Milan Vego
Political objectives are usually achieved by using one’s military power. Converting political objectives into achievable military-strategic objectives is the primary responsibility of military-strategic leadership. This process is largely an art rather than a science. There are many potential pitfalls because much depends on the knowledge, understanding, experience, and judgment of military-strategic leaders. Most often, mistakes made are only recognized after setbacks or defeats suffered during the hostilities. Despite its critical importance, there is no consensus on the steps and methods in converting political- into militarystrategic objectives. There is scant writing on the subject in either doctrinal documents or professional journals.
Political vs. Military Objectives
Any war is fought to achieve certain political objectives, which may be described as securing important national or alliance/coalition interests in a certain part of a theater. When aimed to achieve national interests, a political objective is strategic in scale. Its accomplishment could have a radical effect on the course and outcome of a war. In his seminal work On War, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) wrote that “no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is the political purpose; the latter its operational objective.”1 He observed that “the political object—the original motive for war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”2 Political objectives may be purely political. However, they are often combined with ideological, geopolitical, economic, financial, social, ethnic, and religious objectives.
A military-strategic objective is ending the enemy’s organized resistance and thereby achieving a major part of a given political-strategic objective. Yet the entire political objective is not accomplished unless military-strategic success is consolidated during the posthostilities (or stabilization) phase of a war. A military-strategic objective must always be subordinate to a given political objective. The British theoretician B.H. Liddell Hart cautioned that political leadership must make sure that political objectives of a war are achievable with military means that are currently or will soon be available. He warned that policy should “not demand what is militarily—that is, practically, impossible.” The “war aims must be adopted to limitations of strength and policy.”
In the case of continent-size countries, such as the United States or the Russian Federation, or of the oceanic theaters (for example, the Atlantic or Pacific), the possibility exists of having a war in two or more war theaters. Then, for each of them, a single military-strategic objective must be determined. In World War II, the United States had two national military-strategic objectives: unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in Europe (Nazi Germany and Italy) and in the Pacific region (Imperial Japan).4 Then, in each theater of war, there would also exist two or more theater-strategic objectives—whose accomplishment would result in the destruction of a major part of the enemy forces and then set conditions for a posthostilities phase in a given theater of operations. Their accomplishment would have a radical effect on the course and outcome of a war in a given theater. It would also signify a major phase in a war. In a theater of operations with a large population and developed infrastructure (“developed” theater), such as was Western Europe in World War II or the Iraqi theater of operations in 2003, the theater-strategic objective is subordinate to a given political objective (which, in turn, is subordinate to the national or alliance/coalition political-strategic objective) (see figure 1). In contrast, in a sparsely populated theater with little or no infrastructure (“undeveloped” theater), as were the Solomons, central Pacific, and Papua New Guinea in World War II, the theater-strategic objectives would be predominantly or exclusively military.
In the offensive phase of the war in the Pacific (after August 1942), the Allies had in the Pacific Ocean area three theater-strategic objectives: defending Alaska and the Aleutians, capturing the Solomons archipelago, and capturing the Japanese strongpoints in the central Pacific. In the Southwest Pacific area, the Allies had two identifiable theaterstrategic objectives: capturing Papua New Guinea and the Philippines. The final theater-strategic objective for the Pacific Ocean area command was capturing/ neutralizing the southern approaches to the home islands (Formosa, Iwo Jima, and Ryukyus) and then, jointly with the Southwest Pacific area’s forces, assaulting and occupying the home islands. This part of the theater-strategic objectives was made unnecessary after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.
Prerequisites
Among the main requirements for determining a realistic military-/ theater-strategic objective are sufficient military capabilities, sound prediction of the duration of a war, accurate strategic intelligence, and realistic political/ military assumptions. The accomplishment of a military-strategic objective is predicated on having sufficient military capabilities. The greater one’s numerical/qualitative superiority, the more ambitious the military-strategic objectives that might be accomplished. For German Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., the main requirement for a war was numerical superiority of the Prussian armies. This was achieved by general conscription. Moltke’s aim was to defeat an enemy army in a “single powerful blow.” At the same time, the importance of numerical superiority should not be overstated. Experience shows that in many cases, superior numbers are of no avail.
mbers are of no avail. In evaluating overall strength of friendly and enemy forces, a great deal of attention must be paid to intangible elements, such as morale and discipline, will to fight, skills of the leaders, and soundness of doctrine. These factors are often more critical than numerical strength. Sometimes, the spiritual strength of an army may balance other deficiencies. The influence of a single personality may also greatly enhance the capabilities of the entire army and even the entire state.5 Experience shows that numerically weaker forces could often defeat a much larger force because of the better quality of their leaders and the better training, morale, and discipline of their troops. In Germany’s invasion of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in May 1940, for instance, the ratio of attacker to defender was 0.7 to 1, or 3,740,000 Allied soldiers (including 2,240,000 French troops) facing 2,760,000 Germans. The Allies had a 3-to-2 superiority in artillery pieces. However, France had only 3 armored divisions (plus 1 more created during the campaign) against Germany’s 10 panzer divisions.6 The German success in that campaign was due more to much higher quality of leadership, doctrine, combat training, and morale/discipline than to materiel.
In some cases, as the war on the Eastern Front in 1941–1945 illustrates, the sheer number of troops, tanks, guns, and aircraft is simply overwhelming, no matter what the skills of the commanders and rank and file, morale and discipline, or training and soundness of doctrine of the opposing force. The Germans had assigned 145 divisions (including 19 panzer divisions and 14 infantry motorized divisions) with 3.2 million men (out of a total 3.8 million) for the invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941.7 They also had a small contingent of Romanian and Finnish forces, but the effectiveness of their equipment and combat was well below that of the Germans.8 The German Eastern Army (Ostheer) was superior in combat experience to the Red Army. Except for nine security divisions (SicherungsDivisionen),9 all other German divisions were fully equipped with modern weapons. The training and confidence of the German troops were high. German leadership, especially at the operational level, was superior to leadership of the Red Army.10 The German high commanders were experienced in maneuvering large, motorized forces, and the individual German soldier was self-confident. The Germans believed that the element of surprise in launching the invasion would probably compensate for some of the German numerical inferiority.
In their invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russians mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 men.12 They faced initially a 250,000-man Ukrainian army.13 The Russians employed seven combined arms armies and elements of two others plus one guards tank army. They also deployed airborne, naval infantry, and Spetsnaz light infantry around Ukraine’s borders.14 The Russians not only had numerically inadequate forces to defeat and effectively control Ukraine—a country covering some 233,000 square miles (600,000 square kilometers) and with a population of about 41 million (in January 2022)—but they also grossly underestimated the Ukrainian ability to use skillfully their smaller but better trained and highly motivated forces both in defense and on offense.
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