Eric Min
On May 31, U.S. President Joe Biden announced a three-phase proposal to end the war in the Gaza Strip. He called, first, for a temporary cease-fire tied to partial withdrawals of Israeli forces, limited hostage exchanges, and an influx of aid. Negotiations would then begin and, if successful, lead to the second phase, involving a permanent cessation of hostilities, tied to full withdrawals and complete hostage exchanges. The final phase would see reconstruction efforts begin in Gaza, and the exchange of the remains of Israeli hostages.
Despite the fanfare with which it was announced, this proposal was just one of many to have been made since the war began. Indeed, Israel and Hamas had previously rejected similar plans advanced by Egypt and Qatar. And, like the other proposals, the Biden plan has fallen flat. Although these mediated initiatives have not succeeded in forging peace, they represent attempts to end the ongoing suffering caused by the war. It can’t hurt to try.
Or can it? The historical record reveals that such diplomatic interventions often have hugely negative consequences. Outside powers have almost never been able to impose lasting cease-fires without support from the belligerents themselves and, perhaps more troublingly, external efforts to facilitate diplomacy can make wars worse. Rather than bringing peace, there is the uncomfortable likelihood that diplomacy which takes place regardless of what is happening on the battlefield, can actually exacerbate a war. The United States and its allies should pressure Hamas and Israel to change their wartime conduct, instead of seeking to impose negotiations when neither side has expressed an interest in a settlement.
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