M. A. Al-Asqalani
Israel recently dealt Iran two significant blows with two assassinations at the highest levels of Iranian proxies. First, the IDF took out Fuad Shukr, a senior commander of Hezbollah. The next day, Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of the political bureau of Hamas, was assassinated in his guest house in Tehran. The assassinations join other tactical victories Israel has scored in its war against Hamas since the October 7 massacre. And yet, it's at this point undeniable these have come at the expense of its larger strategic goals.
Indeed, beyond simply winning its war with Hamas, what are the larger strategic objectives of the State of Israel? Restoring deterrence? Destroying Iranian proxies? Regime change in Tehran? The reason we can't say for certain is that the Israeli government has become fixated on the tactical aspect of this conflict, without developing a clear theory of strategic victory.
This also seems to be the conclusion drawn in a coordinated set of statements tweeted out Friday morning by the heads of Western states calling for deescalation, a hostage deal, and a pathway to a lasting peace. These are not things beyond Israel's capacity. I know this because in the not-so-distant past, Israel faced the same challenge, and made a very different choice, to prioritize strategic victory.
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