From Coercion to Capitulation: How China Can Take Taiwan Without a War

Dan Blumenthal, Frederick W. Kagan, Jonathan Baumel, Cindy Chen, Francis de Beixedon, Logan Rank & Alexis Turek

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Executive Summary

Fear that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will invade Taiwan and draw the US into a massive war in the Pacific has for many years driven an increasing American focus on preparing for conflict with the PRC. The expansion of PRC military capabilities and Beijing’s announcement of military expansion milestones in 2027 have intensified those fears and sparked intense debates about America’s potential role in and readiness for deterring and defeating a PRC invasion.

Concerns about America’s ability to defend Taiwan are valid and important because US interests would be severely damaged by the PRC’s conquest of the island. Taiwan is strategically vital to the larger US-led coalition to contain the PRC: A US-friendly Taiwan links America’s allies in the northwestern Pacific with US partners and allies to the south, whereas a PRC-controlled Taiwan would become a springboard for further PRC aggression and would seriously compromise the US-led coalition’s ability to operate cohesively.