Vladimir Socor
Moscow has recently expressed interest in holding talks with Kyiv without clarifying whether such talks would end with a formal “peace” settlement, an informal “ending (pausing) of the war,” a formal armistice, or an informal suspension of hostilities. The only certainty is that Moscow would use such talks to impose terms amounting to Ukraine’s surrender or, failing that, continue offensive military operations and blame this on unreasonable Ukrainian intransigence.
Russia does not need to offer a ceasefire to incentivize Ukraine to enter into talks. On the contrary, Moscow is intensifying its offensive military operations to force Kyiv into talks. But Moscow could very well offer an armistice, were Kyiv to accept the Kremlin’s settlement terms. These include demilitarizing Ukraine and turning it into an unprotected neutral state, as discussed in March–May 2022 (a framework agreement was initiated in Istanbul on March 29 that year—see EDM, March 30, 31, April 4, 5, 2022 for Jamestown coverage). Additionally, Russia seeks Ukrainian acceptance—possibly without official recognition—of Russia’s territorial gains achieved (see EDM, May 29).
On May 17, 24, and 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin made three extensive statements proposing to reactivate the talks that broke down in the spring of 2022. Putin blamed Kyiv for repudiating the “Istanbul agreements” (Putin’s shorthand for that whole process, in which Istanbul was but a fleeting moment). Putin is factually correct, recalling that Kyiv cast aside those documents and backed out of the negotiations, however, the Kremlin invokes that fact only to blame Kyiv for the breakdown in negotiations.
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