Middle-Power Equities in a Cross-Strait Conflict

Rafiq Dossani, Cortez A. Cooper III, Joan Chang

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Introduction

China and Taiwan have had the potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait for a long time. Such a conflict could have military, political, and socioeconomic consequences that reverberate across Asia and the world (The Economist, 2021; Grant, 2019). One reason that such a conflict could have such broad consequences is the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States. The initiation of any armed conflict by China against Taiwan would likely trigger stringent economic sanctions on China by the United States. This response could be followed by direct U.S. involvement in the conflict.

U.S. sanctions, which are known for their extensive global reach and efficacy, make the aftermath of an invasion an unappealing prospect for China, whose economy relies heavily on global trade and investment. Nevertheless, because the unification of Taiwan with mainland China is a core interest for China, an extreme provocation, such as a declaration of independence by Taiwan’s government, could cause conflict.1 Lesser provocations, such as stringent U.S. controls on China’s imports of technology from Taiwan or the continued arming of Taiwan by the United States, could also trigger tensions that could escalate into a conflict that consequently involves the United States.2 There is also the real possibility of unintended escalation from gray-zone activities to full-scale war.3