Boaz ItsHaky
Events in the Middle East are sweeping through the region at speed and intensity, making it difficult to keep current. Situations are fluid, trying to stay ahead of the curve requires adjustments on the go. The following is a mix of the old with the latest, and my assessment of what needs to be done.
Iran & Syria
I begin this article with Iran and Syria because of the recent attack on a building in the proximity of Iran’s consulate in Damascus – an Attack which killed a few high-ranking Iranian officials. Iran has accused Israel of perpetrating the attack and vowed revenge. Yet, no official Israeli confirmation has been provided.
My assessment is that Iran’s response will be minimal, which eventually will benefit Israel’s regional axis that is forming rapidly. Possible retaliation vehicles include:
• Missiles and/or UCAVs launched from Yemen. Israel will retaliate against the Houthis, which will yield geopolitical benefits and support.
• Missiles and/or UCAVs launched from Iraq. Israel has an Iraqi target bank that has been in the waiting for a long time.
• Missiles and/or UCAVs launched from Iran. This will allow Israel to openly move its fight from Iran’s proxies to Iran’s territory. The Ayatollahs understand very well the consequences of such an option, which is why they always attack Israel through their proxies.
• No full activation of Hezbollah because of various complicate constraints (see Lebanon below)
Lebanon
Israel should apply the “peeling an onion” strategy against Hezbollah in Lebanon. That is, peeling off Hezbollah’s capabilities, layer after layer, forcing Hezbollah to retreat. First layer will force a retreat from Israel’s immediate border, followed by additional steps that will force Hezbollah’s retreat to the northern bank of the Litani river. In tandem it will force Lebanon to reestablish the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701... to the dot.
Apropos UN: The March 30th explosion in which 3 UN observers and their translators were wounded in the town of Rmeish in southern Lebanon. We have come to find out that the explosion caused by explosives that were buried by Hezbollah (most likely an IED) and not by Israel’s direct or indirect fire, which was blamed for the incident.
In my assessment, Iran will not fully activate its “proxy crown jewel” Hezbollah. Such activation would mean a total destruction of Lebanon that could force Hezbollah – perhaps for the first time – to disobey orders from the Ayatollahs. If events will further escalate but not to a full activation of Hezbollah, Israel should consider – as a warning at first – some “roof knocking without the followup” on a few very specific buildings in Beirut’s Dahieh neighborhood.
Jordan
Iran’s may be trying to open a new front against Israel in Jordan. Recent evidence suggests that Iran is currently attempting to arm thousands of Jordanian Palestinians. To a certain degree these efforts are not new, for that reason I suggested in my Day After Plan
that Jordanian Palestinians will also be allowed to move to the new designated Palestinian State.
It is in Israel’s strategic interest to keep Jordan as is. Reducing the Jordanian Palestinian (demographic) pressure cooker in Jordan will only serve Israel’s best and broad interests.
Egypt & Gaza Strip
In my assessment October 7th was ordered by Iran in the attempt to drive a wedge into Israel and Saudi Arabia normalization initiative. The Ayatollahs were aiming for a mild to mid level blow to Israel, strong enough – but not too strong – to halt the normalization initiative. As an add-on to recent Abraham Accords, the threat to the Ayatollahs’ expansionist ambitions has become intolerable and required some action. Hamas was told that other proxies will pool together into the action as well, but it was not told to what extent. Hamas was led to believe that other proxies’ involvement will be to the max, otherwise it would have never agreed to go on what turned out to be a self-destruct mode. Hamas hopes never materialized because that was not what the Ayatollahs were aiming at, their aim projected a one location border breach, at best two, assuming that this will be sufficient to halt the normalization initiative between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The magnitude of Hamas’ “uber success” was by default to Israel failings on October 7. However, in the long-term aftermath, it will eventually lead to a significant destruction of Hamas’ physical capabilities. Enough for it to lose control over the Gaza Strip, an unwanted event the Ayatollahs did not wish for, on the contrary.
The tragic death of 7 World Central Kitchen (WCK) employees on April 2nd. The incident enhances further my solution to the humanitarian aid distribution in my Day After Plan.
Rafah and Philadelphi Route. Timing is everything and the optimal timing to overtake Philadelphi Route first and Rafah second was at the very first leg (together or without any other measures) of the first phase of the ground operation. The fact that it did not happen then, points to continued failings of Israel’s planners and decision makers well beyond October 7th. In fact, the failings continue to this very day.
Regardless, it must be done, here is a four steps plan to overtake Philadelphi Route and Rafah:
1. Move the civilian population to an area north of Deir Al Balah and south of Gaza city.
2. Isolate Rafah from the south, north and west. The Philadelphi Route from Kerem Shalom to Rafah Crossing, to Salah Al Deen Road, to Al Nasser Street, west on Gush Katif’s road sharp curve to north. From there cut through in a straight line to the Mediterranean Sea.
3. Takeover of Philadelphi Route from Rafah Crossing all the way to the Mediterranean Sea.
4. Takeover of Rafah with or without initial siege.
Egypt is building a miles wide buffer zone along its border with the Gaza Strip. The complete project will stretch from the Mediterranean and all along its Gaza Strip border. The initial rationale is to create an isolated area that will be capable of absorbing an influx of Palestinians fleeing from the strip. Pertaining to the long term phase of my Day After Plan, this area could in effect become part of the future Palestinian state in Sinai.
Plans for a Palestinian state that will include Judea and Samaria (in one form or another) will be a no starter in Israel’s post October 7th. A fact that no U.S. presidential candidate should weigh lightly. Any regional or geopolitical grand realignment plans should take note of that as well. Including the ambitious India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative, which will leave Egypt (a partner) with lost revenues from decreased traffic through the Suez Canal.
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