28 July 2024

No First Use Can Still Help to Reduce US-China Nuclear Risks

Adam MOUNT

INTRODUCTION

China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and the US response to it, will shape strategic stability for the remainder of the century. Much of the debate in the United States on “tripolar deterrence” or the “two peer problem” has concentrated on the strategic level, evaluating how the increase in China’s arsenal affects the quantitative and qualitative requirements for the US strategic arsenal (Center for Global Security Research Study Group 2023; Fravel, Hiim and Trøan 2023; Glaser, Acton and Fetter 2023; Mount 2023). At the same time, the risks of limited nuclear use in the context of a US-China theater conflict are also in flux.

One way to understand the evolving risks of nuclear escalation in a US-China conflict is through the ongoing debate on no first use. While Beijing has not altered its long-standing policy on no first use, dramatic shifts in its strategic force structure raise questions about whether China is also reconsidering its historical position that nuclear weapons cannot help to manage escalation in a limited conflict. Though the United States remains unlikely to adopt a no first use statement, ongoing debates on nuclear declaratory policy will affect how US leaders understand their options in a crisis.

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