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17 August 2024

The Kursk Offensive and the Risk of a Wider War

James W. Carden

As the Kursk offensive heads into its second week, Ukrainian forces now claim to control nearly 30 Russian villages comprising 1,000 square miles of Russian territory. In a meeting with security advisers at his residence in Novo-Ogaryovo on Monday, Russian President Vladimir Putin directed his ire at Ukraine’s sponsors, claiming, “The West is fighting us with the hands of the Ukrainians.” The Kursk offensive marks a significant escalation in the two-and-a-half-year-long conflict.

So, what are some of the broader implications of the Kursk offensive?

A few observations:
  • The Kursk offensive highlights, among other things, the inherent risk of what I would call “non-allied allyship.” Washington has no treaty of alliance with Ukraine, yet the Biden administration persists in acting as though Ukraine is not just a treaty ally—it acts as though Ukraine’s survival in the form it took for three short decades (1992–2022) is essential to the national security of the United States. Washington’s granting of non-allied allyship to Ukraine has led Kiev to act in ways that are detrimental to its own survival—including through Kiev’s refusal to implement agreed-upon provisions of the Minsk Accords, which, if implemented, would probably have demonstrated to the Russians that waging a war of choice was unnecessary.
  • The Kursk offensive also shows, once again, that the idea that “if the Russians are not stopped in Ukraine they will go on to conquer Eastern Europe” is patently absurd. Russia could not conquer Kiev in 2022 and has been fighting a costly war of attrition even since.

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