Monte Erfourth
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. invasion of Iraq, commencing on March 20, 2003, marked a significant chapter in modern geopolitical history. The G.W. Bush Administration claimed it as an act of preemption driven by three strategic objectives: disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime, and establishing a democratic government. What resulted was widespread military conflict, political turmoil, and enduring regional instability. This short essay delves into the strategic successes and failures of the U.S. in Iraq, from the decision to invade and de-Baathification to the U.S. withdrawal in 2011 and the return of U.S. forces in 2014 to combat ISIS.
THE DECISION TO INVADE
The decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was heavily influenced by groupthink, where policymakers in Washington exhibited a lack of critical debate and a consensus driven by shared misconceptions.[1] This environment stifled dissent and alternative viewpoints, leading to an overestimation of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and an underestimation of the complexities of Iraqi society. Policymakers failed to appreciate the deep-seated historical and religious dynamics in Iraq, such as the significance of Shia Islam and Iran's longstanding influence in the region. The pervasive belief that Iraqis would greet American forces as liberators further skewed strategic planning.
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