Benjamin Giltner
Once again, Ukraine is on the attack, launching a counter-offensive in Russia’s Kursk region—an all too familiar battlefield for the World War II historian. With the tactical success of this offensive, the Ukrainian military’s morale is bound to rise. Amid the analyses swirling around this ongoing battle, there is a subsection of defense scholars and policymakers who place a premium on achieving decisive victories on the battlefield. Specifically, they advocate for the U.S. send Ukraine more weapons to decisively defeat Russia. Taken at surface value, these proponents of decisive warfare have a point: the quicker Ukraine can win this war, the better. No one, especially the Ukrainians, wants to fight drawn-out wars. Yet, an extensive historical record shows multiple instances of attempts at decisive victories failing, and shows that Ukraine will unlikely be able to achieve blitzkrieg-like victory against Russia. To avoid a disastrous outcome from the pursuit of a decisive victory, Ukraine and its allies must begin some sort of peace process.
For starters, the success or failure of a decisive offensive depends on whether an attacking force can launch a rapid surprise attack. The last thing an attacking force wants is for the enemy to know where it will strike. Otherwise, the defender will have the time to fortify its defenses to counter these attacking forces. In war, defense typically has the advantage over offense. Defending forces can remain concealed throughout its home terrain, draw the enemy’s attacking forces further into its territory to overextend the attacking forces logistical lines, launch preemptive attacks, and use suppressive fires to prevent the attacker from advancing. This means that while an attacking military might try to knock out the enemy military in a swift attack, a capable defending force can force an attack into a battle of attrition.
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