25 August 2024

Filling the Void Left by Great-Power Retrenchment: Russia, Central Asia, and the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Charles E. Ziegler

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, ending in August 2021, created favorable conditions for Russia to reassert itself as a regional hegemon in broader Central Asia. Historically, as great powers retrench from a territory, the resulting void can be filled either by rival powers or by friendly successor states responsive to the retrenching power’s agenda. While the United States has lacked reliable successors to take its place in the region, Russia has asserted itself in a number of ways to boost its own power and influence. Moscow has not only cultivated bilateral ties with each of the five Central Asian states, but it has also instrumentalized regional security organizations to advance its interests. However, the full-scale assault against Ukraine beginning in 2022 has undermined Russia’s initiatives in Central Asia and its aspirations for regional hegemony. The Central Asian countries fear Moscow’s apparent neo-imperial ambitions and prefer to develop multi-vectored foreign relations. In this situation, China is poised to supplant Russia as the dominant power and security provider in the region, which could create tensions within the so-called partnership without limits between Moscow and Beijing.

As a continental land power, Russia historically has aspired to exercise hegemony in four bordering regions: Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Pacific littoral. Initially weakened after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia’s limited military and economic capabilities constrained its influence among the newly independent former Soviet republics throughout the 1990s. Upon taking office in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin initially focused on reasserting Russia’s position in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Moscow then announced a “pivot” toward Asia in Putin’s third presidential term from 2012 to 2018. In the following years, however, Russia has struggled to expand its influence in the Pacific littoral.1 Nonetheless, the close strategic partnership with China, which is the most important component of the pivot, has secured Russia’s strategic backyard and enabled it to concentrate on Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

No comments: