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12 June 2024

Turning Point or Dead End? Challenging the Kremlin’s Narrative of Stability in Wartime

András Tóth-Czifra

A Theater of Stability

In early 2024, the most important message that the Russian government communicated to the outside world was that Russia had solved the problems that arose in the first two years of the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, stabilized its economy and domestic politics, and had the upper hand and the stronger determination in a protracted conflict.

This view is supported by surface-level data that Russian officials often highlight. These can be summarized as:
  1. In 2023, Russia’s economy grew by 3.6 percent, after a 1.2 percent drop in 2022.[1] This happened despite unprecedented sanctions, including import limitations and an oil price cap, both of which Russia has been successful at circumventing, even if they did raise costs for importers and exporters.[2] The growth was indeed supported by the domestic military-industrial complex, as even the Russian Central Bank will readily admit. But, to many, this only shows that Russia has the means to reallocate resources strategically to pursue a long war.[3] In 2024, economic growth has continued and first quarter receipts of the federal budget were 53.5 percent higher than a year before.[4]

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