Mark J. Desens
Generals Boomer and Conway’s June 15, 2024, article critiquing the Marine Corps Force Design plans was a step forward in the dialogue. While the title was unfortunate (but catchy), the tone was less shrill than what we’ve seen from some of our retired generals.
Like the other three and four-star generals who have offered critiques, these are legendary men from my time on active duty. General Boomer led a two-division breach of Saddam’s defenses and a rout of Iraqi forces in the retaking of Kuwait in 1991. General Conway led the Corps next attack eleven years later to finish Saddam’s evil rule and served as our 34th Commandant. I had the pleasure of serving in General Conway’s command in early 2003 as a planner with the 3rd Marine Air Wing and again from 2006-2008 in the Operations Division for the Marine Corps in the Pentagon. Both are men whom I greatly admire. However, I could not disagree more with their assessments.
The root of the problem is that their experiences are from a different era. The character of warfare has shifted. Their generation appears unable to comprehend the nature of today’s fight. First, that the deadliest and most important fight may be getting to the fight and, second, that modern technology has greatly diminished the value of legacy formations and equipment. To be clear, these are smart men. But individual experiences can make for stubborn anchors to change. The paradigm of warfare has shifted while they haven’t.
When Marine Expeditionary Forces fought Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Marines had the luxury of moving their forces to the theater – primarily by sea over a period of several months – in virtually uncontested waters. An amphibious assault was not a real factor in either contest. The threat of simple floating mines – one of which damaged the USS Tripoli - was enough to keep an entire Marine Expeditionary Brigade (5th MEB) from ever reaching landfall in 1991. An amphibious assault in the 2003 invasion was never seriously considered.[i] Despite the warnings, these men never questioned the value of amphibious power projection or our ability to move force across the globe. In their view, getting to the fight was the Navy’s problem. How they were able to all but ignore Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) threats remains a mystery.
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