Lucas Myers
A U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 242 hovers during an aerial demonstration at the Singapore Airshow 2022 near Changi Exhibition Center, Republic of Singapore, Feb 15, 2022.Credit: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Bryant Rodriguez
When escalating tensions between Israel and Iran in April 2024 spurred fears of a wider Middle Eastern war, U.S. partners in the region reportedly attempted to limit the United States’ ability to attack Iranian forces from their territory. In an increasingly non-aligned world, and where U.S. influence is relatively less than in the Cold War, military access and logistics should not be taken for granted. This is not because of any insurmountable military problems but rather political ones as many countries hedge between great powers.
This issue is perhaps most urgent in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. force projection in the critical region relies upon overseas bases and military access agreements. Although the United States has strong alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, other U.S. partners are considerably more reluctant to outwardly go against Beijing, especially in South and Southeast Asia.
While the United States has steadily improved relations with many important regional allies and partners, a persistent commitment to hedging in South and Southeast Asia raises concerns about U.S. force projection into the region during a potential conflict with China. Only by putting in real effort to enhance trust and providing greater, more reliable economic incentives can the United States improve the likelihood that key “swing states” are amendable to U.S. military access and logistics support in an Indo-Pacific crisis.
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