Pages

23 April 2024

What Would Russian Victory in Ukraine Look Like?

Seth G. Jones

As war persists in the Mideast, Ukraine’s fight for survival has slipped from the headlines. Yet its efforts grind on, and as I witnessed on a recent visit, its forces are in an increasingly perilous position against their Russian invaders. A palpable sense of anxiety among Ukrainian officials has replaced the optimism of 2022 and 2023. To grasp what is at stake, we must assess how a Russian victory might materialize and what such an outcome would mean for the free world.

The most obvious way Vladimir Putin’s army might prevail is by breaking through Ukrainian lines, collapsing its military, and seizing Kyiv. Though difficult, this is likely Russia’s strategy, which hinges on using brute force in a campaign of attrition by wearing down Ukraine’s lines, forcing units to disperse, decimating its defense production and breaking Ukrainian society’s morale.

A key component of that effort would be to pummel Ukrainian defenses with artillery, attack drones, ballistic and cruise missiles, and glide bombs. This is already happening. Since March, Russian forces have punished Ukrainian lines with artillery and an average of 44 glide bombs and 77 drones a day, senior Ukrainian military officials told me. Russia would also likely continue to escalate its air, missile and drone campaign to target Ukraine’s weapons production facilities, military installations and electricity grid—cutting off its ability to wage war. This, too, has persisted for months.

To capitalize on its ground gains, the Russian military would seek to break Ukrainians’ morale by relentlessly punishing their cities. Such attacks would be complemented by an aggressive propaganda campaign to convince civilians that the U.S. and Europe have abandoned them and that defeat is inevitable.

After weakening Ukrainian defenses and morale, Russian ground forces would punch through fatigued military lines with armor and dismounted infantry, supported by missiles, attack drones and air power. Russia might first seize cities closer to the front lines, such as Slovyansk, Kupyansk and Kramatorsk. Its taking of Kyiv would be only a matter of time. The Russian military is already pressing forward on several axes, including around Siversk and Bakhmut in the east and Robotyne and Verbove in the south.

Most Ukrainian combat brigades are at least 50% undermanned, according to military officials. Russia is using armored columns against defenses more effectively in some areas, such as Donetsk oblast, because of Ukrainian artillery shortages. Moscow is also preparing to mobilize an additional 300,000 soldiers that some Ukrainian and Western officials believe might be used for a major offensive campaign in the late summer or early autumn.

The military balance favors Russia. Its forces have a significant advantage in manpower and a 7-to-1 advantage in firepower, according to Ukrainian assessments. That is owing in part to the West’s dithering in the provision of aid, which has prevented Ukrainian forces from receiving critical artillery, aircraft and air-defense systems. With help from China, Iran and North Korea, Russia has also revitalized its defense industrial base. Quantity has a quality all its own.

In the event that Russian forces can’t take Kyiv, they could nevertheless conquer more territory in the east and south. The Russian army could capture the remainder of Luhansk oblast and push west to take territory in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts. In the south, the Russian army could advance in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, retaking the city of Kherson among others.

A partial Russian victory would create a rump Ukrainian state with a broken economy, while Russia could grow stronger with greater natural resources, industrial strength, and agricultural wealth. Since January, it has already seized more than 139 square miles of territory—an area roughly the size of Las Vegas.

A Russian victory would send shock waves across the globe, stoke the appetites of its allies in China and Iran, and eviscerate U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization credibility and deterrence. It would also embolden Mr. Putin, who sees himself as a modern-day Peter the Great, and put in serious danger Poland, Moldova, Georgia, the Baltic states and other U.S. allies and partners that border Russia.

Some Eastern European governments have already begun to explore contingency options in the event of a Russian victory, developing plans to accelerate air and missile defense, rush additional troops and equipment to NATO’s eastern flank, and buy more advanced weapons systems. The European Union would doubtless also face a humanitarian catastrophe with millions more Ukrainians pouring across its borders.

A Russian victory isn’t inevitable. The Russian military hasn’t won a conventional war since World War II, and its forces suffer from systemic corruption, massive casualties, and an inability to conduct joint operations between air, ground and naval forces.

But the clock is ticking. Without a clear U.S. strategy and a sustained supply of Western weapons, intelligence and training, Mr. Putin could prevail. A dangerous world would suddenly become a lot more so.

Mr. Jones is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

No comments:

Post a Comment