Peter Mills
Executive Summary
The Taliban achieved its primary objective by taking over Afghanistan in 2021. It now presides over a weak state that is unable to address long-term socio-economic and security challenges. Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada is worsening tensions within the Taliban as he expands his power within the regime and his policies are exacerbating the economic crisis the country faces. The Taliban faces opposition from domestic groups, which it can suppress in the short term at the cost of aggravating their underlying political grievances over the long term. The Taliban also provides a safe haven for Salafi-jihadi groups that it does not control and is permitting to gain strength. It is unlikely to be able to restrain or prevent those groups from conducting an attack outside of Afghanistan should they choose to do so.
The Taliban’s inability to address the long-term challenges it faces will render it vulnerable to growing domestic opposition and degrade its ability to control Salafi-Jihadi groups in Afghanistan.
I. The Taliban Supreme Leader, Factionalization, and Decision-making
The Taliban is not a homogeneous organization but rather remains a broad coalition of factions with sometimes competing tribal, ethnic, political, business, and ideological relationships. These factions are often difficult to neatly categorize and remain imperfect broad categories rather than strict groupings. Two of the most significant Taliban factions remain the Haqqani Network – with its support base primarily in southeastern and eastern Afghanistan – and the “Kandahari Taliban” with its support base primarily in southern Afghanistan. The split between these factions is partially reflective of the fact that each draw upon a different Pashtun tribal confederacy.1 The Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani also serves as the Taliban Interior Minister and maintains relatives in key positions of power within the Taliban government. The Taliban’s supreme leader and de facto head of state Hibatullah Akhundzada rule Afghanistan from Kandahar with a small inner circle of religious leaders and supporters, often referred to as the “Kandahari Taliban.”
Akhundzadadoes not exert sole control over his powerbase in Kandahar, however, as Taliban leaders like Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoub and Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar, share Akhundzada’s Kandahari background but disagree with his policies. Baradar and Yaqoub rule primarily from Kabul and work with the Taliban cabinet based in Kabul, a group sometimes referred to as the “Kabul Taliban.”2 This group of “Kabul Taliban” can overlap with the Haqqani Network which exerted command and control over Taliban forces in and around Kabul during the Taliban’s insurgency.
Finally, the Taliban movement has expanded to incorporate “Tajik Taliban” and “Uzbek Taliban” groups since the mid-2010s as part of a strategy to expand the Taliban’s support into northern Afghanistan.4 The Taliban Army’s Chief of Staff Qari Fasihuddin is the senior Tajik Taliban commander and has the greatest influence among Tajik Taliban leaders within the Taliban government. The Taliban Agricultural Minister and former 209th Corps Commander Attaullah Omari and Deputy Prime Abdul Salam Hanafi are the two highest rank Uzbek Taliban leaders within the Taliban government.
Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada is taking steps to further expand his power, which will likely exacerbate tensions within the Taliban movement among the factions at the national level, as well as among non-Pashtun commanders in the Taliban’s lower echelons. Akhundzada presides over a fractious Taliban movement that comprises many overlapping factions covering a complex set of tribal, ethnic, political, business, and ideological relationships. He has become more autocratic and willing to override other Taliban leaders’ decision-making after having consolidated power over the Taliban government throughout 2022.5 Akhundzada has established control over the regime’s security policy and is further centralizing power by establishing his own security forces separate from those that report to the Defense Ministry. Top Taliban leaders— including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoub, and Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar—lead their own factions within the Taliban movement, which undermines regime efforts to align socio-cultural and economic policies. Akhundzada has demonstrated his ability to advance his preferred policies, nonetheless. For example, he forced his cabinet to abruptly reverse its plans to reintroduce secondary schooling for girls in March 2022.
Akhundzada: Consolidating Power in Kandahar and Within the Regime
Akhundzada is the ultimate decision maker within the Taliban government and is consolidating his power in Kandahar. Akhundzada is shifting regime decision-making from Kabul to Kandahar, where he lives in relative seclusion. He relies on a narrow clique of ultraconservative religious leaders who are predominantly from Kandahar to support and implement his policies within the Taliban government. Akhundzada forced the Taliban spokesperson and other officials to relocate from Kabul to Kandahar in early April 2023 as part of this shift in power from Kabul to Kandahar.7 Most Taliban cabinet meetings initially took place in Kabul, however, over the course of 2022, they shifted to meeting directly with Akhundzada in Kandahar.8 Akhundzada’s efforts to build a parallel governing system in Kandahar and shift decision-making away from Taliban leaders in Kabul led to rare public criticism from Sirajuddin Haqqani and Yaqoub in early 2023.
The Supreme Leader does not exert sole control over the Taliban movement’s base of power in Kandahar, however. The Taliban leadership is predominantly Pashtun and predominantly from Kandahar and its neighboring provinces.
Key leaders maintain power bases in Kandahar while overseeing Taliban ministries in Kabul. Yaqoub maintains patronage networks in Kandahar while also running the Ministry of Defense from Kabul.11 The cofounder of the Taliban movement, Abdul Ghani Baradar, also remains influential in southern Afghanistan and maintains a working relationship with Yaqoub.
Akhundzada is expanding his power over Taliban governance to ensure regime officials implement his edicts. Akhundzada has created provincial religious councils since late 2022 to monitor provincial Taliban officials and oversee the implementation of Akhundzada’s decrees.13 He has charged the Attorney General’s office—renamed the Chief Directorate of Supervising and Implementing Decrees—with this mission.14 This office also has the power to monitor and prosecute Taliban officials within the Defense and Interior Ministries, as well as the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI).15 Akhundzada directly appoints district commanders and low-level government officials within the central government.16 Akhundzada’s rhetoric has repeatedly emphasized obedience to his decrees on both the Taliban movement and the Afghan population.
The Supreme Leader is also developing a security force that is loyal to him rather than the Taliban regime despite broad alignment among leaders on defense issues. All Taliban leaders want the government to survive and support violently repressing anti-Taliban groups, including Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF). Akhundzada is building a 40,000 strong military force separate from the Taliban military and police, however, because he does not trust top Taliban leaders, including Yaqoub and Sirajuddin.17 A UN Security Council report stated that Akhundzada previously tried to fire Yaqoub and Sirajuddin, who control the majority of the Taliban security forces after they publicly criticized his policies in early 2023.18 Akhundzada aims for his military to share his Noorzai Pashtun tribal background without any loyalties to other senior Taliban military commanders.19 Akhundzada’s Noorzai tribe has traditionally been one of the weakest and most socio-economically disadvantaged Pashtun tribes compared to other tribes in southern Afghanistan. Akhundzada’s favoritism towards his own tribe is not unusual in Afghan politics, but it does disempower traditionally higher social-status Pashtun tribes, contributing to friction within the predominantly Pashtun Taliban movement.
Akhundzada’s consolidation of power is exacerbating tensions between Taliban factions in Kandahar and Kabul, but Taliban leaders continue to give priority to maintaining regime cohesion. Sirajuddin gave a speech publicly criticizing the Taliban leadership for monopolizing power, failing to address the Afghan people’s concerns, and violating their rights, in mid-February 2023.20 This speech implicitly targeted Akhundzada’s leadership and demonstrated a rare example of public dissent within the Taliban leadership. Other Taliban leaders including Yaqoub, and Baradar’s allies, expressed support for Sirajuddin by giving speeches echoing his critiques several days later.21 Akhundzada’s faction condemned the public criticism and reasserted that all Taliban members have a religious duty to obey Akhundzada.22 Akhundzada did not remove Baradar, Sirajuddin, or Yaqoub from their positions, however, and these leaders de-escalated their public criticisms of Akhundzada in mid-late 2023. Both sides’ decision to refrain from escalating the dispute suggests that Taliban leaders are reluctant to risk regime cohesion, despite deep disagreements within the leadership.23 Akhundzada removed his Finance Minister, Hidayatullah Badri, in early 2023 after Badri contested Akhundzada’s ad hoc and erratic withdrawals from the Taliban treasury.24 Badri continued to informally exert power over the Finance Ministry even after Akhundzada reassigned Badri to the Afghan central bank, however.25 This further indicates there are constraints on Akhundzada’s ability to sideline key Taliban powerbrokers within the regime.
The Supreme Leader is also sidelining relative newcomers from Uzbek and Tajik backgrounds to the regime’s ranks. Akhundzada has appointed loyalists from Kandahar across the Taliban government, both in Kabul and in the provinces.26 Uzbek Taliban commanders such as Salahuddin Ayoubi, Makhdom Alem, and Attaullah Omari played a critical role in enabling the Taliban conquest of northern Afghanistan in 2021. These commanders subsequently found themselves detained, demoted, and sidelined from military command authority over the course of 2022.27 Akhundzada responded to dissatisfaction among important Uzbek Taliban commanders by separating them from their power bases in northern Afghanistan and assigning them to positions in Kabul and southern Afghanistan with little power.28 Tajik Taliban commanders also occupy subordinate positions within the regime, but Akhundzada has not marginalized them to the same degree as Uzbek commanders. The Taliban Chief of Army Staff, a Tajik Taliban commander, notionally commands all Taliban military forces, but his power diminished over the course of 2022.29 The Taliban Commerce Minister has a Tajik background and plays an active role in coordinating Taliban trade policy—but he does so under Baradar’s direction—who retains ultimate control over Taliban economic policy.
Divisions in Regime Policymaking
Akhundzada’s isolationist beliefs undermine the regime’s broader efforts to engage with other countries for economic and military gains. Akhundzada believes that international engagement undermines Afghanistan’s independence and has stated that ideological differences preclude a lasting agreement with the international community.31 His perspective diverges from others within the regime, namely Sirajuddin, Baradar, and Yaqoub, who express more pragmatic views based on balancing between multiple international actors to improve the Taliban’s economic and military capabilities. Baradar, the head of the Taliban’s Economic Commission, regularly speaks about encouraging international investment into Afghanistan.32 Yaqoub sought to increase military and trade ties with Qatar, UAE, and India from mid-2022 to early 2023.
Regime factions are not aligned on sociocultural policies, which is resulting in inconsistent implementation of some of Akhundzada’s edicts. Akhundzada has issued edicts for extreme social policies—particularly with regard to banning women’s education—that other Taliban leaders oppose. Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Stanekzai has offered the most public pushback by speaking every several months since mid-2022 about the importance of girls’ education.34 Stanekzai escalated his rhetoric on January 10 stating that when Islamic leaders issue an order against Islamic law—as Stanekzai had previously characterized Akhundzada’s ban on girls’ education—everyone has the right to reject it.35 Sirajuddin, Yaqoub, and Baradar shared Stanekzai’s criticisms in February 2023, which set conditions for Taliban leaders to disobey Akhundzada’s edicts.36 Some Taliban officials have quietly defied Akhundzada’s ban by sending their daughters to secret schools, for example.
Akhundzada also struggles to implement edicts governing Taliban members’ behavior, including measures limiting corruption and extrajudicial killings. Akhundzada issued multiple edicts banning “unnecessary or extravagant” second, third, and fourth, marriages for Taliban officials, but many Taliban commanders continued to engage in multiple marriages despite Akhundzada’s decree.
Akhundzada has repeatedly issued decrees banning nepotism in Taliban government appointments, indicating it remains an ongoing problem.39 Taliban security forces continue to engage in rampant extrajudicial killings in violation of the Taliban’s stated promise of amnesty for people affiliated with the former Afghan government.40 Afghan journalists reported that Akhundzada came into conflict with his director of intelligence over the high number of Salafists killed during Taliban counter-ISKP operations in April 2023. Akhundzada warned his security officials that the Taliban government would not survive if it failed to prevent extrajudicial killings.41 Akhundzada’s failure to enforce his decrees among the Taliban movement’s members suggests that, despite his consolidation of power, there are limits to his authority and to Taliban members’ obedience to the Supreme Leader, a core aspect of the Taliban movement. Mid-ranking Taliban commanders can use their relationship with senior Taliban leaders, such as Sirajuddin, to avoid accountability for fighting with other Taliban commanders and violating Akhundzada’s edicts.
II. Taliban Policies Exacerbating the Economic Crisis
Afghanistan is facing an economic crisis, which the Taliban government is unlikely to correct given the government’s weak institutions and insufficient revenue. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP) has shrunk by 30-35% since 2021 and 60-70% of the Afghan population is unable to afford food and other necessities. 43 Banks are unwilling to facilitate financial transactions in Afghanistan despite US exemptions due to concerns about money laundering and terrorism financing given the Taliban’s relationship with Al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadi groups.44 Although Taliban leaders frequently highlight the relative improvement in security in Afghanistan compared to 2021, the regime lacks the legal institutions to guarantee investors’ property rights and provide legal recourse for investor contract disputes. Taliban-run Afghanistan has no constitution, no clear rule of law beyond Akhundzada’s edicts, and individuals are systematically denied access to legal representation.
The Taliban is unlikely to generate sufficient revenue through taxes to address the economic crisis. The Taliban government collected approximately $2.1-2.3 billion in tax revenue between March 2022 and March 2023. Part of this revenue generation came from more customs revenue due to reduced local corruption at border posts.46 The Taliban Ministry of Agriculture also collects Ushr and Zakat, which are traditional Islamic taxes on land and charity respectively, separately from the Ministry of Finance. The Taliban’s revenue collection is close to the $2.5 billion that the former Afghan Republic collected in 2019, despite the economic contraction since 2021. This $2.5 billion in revenue is far below meeting the former Afghan Republic’s $11 billion in spending, due to the halt in foreign financial assistance.47 The Taliban government has prioritized paying state salaries and maintaining the state bureaucracy, which leaves little money left for development projects and public services.
The Taliban still depends on international financial assistance to stabilize Afghanistan’s currency and maintain public services. The UN injected $1.85 billion in cash to support humanitarian operations and prevent the Afghan currency from collapsing and worsening the economic situation in Afghanistan in 2022.48 Taliban-run Afghanistan received $2.6- 3.5 billion in overall humanitarian aid in 2022.49 The Taliban remains reliant on this foreign assistance to maintain public services, including public health.50 The Taliban government can maintain the state’s bureaucratic capacity in the short term but its ability to provide public services will decline as foreign funding enabling those services declines.
The regime’s use of state funds for patronage rather than public goods is exacerbating its budgetary problems. The Taliban government is collecting significant mining revenue but top Taliban leaders divert some of this money from the central government.51 Akhundzada is funneling Ushr and Zakat taxes collected by the Agriculture Ministry into separate accounts controlled by himself.52 Sirajuddin diverts significant revenues from chromite mining operations in eastern Afghanistan to fund his patronage networks before it goes to the Taliban central government.53 Yaqoub controls substantial unspecified revenue streams and diverts this money to his patronage network before these funds go to the Finance Ministry.54 Baradar is working to centralize all mining revenues under the Ministry of Mines, which one of his allies heads.
Akhundzada’s hardline policies and the Taliban’s diversion of humanitarian aid disincentivize international aid to Afghanistan, which will likely exacerbate the country’s economic crisis. The international community does not recognize the Taliban regime as the legitimate Afghan state and has signaled that the Taliban must form an inclusive government and allow girls’ education, to obtain recognition and financial support.56 Although Sirajuddin, Yaqoub, and Baradar want to implement less extreme sociocultural policies to facilitate foreign investment in Afghanistan, Akhundzada and his hardline supporters are unwilling to change policy no matter how severe the consequences may be for Afghans in Afghanistan.57 Akhundzada’s edict banning women from working for NGOs in December 2022, which the regime extended to women working for the UN in April 2023, suggests the Taliban government’s policies are becoming more extreme, not less.58 This move led to the UN halting its operations for a month following the April ban.59 Taliban interference with the UN’s distribution of humanitarian aid, including seizing aid or directing who receives it, tripled from early 2022 to early 2023.60 The UN’s $4.6 billion 2023 Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan was only 5.4% funded as of mid-April 2023.61 The UN revised the budget for this Humanitarian Response Plan downwards to $3.2 billion in August 2023.
The Taliban’s steps to resource its government, namely generating more tax revenue, drive protests across the country. Local shopkeepers began staging protests in late 2022, temporarily closing their shops, to protest greater Taliban taxation.63 Local shopkeepers staged further protests in major Afghan cities, including Herat and Kabul, in early 2023.64 Local Taliban authorities temporarily reduced taxes in response to some of these protests.65 These protests suggest the Taliban’s ability to raise further revenue without provoking political blowback is limited
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