India’s increased defence and security engagement with Southeast Asia

Viraj Solanki

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On 19 April, India delivered BrahMos missiles to the Philippines – the first batch of a US$375 million deal with Manila that will see New Delhi provide three batteries of the cruise missile to the Philippine Marine Corps. The agreement constitutes India’s most valuable defence-export deal to date. It is further indication that following the India–China border clashes of June 2020, New Delhi is seeking to engage more closely with China’s neighbours on regional defence and security issues to counter the latter’s influence – where previously it was more hesitant to do so for fear of antagonising Beijing.

India’s greater willingness to engage Southeast Asian states is in part the result of growing India–China competition. The border clashes in 2020 widened the trust deficit between New Delhi and Beijing and added to the geopolitical polarisation of South and Southeast Asia. India has become increasingly concerned that a China-dominated Southeast Asia could pose a greater challenge for India than previously anticipated. As a result, New Delhi is wary of Beijing’s growing regional presence and influence, including its activities in the South China Sea and the potential impact of those activities on India’s freedom of navigation. As a result, India has become less willing to cater to China’s sensitivities with respect to engaging its neighbours.