Indian Strategic Studies: September 2024

21 September 2024

Next steps for UK–India defence and technology cooperation

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury & Simran Brookes

For over a decade, the British and Indian governments have been talking about ‘realising the potential’ of their relationship. Now appears the opportune time to do so. The UK’s new Labour government led by Sir Keir Starmer seeks to enhance its ties with India, having included establishing a new strategic partnership with New Delhi as a manifesto commitment. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, at the start of his third five-year term, also remains committed to elevating bilateral ties. But doing so, especially in both the defence and technology spheres, will require partnership with industry, research and innovation centres and academia.

Growing political and military tiesEven before the UK election, there have been positive developments in the bilateral relationship in 2024. India’s defence minister and external intelligence chief visited the UK after a gap of 22 and six years, respectively. Both foreign ministers and national security advisors have also been meeting regularly. Within three weeks of his appointment as foreign secretary, David Lammy visited New Delhi on 24 July during his first trip to the Indo-Pacific. While it is not yet clear if Starmer’s government will continue the UK’s ‘tilt’ towards the Indo-Pacific, his administration does seek to maintain its commitment to the region, in which the UK has significant economic interests.

Inside the Afghanistan Evacuation in 2021: An Ambassador’s Perspective

Robert Riley

In over four decades of serving as an ambassador, Foreign Service Officer, and staffer in public and private international service organizations, I have lived through countless diplomatic challenges and crises. But nothing could have prepared me for the gravity of what unfolded during the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. The rapid collapse of the Afghan government and security forces left behind chaos and uncertainty, creating an urgent mission to save our Afghan allies and American citizens stranded in the country. While many have focused on the politics and optics of the withdrawal, my colleagues and I worked tirelessly in the trenches, combining every resource we had at our disposal to ensure their safe passage.

Setting the Scene: A Historic Withdrawl from Afghanistan

This is a story of unsung heroes, public and private entities, volunteers, and ordinary citizens who stepped up. Using office software, satellite maps, messaging apps, and even secret codes to hide our intentions from the Taliban, we worked collectively to guide thousands of people to safety. What we accomplished was nothing short of a miracle, but it was not without immense challenges—many of which were shaped by decisions made long before the final withdrawal.

Philippines says disputed reef 'not lost' to China despite pullout

The Philippines insisted on Monday (Sep 16) that it had not given up a South China Sea reef, two days after it pulled out a ship stationed there following a months-long standoff with rival claimant China.

Manila had deployed the coast guard flagship BRP Teresa Magbanua to Sabina Shoal in April to stop Beijing from building an artificial island there, as it has atop several other disputed spots in the strategic waterway.

But the ship was abruptly called back to the western Philippine island of Palawan, with Manila citing damage from an earlier clash with Chinese ships, ailing crew members, dwindling food and bad weather.

"We have not lost anything. We did not abandon anything. Escoda Shoal is still part of our exclusive economic zone," Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Commodore Jay Tarriela told a news conference Monday, using the Filipino name for Sabina Shoal.

Beijing claims most of the South China Sea, including Sabina Shoal, despite an international tribunal ruling that its assertions have no merit.

Where Capitalism Is Working

Ruchir Sharma

Widespread disaffection with the current capitalist systems has led many countries, rich and poor, to look for new economic models. Defenders of the status quo continue to hold up the United States as a shining star, its economy outpacing Europe and Japan, its financial markets as dominant as ever. Yet its citizens are as pessimistic as any in the West. Barely more than a third of Americans believe that they will ever be richer than their parents. The share that trusts the government keeps trending downward, even as the state builds an ever more generous safety net. Seventy percent of Americans now say that the system “needs major changes or to be torn down entirely,” and the younger generations are the most frustrated. More Americans under 30 have a more positive view of socialism than of capitalism.

In countries with emerging economies, it has been a shock to see “the land of the free” abandon its traditional skepticism of centralized power and planning and instead promote big government solutions. Many of these countries, from India to Poland, have not forgotten their own failed trysts with socialism. They were surprised when U.S. President Donald Trump led a revolt against free trade and open borders, and when his successor, Joe Biden, began promoting what National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan called an “economic mentality that champions building.”

And they can no longer look for inspiration to China. The “economic miracle” that began after the Communist Party started ceding power to the private sector in the late 1970s is faltering under leader Xi Jinping. China has returned to its old command-and-control ways, punishing businesses who grow too powerful in the eyes of the ruling party. Weighed down by heavy debts, an aging population, and an overreaching state, China’s economy has fallen off the miracle path.

Explaining China’s Diffusion Deficit – Analysis

Jeffrey Ding

Why Diffusion Capacity?

Why is it so important to distinguish between a state’s capacity to bring forth new-to-the-world inventions and its capacity to adopt innovations at scale? When there is a substantial gap between these two variables, assessments based solely on innovation capacity indicators will prove misleading because they undervalue the process by which new advances are embedded into productive processes. Specifically, a “diffusion deficit” characterizes situations when a state has a strong innovation capacity but weak diffusion capacity, which suggests that it is less likely to sustain its rise than innovation-centric assessments depict.

In many cases, there is not much daylight between a state’s diffusion capacity and its innovation capacity. These two parameters can be highly correlated. After all, the state that first pioneered a new method has a first-mover advantage in the widespread adoption of that technique. In addition, absorbing innovations from international sources is difficult without the tacit knowledge embedded in the original context of technological development. Diffusion and innovation are entangled, overlapping processes.

Russian and Chinese strategic missile defense: Doctrine, capabilities, and development

Jacob Mezey

Introduction

The purpose and composition of the United States’ homeland and regional missile defenses has long been the subject of a divisive public debate. In 1973, just a year after the landmark Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed, noted strategic forces scholars Bernard and Fawn Brodie wrote that the “whole ABM question touched off so intense and emotional a debate in this country as to be virtually without precedent on any issue of weaponry.1 This debate continued through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the passage of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act, the George W. Bush administration’s subsequent withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and has now received renewed attention in the recently released report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.2

The primary point of contention in this debate—besides the cost and effectiveness of missile defense programs—has been the reaction of the United States’ main nuclear-armed strategic rivals, Russia and China. Critics have argued that US defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could generate an arms-race dynamic either by forcing adversaries to increase their nuclear arsenals or by engendering fears of a US preemptive first strike, which could indirectly create crises.3 Similar statements have been expressed by Russian and Chinese officials, who have leveraged complaints that US ballistic missile defenses undermine the efficacy of their states’ nuclear deterrents and therefore their security.4

China is Learning About Western Decision Making from the Ukraine War

Mick Ryan

Wars are full of uncertainty.

Whether it is the uncertainty of what the enemy is doing on the other side of a hill, through to uncertainty about the motivations of political leaders in their decision-making, the ‘fog and friction of war’ is every bit of relevant in considering war in the 21st century as when Carl von Clausewitz wrote about this concept in the early 1800s.

However, sometimes there are things in war that we can be certain about. I would propose that one certainty of the Russo-Ukraine war is that China is watching it closely. In particular, it is learning to improve its strategic decision models (within the bounds of the CCP system) by watching U.S. and NATO decision-making and responses to the Ukraine war. Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and around Taiwan is also prompting Western debates which inform China’s strategic calculus.

I have explored the topic of Chinese learning from the Ukraine War in several previous articles. My first examination of China’s potential observations from the war in Ukraine was published back in April 2022. This was designed as short, initial exploration of what China might learn from the conflict. A year later, in February 2023, I undertook another exploration of how China might be using the war in Ukraine to wargame its own future operations. Finally, in September last year I published a piece here that proposed multiple areas where the Chinese leadership might be learning from the war in Ukraine.

China’s continued experimentation for peaceful reunification

Erik Green

In September 2023 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced plans to make Fujian province ‘a demonstration zone for integrated development’ with Taiwan. Looking back at this announcement a year later, this policy seems to have marked the beginning of a new Taiwan strategy that seeks to achieve ‘peaceful reunification’ through bottom-up innovation and regional experimentation, while still preparing for reunification by force if necessary.

Under this new strategy, the CCP encourages officials to devise initiatives for deepening cross-strait integration. These are then tested in areas such as Fujian, with the aim of replicating successful initiatives across China and the Taiwan Strait. This has led numerous national and local actors to implement integration policies focusing on economic and legal cooperation, as well as the building of shared infrastructure. In the last six months, this strategy has expanded; state media have framed the China Coast Guard’s (CCG) incursions into Taiwan’s protected waters around Kinmen – a Taiwanese island group just ten kilometres from Fujian’s coast – as a local experiment in legal integration. Such developments highlight the increasing resources that China is dedicating to achieving ‘peaceful reunification’ through experimentation and innovation. The CCP will likely re-evaluate this strategy in 2025 – the date for achieving significant progress in Fujian, and the end of the 14th Five-Year Plan.

Breaking The Circuit: US-China Semiconductor Controls – Analysis

Catherine Tan

In October 2022, the Biden administration introduced export controls to limit China’s access to advanced US semiconductors and technologies, aiming to maintain US technological superiority and address security concerns. These controls, targeting areas such as advanced chips and supercomputer components, were tightened in 2023. While the controls have disrupted China’s semiconductor industry in the short term, concerns persist about their long-term effectiveness and potential Chinese retaliation, along with significant policy gaps that will be explored further in the following brief.

“Small Yard, High Fence”: The Biden Administration’s Strategy

In the early 2000s, bringing China into the global community was widely seen as a strategic decision. The Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations supported integrating China’s economy into the international rules-based system, believing economic interdependence would promote stability and mutual economic gain. However, this did not lead to China’s democratization as hoped. Instead, China has used this economic partnership to implement a “Military-Civil Fusion” plan, which uses civilian technology—much of it from US partners—to strengthen China’s military capabilities. Many have now come to see technological ties with China as a potential vulnerability. Concurrently, however, the United States has recognized its own capacity to exploit this interdependence to gain strategic advantages over China.

Exploding pagers could ignite full-scale Mideast war

Amin Saikal

The alleged Israeli attack on members of Hezbollah via their pagers is another ominous development propelling the Middle East towards a full-scale regional war. It leaves Hezbollah with little option but to retaliate with the full support of the Iran-led “axis of resistance.”

The sophistication and impact of targeting the pagers are unprecedented. The attack resulted in at least 11 deaths, including some of Hezbollah’s fighters, and up to 3,000 people wounded.

The main aim of the attack, which US officials have reportedly said was carried out by Israel, was intended to disrupt Hezbollah’s means of communication and its command and control system in Lebanon.

Since Hezbollah has reduced the use of mobile phones by its forces because Israel can easily detect and target them, pagers have increasingly become the preferred messaging device within the group.

The attack may have also been designed to cause panic within the group and among the Lebanese public, many of whom do not support Hezbollah, given the political divisions in the country.

An unleashed Israel is humiliating its enemies

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon

The audacious attack on the Iran-backed terror group Hezbollah is likely to have effectively halted their operations, at least temporarily, crippled their command and control networks, and injured many of their fighters.

Those of us who have fought Al Qaeda and Isis in Afghanistan and Iraq are all too familiar with the jihadists’ use of mobile phones and pagers to detonate bombs, which have claimed the lives of many British soldiers. It brings a measure of satisfaction to see the terrorists receive a taste of their own medicine.

This operation exemplifies what is known in military strategy as the “indirect approach”. Coined by British tank commander B. H. Liddell Hart after World War I, this strategy seeks to reduce high casualty rates in conflict zones characterised by dense forces, such as the Western Front. In this case, it targets a fleeting and elusive enemy that hides among civilians, making them difficult to strike without causing extensive collateral damage, as we have seen in Gaza. As the great General Bill Slim aptly put it, “Hit the other fellow as quickly as you can, as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain’t lookin’.” This principle appears to have guided what was likely a Mossad operation against Hezbollah.

The Case Against Israeli-Saudi Normalization

Frederic Wehrey and Jennifer Kavanagh

When President Joe Biden leaves office early next year, he will probably do so without having realized a signature item on his agenda for the Middle East—a diplomatic normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, sealed by a formal U.S. security guarantee to Riyadh. Yet this elusive agreement runs the risk of being picked up again by his successor, no matter who wins the election in November. While in office, former President Donald Trump was among Saudi Arabia’s biggest supporters, and he has already signaled his desire to expand the so-called Abraham Accords—a series of bilateral agreements between Israel and a handful of Arab countries, negotiated under his watch—to include Saudi Arabia. Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic candidate, could be compelled to revive the deal or some variation of it, both for the sake of continuity and because hammering out a grand bargain in this troubled region would be a foreign policy achievement for a relatively inexperienced politician.

But for Harris or Trump, continuing to elevate this regional accord would be a grave mistake. The proposed arrangement will not end the war in Gaza, solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, block China’s inroads to the Middle East, or counter Iran and its militant proxies. Instead, by committing Washington to defend a deeply repressive Arab state with a history of destabilizing behavior, the pact’s main achievement will be to further entangle the United States in a region that successive U.S. presidents have tried to pivot away from.

The single-minded pursuit of this bad deal has also blinded U.S. policymakers to other, more important drivers of conflict in the region, and it has caused the United States to delay efforts to ramp up pressure on Israel to end its war in Gaza. The next U.S. president should therefore jettison the proposed accord and focus Middle East policy instead on the economic and social issues most important to the region.

While media focuses on Project 2025, concerns grow over UN's 2030 Agenda, 'Transforming our world'

John Mac Ghlionn

While many American journalists and Democrats remain obsessed with Project 2025, the conservative blueprint for a Republican White House, world leaders including Democratic President Joe Biden are now increasingly focused on Project 2030, the United Nation program officially known as "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development."

Leading this movement, as initially reported by the writer Tim Hinchcliffe, is UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who has called for a sweeping overhaul of the United Nations Security Council and the global financial system.

The initiative, presented under the pretense of accelerating Agenda 2030’s Sustainable Development Goals, is being marketed as a noble effort to combat poverty, inequality, and climate change. Yet, beneath the rhetoric lies perhaps a more concerning agenda that could compromise national sovereignty and individual freedoms under the guise of global progress.

Europe does not define, defend or duplicate itself: on it goes to doom

Kevin Myers

The first page of Draghi report on the wretched future of Europe provides an unintentional insight into why the SS EUtanic is heading for the iceberg. It contains a photograph of two engineers. They are, quite naturally, both young women, one of possibly immigrant origin, and we know why: because any realistic portrayal of European engineers as what they mostly are, indigenous males, would be, well, both racist and sexist. Yet all attempts everywhere to make engineering (and those other STEM subjects – science, technology and mathematics) 50 per cent female have foundered, except for medicine. The why of this is complex, and need not detain us here, but the other why, namely that a report about Europe’s future should begin with a lie, should interest us. So too should Draghi’s few mentions of Europe’s catastrophic birth-rate: three mentions, I think, in all, at one stage colourfully called a “demographic headwind.”

“Headwind” is a natural force outside the control of the object facing it, whereas demographics are, to a degree, controllable. Financially rewarding motherhood is one incentive, but where the local culture ruthlessly denigrates and even mocks motherhood – as it does across most of the EU – the only takers of the financial incentives will of course be immigrants. Again, this is a complex problem, but probably the most daunting complexity results from a healthy fear of racism, and a perfectly understandable one as the 80th anniversaries of the liberation of Belsen, Dachau and Auschwitz draw near.

‘Us against the world’ isn’t true and it’s not a winning strategy

Yakov Nagen

“Together we will be victorious .” This slogan, which emerged in Israel in the wake of October 7, printed on signs all over the country, tacked on to the end of ordinary TV advertisements, and stated constantly by government officials, is less ubiquitous today as the war drags on and internal disagreements deepen. But we must still embrace this slogan. It encapsulates a profound truth: our success lies not only in military strength but in the unity of Israeli society. In the face of relentless enemies seeking our destruction, our most potent weapon is cohesion. Victory demands that we build bridges, not barricades, beyond our immediate circles, even beyond the Jewish people.

This war transcends Israel’s physical borders, extending into the global arena. That means that we absolutely cannot afford to isolate ourselves, to be “a people dwelling alone,” as the wicked prophet Balaam characterized the children of Israel in the Bible. Our path forward must include partnerships with other peoples. The ancient vision of the prophets, one of human fraternity including Jews and other nations, is more relevant than ever. In this era of heightened hatred and division, we are called to forge alliances, not withdraw into the dangerous assumption that the world is uniformly against us. Isolation only strengthens our enemies, who seek to broaden their own coalitions while we retreat.

Identifying our enemies, and also finding allies, is essential. Despite the global level of pervasive evil and rising hostility towards Israel, we must resist the dangerous narrative that “everyone is against us.” This, after all, is the story Hamas wishes to promote, a portrayal of themselves as leaders of a global religious war of Islam against Judaism.

Fighting Abroad from an Ally's Land

Jeffrey W. Hornung, Kristen Gunness, Bryan Rooney, Dan McCormick, Lydia Grek, Ryan A. Schwankhart, Gian Gentile & Marisa R. Lino

Discussions about U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific often assume that the United States will have the ability to not only quickly access its military capabilities stationed in the region, but also to freely operate from bases in allied countries. The authors of this report explore this assumption, examining the opportunities and constraints that the U.S. military might face when operating from the territories of Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Philippines. The authors examine the basing and access assumptions for the U.S. military should it wish to preposition supplies in, and operate from, these allies in peacetime and in a conflict over Taiwan when these allies themselves have not been attacked.

For this research, the authors conducted a comprehensive literature review of historical and current studies on access; held an internal RAND workshop with military experts to determine the types of capabilities and access requests the United States might make of Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines in a Taiwan contingency; conducted extensive discussions and interviews in the fall of 2022 with officials and experts in Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines and with U.S. government personnel and experts in the United States who work on issues related to these three allies; and examined important agreements the United States has with each treaty ally that are relevant for U.S. military access and basing.

Theater Army Strategy – U.S. Army Pacific

On behalf of General Charlie Flynn, Commander of United States Army Pacific, I want to provide you with a digital copy of the United States Army Pacific Theater Army strategy that was approved for public release this week. Please take time to review the attachment and the reader’s notes below – and incorporate into articles, analysis, discussion, research, teaching, and policy development.

I reference the classified version below, so if you can, please contact me on SIPR for the complete version.

Very important: The Commanding General who called for this strategy and shaped its development in every critical way has described his vision as building the foundation for peace, stability, and development across the incredibly important Indo-Pacific region. The higher direction is to avoid armed conflict; the military strategy is to be a useful and relevant instrument for national leaders every day, and ready for the future.

Russia Evaluates Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Combat Missions

Dr Charles Bartles

The accompanying excerpted article in a monthly journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Armeisky Sbornik, discusses the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the modern battlefield. Russia believes that current UAV usage is not just a feature of the current conflict, but also indicative of the changing character of war. Therefore, Russia is now considering how UAV usage will be employed for all types of combat actions (offense, defense, raid, meeting battle) and when on the march.[i] Although not explicitly stated, the article suggests that UAVs will no longer be concentrated in a single unit as they were before 2022.[ii] Russia’s understanding of the situation suggests that individual units will likely each have their own UAVs and counter-UAV technologies. In the Russian view, success on the modern battlefield requires that all types of units, not just electronic warfare and air defense personnel, need some degree of UAV and counter-UAV technologies to accomplish their respective missions.

NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg on the Future of Russia’s War in Ukraine

Ravi Agrawal

There’s little doubt that Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine transformed NATO. Sweden and Finland reversed decades of policy to join the military alliance, and member states ramped up their defense spending to support Kyiv and prepare for future conflicts with Moscow. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary-general, presided over these dramatic changes in the final years of his decadelong tenure. As he prepares to hand over the reins to Mark Rutte, a former Dutch prime minister, Stoltenberg sat down with me on FP Live to discuss Ukraine’s potential use of long-range missiles, and what NATO should do about the growing collusion between Russia and Iran, China, and North Korea.

A Cease-Fire in Gaza Wouldn’t End Israel’s War

Steven A. Cook

In late May, U.S. President Joe Biden laid out the details of what he called an Israeli proposal for a cease-fire in Gaza. In the course of his remarks, he made the case that “once a cease-fire and hostage deal is concluded, it unlocks the possibility of a great deal more progress, including—including calm along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon.” Two weeks later, Axios scoop machine Barak Ravid revealed that the “White House believes that a ceasefire in Gaza is the only thing that would significantly de-escalate the tensions on the Israeli-Lebanese border.”

New Gaza Health Numbers Show Israel Kills Two Babies Every Day

Sharif Abdel Kouddous

The Israeli military killed at least 710 Palestinian babies before they made it to their first birthday, the equivalent of two infants under one-year-old killed by Israel every day for nearly a year. That’s according to a 649-page document published by the Ministry of Health in Gaza on Sunday listing the names of tens of thousands Palestinians killed by Israel between October 7 and August 31.

Of the 40,738 the ministry has confirmed dead, it has biographical information—including identification number, gender, date of birth, and age—for 34,344. Because the ministry does not have complete biographical information for the remaining 6,394, it has not listed their names. The list starts with the youngest victims. For the first 13 and a half pages, the age is listed as 0—those under one year old.

North Korea – A new eye in the sky?

Joseph Dempsey

Conversion work on one of the three Ilyushin Il-76 Candid aircraft that Russia delivered in the early 1990s is being carried out at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport. Though operated by state-owned carrier Air Koryo, these aircraft are used in paratrooper drills – and the past application of temporary camouflage has indicated their availability for military dual role.

In late 2023, one of the three aircraft was moved to a separate maintenance area at the airport with a new fenced area around it. This additional layer of security and the subsequent appearance of a covered structure on top of the fuselage suggested a possible special-mission role for the airframe.

An obvious option is that the aircraft is being converted for the AEW role or is at least an AEW radar testbed. There appears, for instance, to be consistency in size and position of the rotating-radar-mounting points seen in other Il-76 AEW conversions, such as those by Russia (A-50U Mainstay and A-100), China (KJ-2000) and Iraq (Adnan-2).

The mounting points had, until very recently, only been under cover in available satellite imagery, with no official reporting of what seemed a secretive project, even by North Korean standards.

Fighting For Our Humanity, Fighting For Our Future – OpEd

Robert J. Burrowes

It is easy to peruse the state of human affairs and fail to perceive the catastrophic state in which we find ourselves.

After all, it is the responsibility of various Elite agents and agencies to ensure that the bulk of humanity remains unaware of the state of our world and that even those relatively few with some level of awareness in one or two domains are not aware in others. See ‘The Elite’s 5,000-Year War on Your Mind is Climaxing. Can We Defeat it? (Parts 1 & 2)’.

Beyond the problem of limited awareness, however, the Elite also has a substantial array of tools to ensure that the few who do become aware, whether of one problem or even something approaching the whole, remain powerless to respond effectively.

And so our future and even our very humanity are now threatened in ways that have eluded virtually everyone.

And the effective resistance to this multitude of threats is zero.

The Three Laws of Robotics and the Future

Ariel Katz

Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics have captivated imaginations for decades, providing a blueprint for ethical AI long before it became a reality.

First introduced in his 1942 short story “Runaround” from the “I, Robot” series, these laws state:

1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.

2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.

3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.

As we stand on the precipice of an AI-driven future, Asimov’s vision is more relevant than ever. But are these laws sufficient to guide us through the ethical complexities of advanced AI?

As a teenager, I was enthralled by Asimov’s work. His stories painted a vivid picture of a future where humans and physical robots—and, though I didn’t imagine them back then, software robots—coexist harmoniously under a framework of ethical guidelines. His Three Laws were not just science fiction; they were a profound commentary on the relationship between humanity and its creations.

Expert: Air Force, Other Services Need to Embrace Cyber as Weapon of War

Shaun Waterman

The Air Force and its fellow military services need to stop thinking about cyber as a technology issue and focus on learning how to use it as a weapon of war, the U.S. Navy’s former top cyber advisor Chris Cleary said Sept 16.

“I still think all the services are struggling as to how they’re going to embrace cyber,” Cleary told Air & Space Forces Magazine after speaking on a panel about cyber dominance at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference.

“You talk about cyber dominance, and people start talking about Zero Trust and what the [Chief Information Officers] do,” said Cleary, now a vice president with defense contractor ManTech. “No. This is about warfighting.”

Earlier, Cleary told the panel, moderated by Department of the Air Force CIO Venice Goodwine, that military cyber operators need to start thinking and talking about the ways that cyber tools could be used to inflict damage on the enemy.

“What is our business?” he asked, “The Department of Defense exists fundamentally for two reasons, to deliver lethality or prevent lethality from being delivered upon us.”

20 September 2024

A Quad Initiative on Digital Public Infrastructure

Rudra Chaudhuri and Aadya Gupta

In 2024, India will host a Quad Leaders’ Summit. This will be the sixth convening of a high-level dialogue between India, the United States, Australia, and Japan. Following a series of half-starts dating back to 2007, the dialogue resumed in 2017. Since then, six Quad working groups have been created to deepen cooperation in the areas of climate, critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity, health, infrastructure, and space.

There is an urgent need to create a separate strand within existing working group mechanisms on digital public infrastructure (DPI). Given that each member state offers a set of faculties that can be leveraged for specific projects, the Quad is well-placed to deploy DPI in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Indeed, DPI could be piloted in at least six countries within 2024 alone.

This essay provides a rationale for our thinking. It draws on discussions the authors have had with DPI builders, states with a DPI demand, including Pacific Island countries, and the different DPI communities that have emerged in the last eighteen months. Much of these linkages were fused during India’s presidency of the G20.

Adani Airport Controversy in Kenya Discredits India’s Reputation in Africa

Rushali Saha

Earlier this month, a long-simmering dispute involving the Adani Group erupted into a full-blown aviation crisis with hundreds of passengers stranded at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA). Kenya Aviation Workers Union (KAWU) members are protesting against the build-and-operate agreement allegedly in the works with the Adani Group, which critics say is expected to result in significant job losses and impose additional tax burden on Kenyans.

Union workers are demanding the government disclose all details of the proposed agreement, which remains shrouded in secrecy. They have found support from opposition leaders, who are calling for the project to be abandoned.

In response to a petition by the Kenya Human Rights Commission and Law Society of Kenya to stop the deal, the high court has granted a temporary order, suspending the deal pending the determination of the case. While the government’s position is that only a legally non-binding “head of terms” agreement has been signed with Adani, senators allege that the “takeover” project is a “done deal.”

ASEAN Needs To Reclaim RCEP For Regional Economic Leadership – Analysis

Mari Pangestu and Rania Teguh

There is a chorus of calls for ASEAN to walk the talk on its claims of centrality in the management of the strategic challenges to peace and prosperity in East Asia. Calls for ASEAN to ‘do more’ usually centre on its claiming a more assertive role in security affairs in the South China Sea and redoubling its efforts to encourage political dialogue in Myanmar.

But the bigger threat to ASEAN centrality is corrosion of the open economic order on which its prosperity and security depend. And there is opportunity to cement its role as a platform for negotiating a regional economic order attuned to its members’ interests in East Asia through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is less politically fraught.

RCEP is the world’s largest trade agreement, with its 15 members of 2.3 billion people accounting for 32 per cent of global GDP and 29 per cent of world merchandise trade. It aims to create a more integrated and efficient regional market, driving growth, strengthening regional value chains and boosting competitiveness of member economies. RCEP will also promote investment by attracting more foreign direct investment into regional manufacturing.

Other provisions on e-commerce, competition, intellectual property and SME development can also support trade growth. In the 15–20 year phase-in for less developed members, the agreement provides for 92 per cent market access among all the partners.

War game reveals Chinese attacks on communications could paralyze Taiwan - Opinion

Henry Sokolski

Earlier this year, the chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party asked Elon Musk if he was withholding StarShield satellite services from United States service members on and around Taiwan. Musk replied that he was in full compliance with his Pentagon contract. Shortly thereafter, Musk refused a Taiwanese bid to secure Starlink services and Taiwan announced it would be developing a “Starlink” constellation system of its own. As a stopgap, Taiwan contracted with OneWeb for satellite internet and communication services.

Two years ago, to find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center proposed conducting a space war game that focused on a near-term Taiwan-China scenario. This June, it tapped the talents of current and retired officials, Congressional Staff and outside experts to play the game. They were divided into multiple teams, representing Taiwan, Eutelsat OneWeb, the Allied Space Nations (the U.S., U.K., Japan, France, Russia and India), and China which was played by the Control team.

Top security analysts have noted how China could disable Taiwan’s undersea cable and disrupt its microwave, cell and space-based communications systems in order to secure a smokeless victory over the Island. What has complicated this prospect is the increasing importance of private commercial space-based communications and internet services. The controversy surrounding Starlink’s selective support of Ukrainian military operations amply demonstrates this point.

Normalizing Abnormalities: Life in Myanmar’s Resistance Zone

Helen Li

Since gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar has faced persistent political crises and ethnic tensions. The most recent upheaval, the military coup of 2021, ignited widespread protests and brutal crackdowns once again, and Myanmar has descended into a civil war, with a patchwork quilt of resistance forces fighting against the military government.

Amid this chaos, a quiet, resilient life took shape and grew in the borderlands. In the jungle controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU), an armed ethnic resistance group, survival is a collective endeavor. Here, resistance soldiers, Civil Disobedience Movement activists, and internally displaced civilians have forged a new normal, a life where the lines between resistance and routine blur, and hope is reconstructed from the fragments of their shattered pasts.

The Lives of Resistance Soldiers in the Borderland

After the military junta overthrew the elected government on February 1, 2021, Myanmar plunged into turmoil. A.K. and his 27 childhood friends were among the many youths who vowed to resist and fled immediately to ethnic group-controlled zones. Through close contacts, they reached out to the KNU in Karen State via Telegram. Neither of them informed their families about their destination. The farewell was abrupt but solemn, with little certainty about when they would be able to return.

From Ukraine To Myanmar, Drone Warfare Marks A Paradigm Shift – Analysis

Antonio Graceffo

On September 10, Ukrainian forces launched the largest drone attack of the war to date, targeting Moscow with 144 drones. The assault resulted in 20 drones being shot down, while several multi-story residential buildings near Moscow were set ablaze. Flights from Russia’s most important airports were temporarily suspended. In response, Russia launched a retaliatory strike using 46 drones.

The strikes from both sides highlight a now indisputable fact: drone warfare is playing a determining role in the Ukraine war.

Armed drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), are pilotless aircraft used to locate, monitor, and strike targets, including individuals and equipment. Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has significantly expanded its use of UAVs for global counterterrorism missions. Drones have key advantages over manned weapons. They can stay airborne for over 14 hours, compared to under four hours for manned aircraft like the F-16, allowing for continuous surveillance without risking pilot safety. Additionally, drones offer near-instant responsiveness, with missiles striking targets within seconds, unlike slower manned systems, such as the 1998 cruise missile strike on Osama bin Laden, which relied on hours-old intelligence.

The Case Against the China Consensus

Jessica Chen Weiss

Washington faces growing criticism for pursuing open-ended competition with China without defining what success would look like. Even as China’s coercive capabilities and threatening behavior have rightly focused U.S. attention on the risks to American interests, the absence of clear metrics for success leaves the door open for partisan aspersions of the Biden administration’s approach. The administration’s defenders, meanwhile, rebuff these attacks by pointing out that its policies align with a broad consensus about the challenge China poses and the steps necessary to counter it.

To be sure, both Democratic and Republican politicians have engaged in the typical campaign ploy of sounding tough on China. During their recent debate, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris accused former President Donald Trump of selling out American interests and praising Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and Trump erroneously claimed that “China was paying us hundreds of billions of dollars” under his administration’s tariffs (which the Biden administration has expanded). Meanwhile, the drumbeat of hyperbolic rhetoric and congressional hearings on the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party has blurred the line between legitimate commercial, scientific, and educational pursuits involving Chinese entities and those that pose unacceptable security risks or invite other vulnerabilities. Fearing that what might have been welcome yesterday could be deemed disloyal today, companies, researchers, and students have pulled back from many of the activities that have underpinned U.S. economic and scientific leadership.

A Step-Change to Beijing’s “Lawfare” in the South China Sea

Peter Leavy

Recent Chinese maritime activity around the Second Thomas Shoal marks a potentially new and more aggressive stage in China’s campaign to extend control over the South China Sea. Concerningly, the same type of behaviour has now expanded to Sabina Shoal, only 86 nautical miles from the Philippines island of Palawan. Chinese assertiveness is spreading laterally, becoming more violent, and may well be tied to new laws China recently granted itself.

China has long used “lawfare” – leveraging legal systems and principles to achieve military and strategic objectives – to exploit the seams that democracies have between military and civilian activities. They create and exploit legal ambiguities as part of a deliberate strategy. As the PLA Daily commented in describing the People’s Armed Force Maritime Militia (PAFMM), a para-military organisation: “Putting on camouflage, they qualify as soldiers; taking off the camouflage, they become law-abiding fishermen.”⁠

On 15 June, China implemented the “Provisions on Administrative Enforcement Procedures for Coast Guard Agencies 2024”, also known as CCG Order #3. This law allows China Coast Guard (CCG) commanders to detain foreign vessels and personnel for up to 30 days (or 60, for “complicated” issues) if they are in “waters under Chinese jurisdiction”. Such jurisdiction is not defined, although it is likely based on the flawed Nine-Dash Line concept that the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled illegal in 2016.

Where Donald Trump and Kamala Harris Stand on China

Chad de Guzman and Koh Ewe

China clearly looms large over the U.S. presidential election in November. Both the Democratic ticket led by Vice President Kamala Harris and Republican one led by former President Donald Trump have emphasized the great power rivalry throughout their campaigns, albeit Harris to a lesser extent. Overall, their approaches have some differences—and many similarities.

Trump—and his running mate Ohio Sen. J.D. Vance, who has called China “the biggest threat” to the U.S.—have repeatedly offered a zero-sum view, in which the U.S. and China are at a crossroads and only one can come out on top. (Despite this, Trump also boasts of his great relationship with Xi Jinping, saying he’d like to “get along with China, but they’ve really taken advantage of our country.”)

Meanwhile, Harris—who has similarly promised to make sure “America, not China, wins the competition for the 21st century,” a line she repeated at the ABC News debate in September and Democratic convention in August—and her running mate Minn. Gov. Tim Walz, who has a history of engagement with the country, have offered a more diplomatic tone but, nevertheless, advocate for some of the same policies to deal with the economic and security challenges posed by an increasingly assertive Beijing. Harris previously expressed in 2019 a willingness to cooperate with China on issues like climate change, while Biden Administration national security adviser Jake Sullivan recently assured Chinese leaders that she’s committed to “responsibly managing” bilateral ties.

Houthis Launch Missile at Central Israel

Adam Rasgon

The Houthi militia in Yemen claimed responsibility on Sunday for a rare missile attack on Israel, the second time in two months that the Iranian-backed group has successfully penetrated the skies over the central part of the country.

The assault was the latest illustration of the evolving conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Iranian proxies, which have mounted attacks on Israeli territory in what they have said is solidarity with Palestinians under bombardment in Gaza. It also demonstrated the military capabilities of the Houthis, based hundreds of miles from Israel on the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula.

Air-raid sirens blared in dozens of towns and villages in central Israel around 6:30 a.m. on Sunday, sending people rushing to fortified safe rooms and bomb shelters.

The Israeli military initially said the Houthis had fired a surface-to-surface missile that landed in an “open area” and that no casualties were reported. In a follow-up statement, the military said an initial inquiry indicated the missile had “fragmented midair” and that it was reviewing its attempts to intercept the strike.

Perilous Consequences Of The AI Revolution In Drone Warfare Spurred By Ukraine Conflict

Tanmay Kadam

The modern battlefield is rapidly ushering into an era when cheap drones infused with Artificial Intelligence (AI) would be the next favoured weapon for large-scale long-range precision strikes after missiles, warplanes and artillery.

For centuries, artillery was known as the ‘King of Battle’ relied upon by military commanders to rain hell on their adversaries. However, with the introduction of combat airplanes in the mid-1940s, also called as ‘flying artillery’, big guns got a bit sidelined, especially in the advanced Western-style militaries like the United States, NATO countries and Israel.

With the war in Ukraine, artillery rose back to prominence with airpower playing a very limited role due to Ukraine’s small fleet of aircraft and the reluctance of the Russian military to deploy its warplanes in the face of the threat posed by a wide array of air defense systems fielded by Ukraine.

However, alongside artillery, another category of weapon that rose to prominence in the Ukraine conflict is the armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS), especially the cheap off-the-shelf commercial drones and one-way kamikaze drones that are emerging as an expendable and cost-effective alternative to expensive warplanes, cruise and ballistic missiles, and artillery munitions.

The Russian Non-Strategic (Tactical) Nuclear Exercise

Mark B. Schneider

In 2024, Russia, in conjunction with Belarus, held what Russia called a three-part non-strategic (tactical) nuclear exercise whose purpose, according to Russia’s Defense Ministry, was training in the “…practical aspects of the preparation and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” Russia stages yearly large strategic nuclear exercises sometimes involving non-strategic nuclear weapons and many smaller ones involving the strategic forces. Russia often stages theater war exercises which reportedly always end in Russia’s simulated nuclear first use. However, Russia had never previously announced a non-strategic nuclear exercise. Since Russia’s initial announcement of simulated nuclear weapons first use in the Zapad [West]-1999 exercise, Russia had never again officially announced nuclear weapons use. The political purpose of the overt non-strategic nuclear exercise was to intimidate the West and deter assistance to Ukraine.

The second phase of the exercise was broadened to cover almost the entire Russian border with NATO. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) said, “The crews of navy ships involved in the training will equip sea-based cruise missiles with special [nuclear] mock warheads and enter designated patrol areas.” The Russian MoD also indicated the exercise would involve nuclear-capable Backfire bombers, Mig-31s, cruise missiles and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. The exercise involved what the Russians call “electronic launches” (everything short of igniting and launching the missile).

Pacific Dragon: Is the Shipping Industry Ready for Containerized Missile Warfare?

John Konrad

In a groundbreaking naval exercise, the U.S. Navy and its allies tested the launch of one of its most powerful defensive missiles from a shipping container, marking a significant leap in ship defense technology. During Pacific Dragon 2024, the system successfully launched Raytheon’s SM-3 Interceptor anti-ballistic missile, showcasing a new level of flexibility in defending against airborne threats. What’s even more intriguing—and unsettling for some—is the potential to deploy these containerized missile systems on commercial vessels, blurring the lines between civilian and military assets.

Could these systems be installed on commercial ships to defend against threats like Houthi missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea? While it’s a remote possibility, it raises serious questions about the future of maritime security. Extensive testing, and even tougher international discussions on the legalities of arming merchant ships, would be required before this concept could become reality.

A New Era for Naval Warfare: The Mark 70 PDS and Its Capabilities

Central to this exercise was the Mark 70 Mod 1 Payload Delivery System, a containerized version of the Navy’s Vertical Launch System (VLS). This system packs four VLS cells into a standard shipping container, making it easily transportable by semi-truck and mountable on a wide range of naval platforms. It’s a flexible, modular solution that can enhance missile defense capabilities both on land and at sea.

Educate Americans First

Jay P. Greene

As the number of foreign students at our selective universities exceeds a third of total enrollment, it is important to remember the maxim of the 16th-century physician Paracelsus: “Sola dosis facit venenum.” The dose makes the poison.

From the end of World War II to 1977, the percentage of U.S. university enrollment from abroad never exceeded 2%. With this modest level of foreign enrollment, international students offered significant benefits. They strengthened the education of American students by contributing talent, experiences, and ideas from around the world to the learning environment.

Foreign students also added financial resources to U.S. universities because they tended to pay full tuition and sometimes brought with them large donations from wealthy foreign governments or families. In the context of the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the West, foreign students who learned about the American political system and its values could bring ideas about individual liberty and representative democracy back to their home countries.

After 1977, foreign enrollment at U.S. universities crept higher, slowly at first, before it dramatically skyrocketed over the last two decades. Nationwide, the percentage of international students on college campuses has now nearly tripled since 1977. At our leading universities, the percentage of students from abroad has reached critical mass, averaging about a third but sometimes approaching half of total enrollments.

Israel's conduct in the war will consume us all

Daniel L. Davis

Hamas terrorists were responsible for the deaths of 1,139 Israelis – mostly civilians – on October 7, 2023. The Israeli government was fully within its rights to bring the terrorists to justice.

But nearing the one-year mark of Israel’s resultant war against Hamas, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may now be an impediment to peace rather than providing a path to it.

No one can question Israel’s right to seek justice for Hamas’s bloody massacre on 10/7 and few challenge Washington for providing military support to Israel as it seeks to punish Hamas. Yet it is entirely reasonable to question how Israel is conducting its operations, especially if it becomes apparent the Israeli government pursues a course of action that is ineffective — or worse — is making Israel less secure.

I have argued, as far back as November of last year on CNN that Netanyahu has been using military power to pursue a political objective that cannot succeed: the total elimination of Hamas. The reason is simple: one cannot kill an idea with bombs and bullets.

Israel Must Protect Its North, but Can It Afford the Price? | Opinion

Yaakov Katz

In 2002, as Hamas launched its first rudimentary rockets at Israel, their range barely stretched a mile, with most of their targets being the Israeli settlements that still existed at the time in the Gaza Strip. It was a primitive, yet ominous beginning to what would eventually evolve into one of Israel's greatest threats.

As the rocket fire intensified, Ariel Sharon, Israel's prime minister at the time, faced mounting pressure from his right-wing base to respond decisively. "If the rockets were falling on Tel Aviv, Israel would retaliate!" claimed the settlers, who felt abandoned. To them, the government's inaction was proof that it valued Tel Aviv's safety far more than the lives of those living in Gaza's settlements.

A seasoned politician, Sharon pushed back: "The rule for Netzarim is like the rule for Tel Aviv," he said at the time, naming one of Gaza's settlements and emphasizing that an attack on any part of Israel would prompt the same response.

It was a noble sentiment, but nice phrases rarely stand the test of reality. Years passed without a significant Israeli military response to the rocket attacks. In fact, it wasn't until 2008, when Hamas demonstrated the ability to fire rockets that reached closer to Tel Aviv, that Israel finally launched a large-scale military operation aimed at curbing Hamas's capabilities. Meanwhile, the thousands of rockets that had rained down on Gaza's settlements before their evacuation in 2005 did not seem to warrant the same level of urgency.

Even with $1 Trillion a Year the US Military Is Falling Behind

Hal Brands

Vice President Kamala Harris, in last week’s debate with former President Donald Trump, repeated her call for the US to maintain the world’s most “lethal” military. It’s a good thought, given today’s menagerie of geopolitical malcontents.

Russia is slugging away at Ukraine as part of a long, bitter struggle against the West. China’s military buildup, and hoarding of food and energy, suggests that President Xi Jinping is putting his country on a war footing, too. North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenals are improving. Iran and its proxies are roiling the Middle East and the neighboring sea lanes. But far from arming up for what looks more and more like a prewar era, America is slouching toward disarmament, as it struggles to maintain the (insufficient) military strengths it has.

The Pentagon is undertaking a multidecade project to modernize the US nuclear arsenal — put plainly, to ensure that the US has nuclear weapons and delivery systems that really work. But all three aspects of that modernization — the bomber force, land-based missiles and ballistic-missile submarines — are behind schedule and over budget. The US is struggling to update missile silos and other vital infrastructure.

A Korean War Ending For the Ukraine War?

Brent M. Eastwood

An Armistice and DMZ: The Best Idea to Keep the Peace in Ukraine and Russia—Former President Donald Trump has often said he would immediately work to end the war in Ukraine, repeatedly claiming that he could find a way to end hostilities in as little as 24 hours. He has amended that quick turnaround by saying that he would help both sides create a ceasefire before his inauguration day if he gets elected in November.

However, Trump had never offered details on what his peace plan would look like.

That all changed when running mate J.D. Vance appeared on the Shawn Ryan Show at the end of last week and gave some flesh to the bones of a peace plan. You hear it above.

What would the plan exactly look like?

Time for a Demilitarized Zone

“So, I think what this looks like is Trump sits down, he says to the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Europeans ‘You guys need to figure out what does a peaceful settlement look like?’” Vance told Ryan. “And what it probably looks like is the current line of demarcation between Russia and Ukraine, that becomes like a demilitarized zone.”

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