in close proximity to ground troops) is a recurring feature in all wars.5 The synergistic use of both air and ground forces in this medium can produce striking effects, as the enemy is forced to fight in multiple domains simultaneously.
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