As a new generation of United States ground-based conventionally armed missile programmes gather pace, the question of where the US Army and Marine Corps will deploy these systems is coming into focus. These basing decisions are critical in the Indo-Pacific theatre.
The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement
This blog was first published on the Military Balance+ on 2 April 2024.
Efforts by the United States to build up its ground-based long-range conventional strike capability are starting to materialise, setting the stage for further competition with China in the Indo-Pacific.
The US underscored its appetite for these systems with the release in March of the fiscal year 2025 defence budget request. The US Army is asking Congress to fund 230 Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs), a more than 20% jump from earlier plans. The service also seeks funding for 32 ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles as part of its Strategic Mid-Range Fires (or Typhon) programme, while the Marine Corps is requesting eight launchers under the Long-Range Fires programme and 22 Tomahawk cruise missiles. US Indo-Pacific Command’s unfunded priorities list includes various ground-based missile systems.
Prime time for missilesThe push to field ground-launched strike systems with ranges exceeding 500 kilometres dates to 2019, when Washington exited the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The US withdrew due to its assessment that Moscow had been in breach of the treaty for several years, pointing to the 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 Screwdriver) ground-launched land-attack cruise missile, with a range more than triple the treaty’s lower limit of 500 km, as the system of concern.
The withdrawal also came against the backdrop of the US increasingly focusing on the Indo-Pacific to counter the threat posed by China’s expanding and modernising People's Liberation Army (PLA), particularly from its missile and naval forces. The PLA Rocket Force fields a diverse and sizeable arsenal, with thousands of missiles in its inventory. China was not a party to the INF Treaty, allowing it to develop 500+ km-range land-based systems such as the DF-21 (CH-SS-5) medium-range ballistic missile and the DF-26 (CH-SS-18) intermediate-range ballistic missile. The PLA Navy’s major build-up has given it the status of the world’s largest navy numerically with a force of over 370 ships and submarines, of which more than 140 are major surface combatants.
The collapse of the INF Treaty opened the door for the US to use new types of systems to address China’s military advances. Then US secretary of defense Mark Esper told reporters just a day after the treaty’s demise that ‘we would like to deploy a capability sooner rather than later’ of ground-based intermediate-range conventional missiles in the Indo-Pacific. The development of long-range fires is a key part of the force-modernisation efforts of the US Army and Marine Corps to meet the demands of great-power competition, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
Weapons developments spurred by Washington’s interest in these systems are now coming into inventory. In 2023, the Marine Corps activated its first Long-Range Fires missile battery, while the Army fielded its first Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon battery which is assigned to US Indo-Pacific Command. In January 2024, the Army also activated its second Typhon battery, elements of which are planned to operate in the Indo-Pacific region later this year. This followed an earlier call from the head of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral John Aquilino, for US ground-based missile systems to be deployed to the region to bolster deterrence.
Location, location, location
How those weapons will affect the military balance in the Indo-Pacific will depend heavily on basing decisions the US Department of Defense and US allies have not made clear.
The US has not said where it will deploy the ground-based missile system due in the Indo-Pacific this year. The system will likely be based on Guam, as no US allies in the region have publicly declared any plans to host the new generation of American ground-based missiles, likely reflecting concerns about potential Chinese backlash. Beijing called US plans to deploy intermediate-range ground-based missiles in the Indo-Pacific a ‘dangerous move’ and warned that it ‘will take countermeasures’. When Seoul agreed to host US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems in 2016, Beijing responded with an unofficial economic boycott that cost South Korea's economy USD7.5 billion in 2017 alone. In a US–China conflict, the presence of these American long-range strike missiles could also amplify incentives for the PLA to target host countries.
Basing rights from allies will have a significant impact on the target sets of the new US missile systems. For example, a Typhon system armed with 1,600 km-range Tomahawk cruise missiles and deployed to the Japanese island of Okinawa would be able to strike Chinese naval assets operating in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea and Yellow Sea, or even targets on the Chinese mainland, such as PLA Rocket Force brigades under Base 61 in provinces like Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi and Zhejiang. But without basing rights from Japan or other allies, the US could only deploy the Typhon system to its overseas territory of Guam. From there, the system could range much of the Philippine Sea, but would be unable to strike targets much closer to China.
The same ‘tyranny of distance' issues could exist for other US long-range fires. If the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the M270A2 Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers were armed with the planned 499+ km-range anti-ship PrSMs (Increment Two) and deployed to Okinawa, they could strike Chinese naval vessels in much of the East China Sea. However, they would be unable to strike vessels within the Taiwan Strait, assuming that the missile’s range has not been considerably understated. To engage targets in that important waterway, the launchers would have to be deployed further west in the Ryukyu Island chain to Japan’s Ishigaki Island. If HIMARS and MLRS launchers were deployed to Okinawa and equipped with 499+ km-range Increment One PrSMs, again assuming that its range is not significantly understated, they would not be able to strike the Chinese mainland. To do so, they would need to employ the in-development 1,000 km-range PrSM (Increment Four), which could then target PLA forces in Zhejiang and much of Fujian.
Even the US Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, known as the Dark Eagle, which pairs a ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle, would be unable to strike the Chinese mainland from Guam unless it significantly exceeds its declared range of 2,775+ km.
NMESIS launcher being loaded onto a C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft
Deploying US systems to the territory of regional allies would come with some downsides, mainly putting them within range of even more of China’s strike capabilities. While Beijing has intermediate-range missiles that can target Guam, its inventory of missiles able to strike US launchers theoretically deployed much closer, such as in Japan or the Philippines, is far greater. The Department of Defense’s latest annual report on Chinese military power states that the PLA Rocket Force has 2,300 missiles that can range between 300 km and 3,000 km, but only 500 missiles that can range between 3,000 km and 5,500 km.
Irrespective of clarity on basing issues for Washington, it is clear that ground-launched 500+ km-range missile systems are becoming a growing feature of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
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