Strategic Stability and the Ukraine War

Fabian Hoffmann

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INTRODUCTION

The Russia-Ukraine war marks the first instance of a major inter-state war involving the large-scale deployment and use of conventional ballistic and cruise missile technology. As a result, the Ukrainian theater has become a test bed for missile technology and strategy and has revealed the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary missile forces and doctrines. The implications of the deployment and use of offensive conventional missile capabilities and defenses against such capabilities in Ukraine extend beyond the battlefield and affect the broader strategic competition between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper explores those implications, asking how the deployment and use of long-range strike weapons and missile defense systems in Ukraine affects Russia-NATO strategic stability

In this analysis, long-range strike weapons include Russian, Ukrainian, and Western conventional cruise and ballistic missiles as well as conventional long-range drones that have been used by both sides to engage targets at standoff range, including deep inside the adversary’s homeland territory. The meaning of standoff range is context dependent and relates to the distance between adversaries. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war (and in the broader European context), standoff implies the ability to engage targets several hundred kilometers behind the front line.1 In terms of missile defense, this analysis considers Russian, Ukrainian, and Western nonstrategic air and missile defense forces that have been deployed around the front line and deeper inland to protect military and civilian targets.

The paper is structured as follows. In section one, we briefly discuss the concept of strategic stability, conceptualizing it in terms of crisis and arms race stability. We also draw attention to the effect of long-range strike weapons and missile defense on strategic stability and outline the implications that the deployment and use of conventional missile technology in Ukraine can have for strategic stability. In section two, we analyze offensive and defensive developments in the missile domain in Ukraine. We then briefly describe the different long-range strike and missile defense systems that have been employed by Ukraine and Russia and assess their effectiveness (and lack thereof) in the war so far. Section three analyzes the medium- to long-term implications of the deployment and use of long-range strike weapons and missile defense systems in Ukraine for strategic stability. Demonstrated levels of effectiveness and ineffectiveness of these weapon systems shape the prospects of crisis and arms control stability as well as the general likelihood of strategic nuclear exchanges between NATO and Russia.

DEFINING STRATEGIC STABILITY

Strategic stability as a concept has been pervasive in theory and practice. In its broadest sense, strategic stability refers to the absence of armed conflict between states that possess nuclear weapons. More narrowly, the concept can be defined in terms of crisis stability and arms race stability. Crisis stability pertains to a state in which neither side of a nuclear conflict dyad is motivated to use nuclear weapons first. Arms race stability, in contrast, refers to a state in which neither side has an incentive to increase its nuclear arsenal in terms of quantity or quality.

The concept of strategic stability has traditionally been centered on the nuclear dimension of great power competition, particularly the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by each side.3 During the Cold War and especially in more recent times, the concept has been broadened to include a conventional dimension as well. Russian analysts and officials, in particular, have emphasized the role of offensive and defensive advanced conventional weapons for strategic stability.

Offensive advanced conventional weapons encompass a range of long-range strike capabilities.

This category includes conventional cruise and ballistic missiles as well as conventionally armed hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. Because of substantial advancements in guidance, propulsion, and warhead technologies in recent years, these weapon systems now have the potential to pose a credible threat to critical nuclear infrastructure and nuclear assets, including nuclear missile silos and mobile missile launchers.5 As such, long-range strike weapons can complement and upgrade the first-strike capability of existing nuclear arsenals. This interaction may undermine crisis stability by heightening incentives to preempt the adversary in a nuclear crisis and increase pressures to build up one’s nuclear arsenal to retain sufficient survivability.

Concerns surrounding defensive advanced conventional weapons have traditionally centered on strategic missile defense. Strategic missile defense can reinforce the counterforce capabilities of nuclear weapon states by threatening to intercept any warheads that may have survived the nuclear first strike. More recently, Russia has made the argument that not only strategic missile defense but also operational-tactical missile defense integrated into the broader missile defense network can undermine this stability.7 Because strategic and nonstrategic missile defenses may undermine the guaranteed retaliatory capability of a nuclear weapon state, they may incentivize the state to quantitatively or qualitatively improve its nuclear arsenal in an effort to maintain a credible nuclear capability, thus driving arms race instability.8 As such, from a strategic stability perspective, deployments of missile defense have generally been considered controversial and not conducive to a stable nuclear balance.

The Russia-Ukraine war creates short-, medium-, and long-term implications for strategic stability. The short-term implications center on the likelihood of the war expanding to a broader conflict between Russia and NATO, which may eventually escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.9 Although these risks are real, they appear to have been managed by both sides, and a broader NATO-Russia conflict as a result of accidental, inadvertent, or deliberate escalation— although not impossible—appears less likely.

The implications of the war for strategic stability in the medium to long term revolve around the lessons and insights that NATO and Russia can draw from the realities of the war regarding force posture and strategy development and the technological trajectories of weapon systems that the war helps predict. The following sections consider these medium- and long-term implications for strategic stability that result from the deployment of offensive and defensive advanced conventional weapons in Ukraine, in particular conventional long-range strike weapons and nonstrategic or tactical-operational missile defense

THE USE OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN UKRAINE

Both Russia and Ukraine have employed substantial long-range strike and missile defense assets throughout the war. This section discusses the weapon systems used on both sides as well as their effectiveness in this war so far. The following section dives into the strategic stability implications of their use.

Long‑range strike weapons

Throughout the war, Russia has employed a breadth of long-range strike capabilities in Ukraine, including land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, groundand air-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range drones.

The backbone of Russia’s long-range strike arsenal is its land-attack cruise missile arsenal. This arsenal consists of older cruise missile systems, such as the Kh-555 (RS-AS-22 Kluge), as well as more modern and advanced capabilities, including the Kh-101 (RS-AS-23a Kodiak) and 3M-14 Kalibr (RS-SS-N-30a Sagaris).10 These air- and sea-launched land-attack cruise missiles reportedly have a range greater than 2,000 kilometers and carry a payload of several hundred kilograms. Russia has also employed repurposed anti-ship cruise missiles in land-attack roles. These missiles include the Cold War Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 Kitchen) anti-ship cruise missile and the more modern P-800 Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile) supersonic anti-ship cruise missile that have been used to engage civilian and military targets on land.11 Although these missiles are less accurate against land-based targets because of their lack of suitable terminal guidance, Ukraine has struggled to deal with them because of their supersonic terminal speed.

In addition to cruise missiles, Russia’s ground and air forces have employed ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles in Ukraine. These weapons include the 9K729 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) short-range ballistic missile with a range of 500 kilometers and the medium-range Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (RS-AS-24a Killjoy) air-launched ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers.13 Russia has also employed repurposed S-300 air defense missiles in land-attack roles. Although comparatively inaccurate and lacking in firepower, these missiles have been used to saturate Ukraine’s missile defense network.

Finally, the war has seen the large-scale employment of Russian Geran-1 and Geran-2 one-way attack drones, which are rebranded and now license-produced versions of the Iranian Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 long-range drones.15 These long-range drones with an official range of up to 2,000 kilometers are equipped with a 40-kilogram warhead that, although relatively small, has been able to cause substantial damage to Ukrainian civilian infrastructure facilities.

Ukraine’s long-range strike arsenal has largely consisted of Western-made long-range strike weapons and is complemented by a small but growing number of Soviet-legacy and domestically produced long-range strike weapons.

Ukraine first started to receive Western long-range strike weapons in May 2023 when the United Kingdom delivered British Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles.17 In July 2023, France followed suit and supplied identical cruise missiles, known in Paris under the name SCALP-EG.18 Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG are relatively modern long-range strike weapons that are in use in several air forces around the world. They have a range of around 560 kilometers and carry a powerful 450-kilogram multi-effect penetrator warhead. 19 Storm Shadow/ SCALP-EG have been integrated with and launched from Ukrainian SU-24M (Fencer-D) aircraft.20 More recently, Ukraine has started to receive MGM-140 M39 Block 1 ATACMS short-range maneuvering missiles from the United States.21 These ground-launched quasi-ballistic missiles have a range of around 165 kilometers and carry a cluster ammunition warhead capable of dispersing 950 bomblets over a target area.