15 August 2024

The New Reality in the Ukraine War

George Friedman

Last week, Ukraine did what many thought impossible when it invaded Russia – and, indeed, something that had not happened since World War II. The implications are many, but first, some context.

Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 to block what Moscow believed was a potential path of attack by NATO. Moscow thought Ukraine was weak and divided, and it concluded that an invasion would rapidly destroy Ukrainian forces and allow for Russian occupation. Time was of the essence. Every minute the war dragged on was a minute in which the U.S. or NATO could intervene. The government did not expect and thus did not plan for a long and costly war, and it has been paying for its mistake ever since. Even so, Russia believed it still had one important advantage: It dominated the battlefields. If Moscow could not control the strategic aspects of the war, it could at least control the tactical aspects. In this way, it was able to keep Ukrainian forces on the defensive – until last week, when Ukraine invaded Kursk oblast.

How Ukraine was able to invade Russia isn’t yet exactly clear. Sometimes a military falls into a pattern in which certain things are seen as impossible. Sometimes a military lacks or ignores intelligence. Russia began the war on poor intelligence, so a similarly massive intelligence lapse that failed to predict an invasion would be consistent with the pattern. It’s no secret that Russia has turned to North Korea and Iran for additional weaponry lately, so it’s possible Ukraine saw this as the moment of weakness it was. After all, it’s unwise to depend on easily severed foreign supply lines and to admit you’re running out of weapons.

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