Justyna Szczudlik
As a China and Taiwan analyst, the so-called Kinmen issue has been on my mind, especially amid Xi Jinping’s increasing intimidation of Taiwan. I have to admit that it was very easy for me to imagine why Xi would want to seize Kinmen (or/and the Matsu Islands, or even the Pescadores) and then wait and see what the United States and the world would do. Annexing Kinmen and Matsu in particular seems very easy given their geographical proximity and the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), or – even easier – the option of cutting off Kinmen’s water supply from the PRC.
This scenario seems very appealing – easy, cheap, and a good way to test Taiwan’s defense capabilities, U.S. commitments, and the free world’s true adherence to international law. But after visiting Kinmen and talking to people in Taiwan about this particular scenario, I realized that my assumptions were, at the very least, oversimplified.
I fully agree with Sam Goodman’s thesis, put forth in a recent Diplomat article, that Kinmen is the frontline of China’s gray zone operations against Taiwan. I also agree with his recommendations that the international community should be aware of and consider the possibility that a crisis between China and Taiwan could begin with the annexation of Kinmen. No scenario can be ruled out.
However, I disagree with Goodman’s main idea that Beijing could follow the Crimea example and use Russia’s playbook of “encouraging local actors to publicly push for reunification,” which would “create a smokescreen for the PRC to annex Kinmen.” China’s gray zone and cognitive warfare tactics are one issue; a Crimea-like scenario is another. We should not confuse the two. The latter, in my view, is too simplistic and unlikely to happen in Kinmen for five reasons.
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