CLAYTON SWOPE, KARI A. BINGEN, MAKENA YOUNG, MADELEINE CHANG. STEPHANIE SONGER & JEREMY TAMMELLEO
INTRODUCTION
WELCOME TO THE SEVENTH EDITION of the Space Threat Assess - ment by the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). For the last seven years, CSIS has used open-source information to produce an annual assessment of threats to U.S. national security space systems, referred to as counterspace threats, and trends in counterspace capabilities. Each report in this series catalogs yearly developments, uses, and advancements of counterspace weapons and enablers to provide policymakers and the public with accessible insights into the global space threat landscape.
Today, there are more satellites and systems in space providing services, information, and capabilities to people on Earth than ever before. 1 While many of these systems have a civilian mission and are built and run by companies instead of governments, they also support U.S. national security. As noted in past assessments, these civilian and commercial space systems face expanding threats from foreign adversaries, which increasingly include cyber and espionage threats.
Given the criticality of services and capabilities provided by space systems to U.S. national and economic security, the authors believe that policymakers should think in terms of threats and risk as they resource and prioritize miti - gation measures. In addition to threats, a risk assessment includes analysis of vulnerabilities as well as the likelihood of and impacts from undesired events.
Continuing past trends, 2023 saw foreign nations reach new milestones in space: record-setting launches, deployments of satellites, and missions to the Moon and other parts of the solar system. 3 While not strictly advancing in counterspace weapons, foreign countries have shown progress in building and expanding the foundational capabilities needed to support both space and counterspace systems. China broke its national record for launches in one year and, for the third time, sent its reusable spaceplane into orbit. 4 North Korea successfully launched a satellite into space, while Iran placed its third surveillance satellite into orbit. 5 Over the last year, both India and Japan landed missions on the Moon. 6 In February 2024, the world learned that Russia is developing a spacebased counterspace weapon involving nuclear technology, bringing more public awareness and policymaker attention to space security.
As in the prior two years, space-based capabilities, especially commercial space services, played a publicly visible role in conflict zones. Information from commercial remote-sensing space systems and connectivity from satellites continued to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression. 7 Space also influenced the conflict in Israel and Gaza, with media organizations using commercial satellite imagery to share information about the conflict’s impacts. 8 These examples demonstrate the accessibility and utility of space-based services offered by U.S. companies to parties involved in conflicts, putting space business leaders in the middle of geopolitics, global security questions, and, in some cases, military conflict.
OVERVIEW OF COUNTER SPACE CAPABILITIES
This chapter provides an overview of different types of counterspace weapons and a useful taxonomy to classify and differentiate them. Counterspace weapons vary significantly in the technical methods used to create effects against space systems, in how they are deployed, and in the level of technology and resources needed for their development and fielding. For the purposes of this report, counterspace capabilities are organized into four main categories: kinetic weapons, non-kinetic weapons, electronic weapons, and cyber operations. This report also discusses unfriendly behaviors in space and the potential implications of such behaviors on space security. Capabilities intended to conduct espionage only are not considered weapons but are discussed in this report.
Kinetic attacks are defined here as those taken through physical, material means such as bombs, bullets, missiles, and other munitions. All kinetic attacks are considered as meant to destroy or damage. This category includes weapons that target spacecraft, such as direct-ascent (DA) anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles outfitted with conventional warheads, and projectile attacks launched from one on-orbit satellite to another. It also includes attacks using bombs, missiles, or other physical means on terrestrial space infrastructure, such as ground stations, launch sites, rocket and satellite factories, and space monitoring infrastructure. Orbital grappling satellites are another form of kinetic attack. Such a grappler physically handles a target spacecraft to do it harm or attaches itself to a spacecraft and maneuvers it to another location. In the latter case, such “kidnapping” would not destroy the target satellite, but could effectively disable it without generating any debris.
Non-kinetic attacks are defined as those that use radiated energy to destroy, damage, or interfere with space systems. This energy can be directed, such as with laser or microwave energy, or distributed through nuclear detonations or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) events. High-powered lasers and dazzlers and high-powered microwave ASAT systems are included in this category. Dazzlers are intended to temporarily blind an optical satellite, although they may also unintentionally damage targeted satellites. Nuclear detonations in near space or space are included in this category because these attacks primarily damage electronics through the resulting EMP and lingering radiation that gets trapped in orbit by Earth’s magnetic field. Other non-nuclear weapons that create EMP events in space would also be included in this category.
To date, no country has used a kinetic or non-kinetic weapon to destroy or permanently disable another country’s satellite, but four countries—the United States, Russia, China, and India—have successfully tested DA ASAT missiles against their own satellites.9 These types of attacks risk the creation of orbital debris, which can indiscriminately affect other satellites and human-crewed systems, such as the International Space Station (ISS) and China’s Tiangong space station.10 Depending on altitude, orbital debris can persist for decades, if not centuries, and pose a long-term risk to the space environment. According to one industry expert, over half of all low Earth orbit (LEO) fragments today comes from just six breakup events, with more than a quarter of LEO debris fragments produced by one event: China’s DA ASAT test that destroyed its Fengyun 1C weather satellite in 2007.
Electronic weapons use the electromagnetic spectrum to deny or interfere with a target’s ability to use space services and capabilities. These weapons cannot destroy; they only impart temporary effects as long as the electronic system engages its target. This category includes jamming and spoofing of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and satellite communications (SATCOM) signals. Spoofing is a form of electronic attack where an attacker tricks a receiver into believing a fake signal produced by the attacker is the real signal it is trying to receive. It can affect GNSS signals from the Global Positioning System (GPS), Galileo, BeiDou, and GLONASS systems, in addition to non-encrypted satellite downlinks.12 Use of GNSS jammingand spoofing has become commonplace, with GNSS interference observed around the world, often by commercial airline pilots.13 Also included are any electronic attacks to jam space-based radar and the reception of radio frequency (RF) signals by the user of a satellite service on Earth, the satellite itself, or the ground station of a space system.
The final category, cyber operations, includes any offensive activity in cyberspace that targets space systems, including ground infrastructure, satellite terminals, spaceports, and spacecraft. Cyber operations can destroy or permanently disable a targeted system, although they can also be used to temporarily disrupt or to conduct espionage, including gaining access to proprietary or sensitive technical information on a target network. A network exploitation can be a beachhead for any of these purposes, as a cyber operation’s intent is often ambiguous.
The same ambiguity also clouds efforts to understand and accurately classify most unfriendly satellite behaviors conducted by Russian and Chinese satellites, including close approaches. It is generally difficult to neatly categorize these capabilities. For example, Russia’s second Luch/Olymp satellite, launched in 2023, probably positions itself near other satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) to conduct intelligence activities.15 But it might also be validating a concept of operations for future orbital kinetic attacks,
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