The “Quagmire” Then and Now: Lessons for Combat in the Gaza Strip and for Decision Making from the IDF’s Presence in Lebanon Until its Withdrawal to the Awali in October 1983

Ofer Shelah & Yarden Assraf

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On August 31, 1982, about three months after the outbreak of the First Lebanon war, Yasser Arafat and thousands of PLO members (Yitzhak Shamir, then foreign minister, estimated their number to be 11,000)[1] left Beirut for Tunis and Syria. Thus, the declared mission of Operation Peace for Galilee was successfully achieved—of removing the rocket threat from northern Israel. But the IDF, as we know, did not redeploy south of the international border between Israel and Lebanon until 18 years later, after hundreds had been killed and three withdrawals had been declared. In September 1983, the IDF withdrew south of the Awali River; in 1985 to the “security zone,” where IDF and SLA forces fought Hezbollah; and in May 2000 to the international border. The number of IDF officers and soldiers killed during these 18 years has never been officially published, but according to verified estimates,[2] it reached 675 soldiers, which, together with the approximately 540 killed from June to September 1982, placed the cost of the campaign in Lebanon in its full sense at 1,217 casualties. About 250 of the soldiers were killed between September 1982 and the time of the withdrawal to the security zone in 1985.[3] The security price for Hezbollah’s growth and its becoming the enemy that poses the greatest threat to Israel on its borders, as well as the political, social, and internal military costs of remaining in Lebanon Israel continues to pay until this day.