Charles E. Ziegler
As a continental land power, Russia historically has aspired to exercise hegemony in four bordering regions: Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Pacific littoral. Initially weakened after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia’s limited military and economic capabilities constrained its influence among the newly independent former Soviet republics throughout the 1990s. Upon taking office in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin initially focused on reasserting Russia’s position in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Moscow then announced a “pivot” toward Asia in Putin’s third presidential term from 2012 to 2018. In the following years, however, Russia has struggled to expand its influence in the Pacific littoral.1 Nonetheless, the close strategic partnership with China, which is the most important component of the pivot, has secured Russia’s strategic backyard and enabled it to concentrate on Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
When, in August 2021, the United States hastily abandoned its two-decades-long campaign in Afghanistan, Russia was positioned to take advantage of the power vacuum to secure its position as a geopolitical force in Central Asia. No other great power challenged Moscow for primacy in the region. China continued to expand its trade and investment in Central Asia, including Afghanistan, but Beijing has also appeared willing to stand on the sidelines as Russia tackled security challenges in the region, such as the Kazakhstan crisis in January 2022. 2 Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, however, has impacted Moscow’s position in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where Russia has asserted vital national interests. How can we explain Moscow’s inability to capitalize on America’s withdrawal from a region where Russia has substantial historic, cultural, and economic ties?
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