Benjamin Petrini & Erica Pepe
The end of two of the United Nations’ longest peacekeeping missions, in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), arguably represents a turning point for UN peacekeeping in Africa. It comes amid a decline in UN peacekeeping in favour of regionally led initiatives, a shift that has been well under way for nearly a decade. But as regional peacekeeping operations consolidate their role on the continent, greater efforts will be needed to increase their financial independence and operational legitimacy.
The closure of the two missions echoes broader trends confronting UN missions as they face increased anti-Western sentiment and domestic discontent. In June 2023, Mali’s military junta requested that the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali – known as MINUSMA – swiftly pull out amid regional escalation of violence in Western Africa’s Sahelian countries. This decision was part of Bamako’s new anti-Western course that included the end of military support by France and the deployment of Russia’s Wagner Group. Deployed since 2013, MINUSMA’s withdrawal was then completed by December 2023. Similarly, the DRC opted to terminate the UN Organization Stabilization Mission (known as MONUSCO), which has been operational in the east of the country for over two decades, by the end of 2024. MONUSCO has faced public criticism in the DRC for its limited success in reining in non-state armed groups, ensuring civilians’ protection and achieving lasting peace.
The rise of regional Peace Support Operations
Since 2016, UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have steadily declined in number and size (in terms of budgets and the number of personnel deployed), and are projected to plummet once MONUSCO withdraws (see Figure 1). With the closing of MINUSMA and MONUSCO, there are only four operations left on the continent (in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, the disputed Abyei region and Western Sahara). A decade ago there were more than twice as many, and no new UN peacekeeping missions have started on the continent since then.
In parallel, African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) – as local peacekeeping is known in the region – have grown in number and scope under the aegis of the African Union’s (AU) 2002 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The 1994 genocide in Rwanda first catalysed greater African ownership of peacekeeping missions. Later, the formation of the AU in 2002 responded to the need to shift from a ‘non-interference’ to a ‘non-indifference’ approach with respect to threats to peace and security, among other considerations. There are three broad types of African PSOs. Firstly, those directly mandated and led by the AU, like the ATMIS mission in Somalia. Secondly, PSOs initiated by regional economic communities (RECs) such as the West African bloc ECOWAS. Thirdly, ad hoc coalitions can be formed by states sharing a security threat, as in the case of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad region.
Compared to UN peacekeeping, African PSOs deploy in a wider variety of contexts: in addition to peace and security operations, there have been missions to fight epidemics such as Ebola, to support election processes and to curb domestic unrest. Since 2000, 38 African-led PSOs have taken place, with ten active PSOs operating throughout 17 countries on the continent in 2023. In 2022 alone, four new operations were either authorised, mandated or launched by the AU.
New security dynamics in Africa
The gradual shift over the last decade towards peacekeeping operations led by regional actors has come at the same time as profound changes to armed conflicts in Africa. Escalation in the levels of violence, the rise of jihadist groups and the proliferation of non-state armed groups with diverse motives, capabilities and reach have all taken place amid an increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and the weakening of conflict-resolution mechanisms. As a result, Africa’s armed conflicts have become increasingly fragmented and protracted.
Amid escalating geopolitical tension and internal divisions within the UN Security Council – the body which authorises peacekeeping missions – the rising influence of non-Western states and private military and security companies signals a seismic shift from traditional Western-centric approaches. This trend is underscored by the diminishing legitimacy of UN peacekeeping in Africa, which is now largely perceived as a Western-influenced tool bound to limited UNSC-sanctioned mandates.
The challenges ahead
The closure of MINUSMA and MONUSCO will force a strategic reassessment of UN peacekeeping. At the close of 2023, the two missions combined consumed 35% of the annual US$6.45 billion UN peacekeeping budget and one-third of the UN’s global uniformed peacekeeping personnel. As conflicts become more protracted and intractable, hard thinking is needed on the scope, overly ambitious mandates and undefined time frames of several missions. To stay relevant, UN peacekeeping will also need to navigate and adapt to a geopolitically fragmented world.
The current geopolitical fragmentation means African peacekeeping initiatives are likely to increase in number in the near future. However, concerns loom over the ability of regional forces to fill a potential security vacuum left by the UN, not only in terms of their capacity to protect human rights but also whether they will be able to safeguard regional economic interests, particularly in mineral-rich areas that are crucial to global supply chains and could be jeopardised by a resurgence of armed conflicts.
In terms of their scope, African-led PSOs deploy only military personnel, compared to UN peacekeeping missions which are multidimensional and often include civilian staff tasked with peacebuilding goals. PSOs operate with more lax rules of engagement, which in practice means they become a conflict party rather than an impartial force. Moreover, they deploy in conjunction with national forces.
The way forward
For African-led PSOs to fully supplant the UN in the provision of regional peace and security, institutional reforms are needed at the AU level to define RECs’ mandates and improve the PSOs’ legitimacy. This process should include the articulation of a shared vision of peace and stability on the continent so that African peacekeeping does not continue to act as a security support to incumbent governments against threats from insurgencies or violent extremism.
Finally, African-led PSOs’ autonomy and independence will remain constrained as long as the bulk of their funding continues to come from the UN and external donors. While the recent UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) advances the UN–AU partnership for peacekeeping operations, financial dependency reduces regional PSOs’ discretion over mission timelines, scope and mandates. In the longer term, this risks impeding the development of regional conflict-resolution approaches and autonomous diplomatic processes on the continent.
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