Matthew Schleich and Thibault Denamiel
U.S. semiconductor export controls are a double-edged sword. When controls work, they help prevent advanced chip technologies from falling into the hands of bad actors and other U.S. adversaries. However, these same policies strain the very businesses that propelled the United States into technological leadership in the first place. In limiting foreign semiconductor capabilities, Washington also limits its own.
Worse yet, controls do not always work as intended, especially when they are pursued unilaterally. When Washington placed controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment in 2022, it didn’t bring its allies along with it. What followed was a months-long struggle to convince U.S. allies to implement mirroring controls. In that time, U.S. businesses were barred from selling to China while companies in the Netherlands and Japan delivered the very same chipmaking tools to Chinese ports in record quantity.
Generally speaking, this dilemma can also be applied to all 21st century critical and emerging technologies. If the United States hastily tries to hurt Chinese innovation, it will only end up hurting itself.
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