Sumit Ganguly
As a post-colonial state, India has long zealously guarded its sovereignty, both in the region and in the world. Indeed, it was only after much internal debate that it decided to intervene in East Pakistan during the 1971 crisis, as this required violating the sovereignty of its neighbor, Pakistan.1 Not surprisingly, it has also been quite circumspect about wholeheartedly embracing the UN’s doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) on the grounds that that it could undermine India’s devotion to the principle of state sovereignty.2 Underlying this opposition is an unspoken fear: that the R2P could at some point be applied to India itself, thanks to its many lapses in protecting human rights, especially when dealing with domestic insurgencies.
Despite this commitment to upholding sovereignty, in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, India scrupulously avoided criticizing Moscow in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and abstained from the UNSC resolution condemning the Russian invasion. At their strongest, India’s statements simply called on Russia to respect international law without elaborating on what this might mean.4 Months after the invasion and as the crisis continued to unfold, Prime Minister Modi went so far as to tell President Vladimir Putin at a security summit in Uzbekistan: “This is not an era of war.” 5 Beyond this veiled criticism, India has issued a series of carefully-worded statements in various forums about the invasion, but has maintained normal diplomatic relations with Russia and abstained on multiple UNGA resolutions that have censured Russia.6 Most recently, on a December 2023 visit to Moscow, India’s Minister for External Afffairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, as well as President Putin, and publicly referred to Russia as a “valued and time-tested partner” while reaffirming plans to jointly produce a range of weaponry with Russia.
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