George Friedman
Two and a half years ago, Russia invaded Ukraine, a former part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The reason for the invasion was geostrategic: Moscow justifiably feared that a hostile power could invade it from the west through Ukraine and up from the south. Such was the case for invasions by Napoleon and Hitler. Without strategic depth, Russia has no buffers.
For Russia, that no one was currently planning such an invasion meant little. Geopolitics demands preparing to defend against an enemy before the enemy plans to attack. Moscow was, after all, painfully aware that pro-West forces supported an uprising that unseated a pro-Russia president several years earlier. The West’s support was based on the fear that Russia would invade Ukraine and, in time, the rest of Europe. Neither side’s fears were irrational.
The assumption of many was that Russia would rapidly crush the Ukrainian army and that a quick assault would close the door on U.S. intervention and supplies. If the logic was correct, the execution was not. The first foray into Ukraine consisted of tanks on multiple fronts, a show of force meant to sow panic among the public.
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