Why America Is Still Failing in Iraq

Renad Mansour

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Hamas’s October 7 attack and Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip began a fresh eruption of violence across the Middle East. Peace in the region, which has long been Washington’s stated aim, has proved illusory once again. No matter how many times the United States has tried to pivot away from the Middle East, violence always seems to pull it back in. In this latest cycle, the Biden administration’s hasty withdrawal from the region was based on its claim that it was the most stable it had been for decades. And yet, in Iraq, U.S. bases are once again under attack from armed groups, endangering the temporary ceasefire which had allowed Baghdad and Washington to sign the Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue in August 2023 and to begin wider negotiations, including on the removal of U.S. troops from the country. Regional violence after October 7 has complicated this process.

So has the rise of an “axis of resistance,” a network of Iran-allied armed groups that includes Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada in Iraq and Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen. These groups are politically, economically, militarily, and ideologically entrenched in their states, and are united by their shared opposition to foreign occupation.

U.S. forces have attacked these groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, killing their senior leaders and destroying their trading hubs and weapons depots. Washington has also sanctioned their banks and businesses. But these strikes and punitive measures—described by a senior U.S. official as “whack-a-mole”—have not been successful in securing peace or stability. The groups that Washington targeted have not gone away. Instead, they have flourished, becoming even more powerful within their countries and the wider region. Washington has proved itself unable to tackle the true sources of these groups’ power, which lie not in military infrastructure alone but in the social and political structures of the Middle East. Armed groups thrive under fragile governments, and their networks include cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, judges, senior bureaucrats, and civil society organizers. This influence allows these groups, along with the wider political establishment in these countries, to profit from state coffers and enjoy impunity from any prosecution—all while performing key state functions at the national and local level.

Washington’s use of violence and of sanctions has done little to dampen the strength of these groups or to diminish their power. This is because bombs and sanctions do not produce political reform. A more coherent and comprehensive U.S. response is needed to encourage Middle Eastern governments’ accountability and to check the elite power and impunity that are rife in in the region. This is the only way to move beyond the cycle of quick-wins and temporary ceasefires, which never hold.

FORCE FAILS

Armed groups in Iraq and Syria became powerful during the fight against the Islamic State, which in 2014 conquered a third of Iraq and almost half of Syria. When the U.S.-trained and U.S.-funded Iraqi military crumbled overnight, these groups joined the newly formed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which was the first group to respond and resist further ISIS advances. The PMF includes dozens of armed groups across the ethnosectarian—though predominantly Shia—spectrum, with varying ideologies. Some are domestically minded, focusing on the Iraqi state, whereas others see themselves as part of a wider transnational and pan-Shia vanguard struggle, in partnership with Iran, to support allies including the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen. For several years, these groups fought on the same side as Washington to drive ISIS from Iraq and Syria. However, following victory over their common enemy, U.S. and PMF forces turned on each other and began to fight. Washington, particularly during the Trump administration, sought to target Iran by attacking its allies in the region, principally PMF groups in Iraq and Syria. To that end, in January 2020, U.S. forces killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps General Qasem Soleimani and PMF leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

A senior U.S. official told me in 2019 that groups including Kataib Hezbollah are like a “cancerous tumor that need to be surgically removed.” These groups’ supposed malignancy means that Washington’s preferred method for dealing with them is invariably violent. This was seen most recently when Kataib Hezbollah killed three U.S. servicemembers in Jordan on January 28, and the Biden administration responded on February 2 by launching airstrikes across 85 targets in seven locations in Iraq and Syria. Bases and arms depots were hit, with further strikes on two Kataib Hezbollah leaders in downtown Baghdad following days later.

Many U.S. officials and analysts supported this response, although some, including House Speaker Mike Johnson and Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Turner complained that the response was not enough and should have come quicker and with more force. They argued that the delay gave Iran and its allies too much time to prepare and move away from potential U.S. targets. Nonetheless, the attacks led to a cessation of hostilities, with Kataib Hezbollah immediately declaring a cease-fire, and the other groups following suit. This has happened before: strikes produce periodic cease-fires without reducing the influence of these networks or leading to a more stable region. The cease-fires never last long.

BEYOND THE BOMBINGS

The United States has used other weapons to weaken these groups’ influence, including sanctions. The U.S. State Department has designated several PMF groups and leaders as terrorist organizations or individuals, and in the most recent round, announced in January, Washington added dozens of banks and individuals to the list. This included the Iraqi airline company Fly Baghdad, which has apparently been transporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ assets.

For groups deemed more acceptable—including the Atabat groups that remain loyal to Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, or even the Badr Organization, which is one of the larger PMF groups and more integrated into the Iraqi government—the United States has tried cooption. Washington has proved itself willing to work with those PMF groups it deems to be less aligned to Iran or the axis of resistance and more focused on the Iraqi state. To that end, the United States has attempted to induce PMF leaders, including its commission’s chair, Falih al-Fayadh, and the Badr Organization head, Hadi al-Ameri, to integrate into the governments and political settlements of their countries. Washington has sought to incentivize these groups by promising them political backing. One senior U.S. official told me in 2021 that some of the groups linked to the PMF in Baghdad were better off being part of the Iraqi government because it would make them more answerable to the state and, therefore, the public.

Time and again, however, Washington has proved itself unable to pursue a coherent strategy and navigate the networks that make up the Iraqi state. Isolating the good and targeting the bad has not always proved easy. For example, assassinating Soleimani, Muhandis, and other military leaders has made it more difficult for the co-optable individuals from these networks to keep their agreements with the United States. This is partly because the value of U.S. backing—a key incentive in post-2003 Iraq—wanes with every American attack or foreign policy blunder. More critically, simply integrating militias into the government and hoping that they become more accountable has not worked. In the years following the U.S. invasion, the Badr Organization, the Sadrists, and others were integrated into government departments, including the ministries of interior and defense, as well as the national security agency. The lack of accountability in these institutions meant that these fighters served the interests of their ruling elites, not their government superiors or the institutions themselves.

WASHINGTON’S CHOICE

Not only are U.S. policies ineffective in reducing the influence of these armed groups but they have come at a cost. Killing senior leaders has at times disrupted the chain of command, leading to an increase in freewheeling, undisciplined groups willing to strike without the consent of the PMF leadership or its Iranian allies. The death of Iraqi researcher Hisham al-Hashimi in July 2020, for instance, was a consequence of the chaos that ensued after the killing of Muhandis, who in the past could better control these militias. Indeed, U.S. strikes can make the command structures only more incoherent, as was seen by Kataib Hezbollah’s killing of three servicepeople in Jordan. The strike went against the interests of the domestically focused PMF groups, such as Badr or Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which benefit from the status quo in Baghdad and want to minimize any regional escalation that could jeopardize their domestic power.

At the heart of the United States’ failure to find a way to deal with these groups is a fundamental misreading of their nature, their interrelationships, and their connections to the region’s governments. These armed groups are not exclusively military organizations that can be isolated from wider political, economic, social or ideological networks that cross state and nonstate lines. Rather, many of them have their own political parties that are active both locally and nationally. Moreover, these groups have allies in the civil service, the judiciary, and the military. They often fight side by side with government forces to defend the state against insurgent groups, including ISIS, or against protest movements, as was seen in Iraq in 2019. The ties between these armed groups and political and social institutions mean that any direct military attempt to isolate and remove them will not affect their power or the influence of their wider networks.

A different approach is needed. It must begin with a recognition that these groups are not independent anomalies but are indivisible from the networks of power that govern Middle Eastern countries, in which ruling elites rely on their own militias to maintain power. In the short term, the Biden administration and the government in Baghdad, which includes the domestically focused PMF leaders, are on the same page. They want to maintain the cease-fire with the “axis of resistance” and push forward with the Higher Military Commission (HMC) to renegotiate the bilateral relationship between the two countries, including the withdrawal of current U.S. forces. This will, though, require pushing for a cease-fire in Gaza, as Israel’s actions have had consequences across the region.

In the longer term a more sustainable approach to these armed groups is required. Washington should shift its approach away from focusing only on armed groups and instead examine the features of the political settlements that allow these groups to proliferate. The key to ensuring that cease-fires last, and do not unravel and draw the United States back in, is promoting accountability. Washington and its like-minded allies should, then, focus on reforming the states whose leaders harm their publics on a daily basis. Corruption in these countries is rife and offers both financial rewards and impunity for those leaders and armed groups who have captured government bureaucracies. The only challenge to this system and its elites remains the public, who protest and call for a better life. The key, then, for the United States and its allies is ensuring that their strategy supports these civil society movements and finds a way to reduce everyday conflict. That, not military strikes, is the way to peace.