Bernard D. Cole
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has significantly modernized and expanded its naval capabilities, reshaping the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. To shed light on the evolution and implications of the PRC’s naval strategy, Nai-Yu Chen and Jeremy Rausch interviewed Bernard D. Cole about the driving forces behind the transformation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, its current concepts and objectives, and its future trajectory.
What were the original tenets of the PLA Navy’s role in the PRC’s military strategy, and how have these evolved over the ensuing 70 years?
When the PLA Navy was established in 1927, its only stipulated mission was to “carry out the political tasks of the [Chinese] revolution.” By 1982, its focus had shifted to “resist invasions and defend the homeland,” particularly along the coast. This coastal emphasis on supporting the army and operating in “near sea waters” formally changed only in 2004 under Hu Jintao, a shift that I discussed in both editions of my book The Great Wall at Sea.
China has long had a history of deploying strong naval forces, but on an ad hoc basis. An example is the fourteenth-century “Lakes Campaign.” As Edward Dreyer describes in his chapter for Chinese Ways in Warfare, this campaign occurred primarily on Lake Poyang, the largest freshwater lake in China. This was the scene of a large battle between ships of competing factions of the rebellion movement that was fighting to overthrow the Yuan Dynasty. The smaller Ming fleet led by Zhu Yuanzhang used cannon and fire ships to score a victory.
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