Ian J. Kurtz
ABSTRACT
Recently, national security pundits and the media have devoted much attention to the question of whether the current process of Presidential authority to order a nuclear attack is appropriate. Critics maintain that the President of the United States (POTUS) should not possess sole authority and seek to change this. The debate focused on a scenario of an unstable POTUS without any system of checks and balances unilaterally, and without opposition, orders military forces to execute a nuclear attack while the military, powerless and intimidated, do nothing.
The author examines this question: “If a U.S. President were to issue an illegal order to start nuclear war, would or could the members of the Armed Forces intervene and put a stop to it?” The notion that highly trained and experienced military personnel would stand idly by while an irrational commander-in-chief unleashed an illegal nuclear attack on an innocent party because they were in fear of being relieved of duty is an affront to the integrity of the men and women who serve.
DISCUSSION
This paper examines the logic behind allowing POTUS to be the sole individual to initiate a nuclear attack and the role of the military.
While POTUS does indeed possess the authority to give the final order, he does not do so without consultation and does not possess the ability to physically conduct an attack if opposed by his advisors. Contrary to popular opinion, there is no “button,” nor does the POTUS have access to “nuclear launch codes” as if he could enter a few numbers into a transmitter and missiles thousands of miles away would fly out of their silos. To be sure, many of the specifics of this process are classified. However, what is known is that once the POTUS signals his intentions, he will confer with his “senior advisors.” This conference may also involve the civilian members of the National Security Council, senior government officials that provide guidance to the POTUS on national security matters. It is important to note that this process involves many of our nation’s senior government and military leaders; the POTUS would not directly contact military forces. The process is not haphazard, nor is it “insane.”
For over 70 years, the Department of Defense has maintained a sophisticated process that guarantees only POTUS can approve the employment of nuclear weapons. Given that the nuclear program belongs to POTUS as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, such policy is indeed reasonable. However, many critics of the process consistently overlook important considerations: military training, chain-of-command, and core values.
The debate is this: POTUS has become incapacitated (or “unhinged” as is commonly described by the media). He orders his military aide (an experienced, seasoned military officer charged with initiating the process) to open the nuclear football in order to authorize an illegal nuclear strike on an innocent, unsuspecting target. POTUS signals his intent, the order is communicated to the Pentagon where military leadership will be unable or unwilling to object, and nuclear war is underway.
If POTUS were to initiate a nuclear attack, he has significant expertise at his disposal, to include senior officials, both military and civilian. Their responsibility is to advise POTUS, from both a military as well as a legal standpoint. To ensure that presidential authority is properly exercised, the military’s nuclear command and control system would transmit these orders through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders in charge of U.S. nuclear forces.
Although POTUS has the authority to authorize the final order, he is, in essence, “asking” the military to start nuclear war as he does not have the physical ability. There is no button, nor are there codes to be entered into a gadget enabling nuclear arms to launch; he cannot simply sweep aside the military and execute nuclear forces by himself. POTUS may order a nuclear strike all he wants, but only a properly evaluated, legal order from the commander-in-chief will prompt the military to act. Illegal nuclear attack constitutes a war crime; the U.S. military stands at the gate to ensure the laws of war are followed.
Another argument suggests that dissenting leaders are fearful of being “fired.” In 2019, one pundit suggested that the serving secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security might stay silent because they had only been in the job for a few months, indicating a lack of seniority would be a reason to allow such a consequential event to occur. In reality, there is zero evidence to suggest that such a scenario would take place. In fact, during the Trump Administration, several senior leader chose to resign rather than serve under POTUS. It is not a rational argument to suggest that job security, worry about one’s legacy, or ego would play a role in a senior leader choosing to do nothing while POTUS carried out an illegal nuclear attack. What would be rational to assume is that, after the first firing, news would spread rapidly that POTUS is relieving individual military members until he finds someone who will validate his illegal nuclear war order. 21st Century social media being what it is, such a situation would likely de-escalate quickly. It is also reasonable to assume that such dissenters would be honored for saving thousands of lives and restoring faith in the system.
Widely regarded as the finest military force in the world today, the U.S. military is not without skeptics. In 2017 Senate testimony, retired USAF General Robert Kehler, pointed out that military members do not blindly follow orders and the orders, according to their training, must be legal. Unfortunately, the sponsor of a bill to limit POTUS’ authority remained unconvinced, “I don’t have confidence that a military chain of command would reject an order by the president to launch nuclear weapons…” Why the abject distrust of the U.S. military? There is zero evidence to validate these comments and no reason to believe that military members would be complicit in an illegal nuclear attack. The core values of military service such as honesty and integrity are deeply ingrained in the culture and training of the U.S. military and must be taken into consideration here.
The Department of Defense Law of War Manual states: “The U.S. [sic] would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the U.S., or its allies or partners” Any other scenario would constitute an illegal order; therefore, the many layers of military leadership would not be obligated to follow it. Indeed, senior and retired military leaders have testified to the fact that there are severe consequences for carrying out illegal military orders which could include imprisonment or punishment by death during wartime (certainly far more serious than being relieved of command).
Military personnel assigned to the Nuclear Enterprise are subject to a robust vetting process. In addition to security clearances (most possess a Top Secret clearance), many are certified for duty by means of a personnel reliability assurance program and undergo rigorous initial and recurring training. Equally importantly, military members are educated in their Service’s core values.
Nuclear surety provides a layered approach to keeping the U.S. nuclear stockpile functioning safely and properly. It is defined by USAF instruction as, “Policies, procedures, controls, and actions that encompass safety, security, and control measures, which ensure there will be no nuclear weapon accidents, incidents, unauthorized detonation…” The training and education of Nuclear Enterprise personnel reinforces this. Well-trained and educated people provide a strong deterrent by signaling to allies and adversaries alike that they are highly capable of performing the important mission of nuclear deterrence. A commonly used phrase in the nuclear business is, “The U.S. uses nuclear weapons every day to keep the peace.”
Critics suggest that the authority question should be altered to allow for Congressional input. The reasoning is that this would preclude the use of strictly political appointees and instead would bring elected officials into the decision-making process. The author does not consider such options compelling as, again, they are based on the premise that vetted senior officials and the military are untrustworthy.
SUMMARY
The U.S. policy of a safe, secure, and reliable approach to nuclear weapons provides untold contributions to the effective deterrence of adversaries assurance of our allies and is vital to maintaining a vigilant and credible nuclear posture. Ongoing discussion of a perceived problem without analyzing the facts can have a negative impact on our deterrent credibility. It signals to adversaries and allies alike that the ability of our Armed Forces to perform their mission with integrity and professionalism is in doubt. Such uninformed talk, meant to be used for political gain, is deeply disrespectful to the U.S. military. In a crisis, the U.S. military can be counted on to do the right thing.
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