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20 April 2024

The Lessons of Israeli Missile Defense


The performance of Israeli air defenses, combined with assistance from U.S. jets and interceptors, saved countless lives on the weekend. But Iran, Russia and other adversaries are learning from each engagement and probing for weaknesses to exploit. The U.S. needs to do more to deter and protect Americans from future assaults.

It’s no small irony that President Biden is hailing the success of missile and drone defenses over Israel. In the 1980s there was no more dedicated foe of missile defense than Sen. Joe Biden. Democrats have resisted or under-financed missile defenses for decades on grounds that they’re too expensive and too easily defeated by new technology.

Progressives oppose defenses because they think vulnerability somehow makes war less likely. On nuclear arms, the Union of Concerned Scientists and others prefer the doctrine of mutual-assured destruction to being able to shoot down enemy ICBMs.

Israel’s defenses proved how wrong this view is, displaying their practical and strategic value. If the more than 300 drones and ballistic and cruise missiles had reached their targets, Mr. Biden wouldn’t be able to say, as he told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Saturday night, “take the win.” The mass casualties would have all but guaranteed a large-scale military escalation.

The weekend success of air defenses is a tribute to Israeli strategy and decades of investment in defense technology. U.S. assistance was also crucial—an example of alliance cooperation paying off in both directions. The U.S. helped to finance Israel’s Iron Dome defense system, which evolved into a co-production agreement that also covers gaps in U.S. missile defenses. The weekend exchange shows that Israel’s defense capability is far superior to Iran’s—at least for now.

But enemies never stand still, and the West’s adversaries are adapting their methods and technology to defeat aerial defenses. One threat is overwhelming defenses with sheer numbers. Israel stood up well against Saturday’s large attack, but it had U.S. and other help. It isn’t clear that Israel could have similar success if Hezbollah unleashed its missile arsenal from Lebanon and Syria while Iran attacked from the west and the Houthis from Yemen.

There is also the question of asymmetric cost. Drones are cheap to produce and easy to transport, but they can be expensive to shoot down. They can also arrive in swarms. That’s why a middling power like Iran specializes in drone production. Iran has been a crucial drone supplier to Russia, which deploys them to deadly effect in Ukraine. Azerbaijan’s drone swarms made the difference last year in its war with Armenia.

Kyiv has built its own drone production line and has bought Turkish drones. But the West will need to innovate to counter the problem of having to shoot down drones with interceptors that are a hundred times more expensive. The U.S. military is experimenting with promising technologies such as high-powered microwave weapons.

Iran’s attack also puts into focus, or at least it should, the shortfall in U.S. interceptor production. The U.S. stockpile is thin, and the Biden Administration had to ask Japan to transfer some of its Patriots so the U.S. could maintain enough for its defenses.

The Senate aid bill for Ukraine, Israel and the Pacific includes money to grow production of the most advanced Patriot interceptor to 650 a year from 550 now. But only 650? The U.S. could exhaust a year’s worth of production in mere weeks of intense fighting, and that figure is insufficient for the growing missile threats around the world.

The U.S. military needs to field new technology rapidly while also shifting closer to a wartime footing to produce more current munitions, including the Standard Missile that handles air defense on U.S. Navy destroyers. That means U.S. defense budgets will have to increase. Saturday night’s events are a lesson in why the U.S. never wants to be low on ammunition to defend itself.

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