Ian Bond
Western action (or more often, inaction) suggests that governments are not as worried as they should be about the possibility that Ukraine might be defeated and the consequences if it were. In fairness, some countries have done a lot: since the war started, Estonia has given 4.1 per cent of its GDP in bilateral and EU aid to Ukraine; Denmark 3 per cent; and Lithuania 2 per cent.3 In the early days of the war, the EU surprised many (probably including many inside its institutions) by agreeing to fund weapons supplies for Ukraine – so far, the European Peace Facility has spent €11.1 billion on weapons, munitions and other military aid to Ukraine.4
But the West has often taken the right decisions only after long hesitation – in some cases, long enough to allow Russia to prepare its counter-measures. In the autumn of 2022, Ukraine liberated significant areas of territory, particularly in the north and north-east of the country. With large numbers of Western tanks it could have pressed home its advantage. By the time small numbers of Western tanks began to arrive in late winter and early spring 2023, the opportunity had been lost: Russia had laid enormous minefields, and Ukraine’s 2023 counter-attack achieved little. Though Ukrainians have welcomed the approval of the latest $60.8 billion US military assistance package, it has been held up for six months by the internal politics of the Republican Party, and Russia has meanwhile been able to profit from Ukraine’s lack of artillery and air defence munitions.
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