Paul Goble
What a difference a few weeks can make. Earlier this spring, the Kremlin appeared to be yielding so many of its positions in the South Caucasus—or at least was on the defensive—that some Russian commentators discussed how Moscow may have entirely and permanently “lost” the region to the West (see EDM, March 14;T.me/anatoly_nesmiyan, March 19; Rosbalt; Vestnik Kavkaza, April 18; RITM Eurasia, April 20; T.me/sytosokrata, April 28).
They had what seemed to be compelling reasons. First, Moscow had just pulled its “peacekeepers” out of Karabakh and removed some of its officers who had been guarding the Armenian border (see EDM, April 22). Second, Armenia was reducing its participation in the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and was talking about joining the European Union and even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Third, Georgia was still distancing itself from Russia and expanding ties with the West. Fourth, Armenia and Azerbaijan were making progress toward a border accord independent of Moscow’s mediation. Fifth, Baku was conducting a major and very independent naval exercise on the Caspian Sea and continuing to cozy up to Türkiye (Window on Eurasia, December 23, 2023; see EDM, March 5, 14).
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