Paul Goble
Afghanistan is pushing ahead with the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal to divert water that has been flowing into neighboring countries to slow the desertification of its own territory and the threat of starvation to its population. The impact of Kabul’s decision on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan has attracted some attention (see EDM, March 7). Now, the project, launched in 2022 and slated to be completed by 2028, is having a far broader impact on more distant Kazakhstan as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have long enjoyed the reputation of being “water surplus” countries that do not need water from others (Window on Eurasia, August 19, 2021; Cabar.asia, February 29; TASS, March 20; The Times of Central Asia, June 11). The canal is also affecting China and Russia’s influence as the two outside powers most heavily involved in regional geopolitics (see EDM, December 7, 2021; Radio Azatlyk, March 29, 2023; Forbes.kz, April 8). While the Taliban’s recent decision to self-finance the project will slow down construction, Kabul hopes to limit the leverage of other countries in the region to influence the canal’s completion and operation.
The Afghan canal is on its way to having a more serious impact on Tajikistan than any other place in Central Asia. Water shortages in the country are already raising the specter of widespread hunger, and, given Dushanbe’s reliance on hydropower, the Qosh Tepa Canal will lead to a reduction in electric power production (TASS, March 20). Those twin developments, in turn, threaten to amplify Tajikistan’s difficulties in controlling its enormous but sparsely populated Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region, a restive province bordering Afghanistan. China, Russia, and the United States have all tried to help Dushanbe stabilize the territory, lest the Taliban or other Islamist groups expand their influence northward (see EDM, June 22, November 3, 2022; ASIA-Plus, July 26, December 26, 2023; see Terrorism Monitor, October 31, 2023).
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