Boaz ItsHaky
Two states side by side rather than One inside the other
We all must live by the consequences of the choices we make in life – no exceptions. What was before October 7th, 2023, must not take place again. To do so Israel must revisit, revise and renew its “NEVER AGAIN” policy, which will be supported by Israel’s renewed national security policy: A dove equipped with talons of a hawk, where one talon holds an olive tree branch and the other talon firmly grasps Israel enemies.
No longer can Israel have a “Small but Smart IDF.” Rather, a “Large & Smart IDF” that will be far more reliant on domestically made arms and far less dependent on foreign arms and ammunition. Israel must look forward.
In light of a possible October 7th like attack initiated from Judea and Samaria, a potential existential threat to Israel’s national security has become center stage. A similar attack could dissect Israel into two separate areas. Israel’s national security needs have changed forever.
After being at the receiving end of the Palestinians’ choices – of NO – for the past 75 years, there must be consequences for these choices. For the sake of Israel’s continuation, lasting to the Ein Sof (infinite in Hebrew) solution must be instituted now. But it cannot include Judea and Samaria as part of the Palestinians aspirations.
In addition, the majority of Israel’s electorate is already making a sharp hawkish shift on matters of national security, and it will remain this way for the foreseeable future. The new understanding of most Israelis (across the political spectrum) will be: A. A resounding NO for a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria, because of demographic and geographic existential threat to Israel’s national security. B. A resounding YES for once and for all separation from the Palestinians. However, this time with clear cut physical borders.
If Israel wants an arrangement that will last to the long/Ein-Sof term, then Israel must have a "Day After Plan" that is acceptable to at least 80% of Israel’s voters, otherwise it will be short-lived.
However, there’s a bind.
At the regional level there is an opportunity to construct a regional axis that will counter Iran’s expansionism ambitions, Lebanon included (it was a strategic mistake to evacuate Israel’s north, and it must be reversed immediately). In addition, and together with the Western-Axis (and as an additional strategic End), the regional axis will geopolitically counter the worldwide "Axis of Expansionism" (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, et al).
The bind is the much needed and necessary two states solution, to which Judea and Samaria can no longer be accounted for. Since Judea and Samaria are no longer on the table, there’s only one way to unwind the two states’ solution bind. A Palestinian state side by side of Israel, along Egypt border in Sinai, which is vastly vacant. A 20 km wide strip of land, from the Gulf of Aqaba to Mediterranean Sea, connected to the Gaza Strip and as an exchange for Judea and Samaria.
Arab resistance? All Arab countries, which for decades also played the Palestinian choice card of NO, must know that in the post October 7th era there are consequences to bear that maybe were there before then weren’t there. Egypt carries additional consequential costs for the allowance of the over and under massive arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip, as well as for its repeated violations – in Sinai – of the peace accords with Israel.
Unwinding the bind, here is how the Day After Plan should be done step by step.
Immediate & short term:
• Hostages release is the supreme End; all other Ends are secondary!
• Hamas’ Intentions & Capabilities End – eliminate Hamas physical capabilities. Stripped from their physical capabilities, their Intentions will become threat-less.
• Use military pressure as a vehicle for a political strategic win. To do so, Israel must immediately replace its leadership (feasibly possible elections endeavor within the next three months).
• Philadelphi route (and Rafah) – should have been taken as the first maneuver of the first phase of the war. Better late than never, it must be taken now regardless of the higher geopolitical cost. Civilians from this area will be moved temporarily to areas northwest of Deir al Balah and southwest of Netzarim Corridor.
• Humanitarian support to civilian Gazans must be directly related to humanitarian release of all hostages.
• War must not stop until Ends were met, even if it will require moving more troops into Gaza until the release of all hostages.
• Humanitarian support distribution – if above conditions met – will be conducted along Netzarim Corridor (Cross Gaza route). 4-5 distribution points facing north and 4-5 points facing south. Distribution initially will be managed by the IDF or an Israeli humanitarian organization. Observers from Saudi Arabia, UAE, U.S., and U.K. will be present at all distribution points and will certify that no violations were made. Later in the mid-term,, distribution responsibilities will be transferred to Biden’s New Palestinian apparatus.
• Humanitarian support will enter via Border Crossing 96 only. The U.S. push for a temporary pier off the coast of Gaza presently carries too many security issues to be implementable.
• Going forward with the idea of awarding humanitarian support distribution to influential Gazan clans will be a prelude to the creation of warlord’s environment, therefore should be dismissed.
Midterm:
• Humanitarian support distribution will be transitioned to the New Palestinian apparatus.
• End the war.
• IDF will begin transferring governance to the New Palestinian apparatus.
• Begin phasing into the Long/Ein-Sof term.
Long/Ein-Sof term:
• Land exchange – Judea and Samaria in exchange for a State along the Israel-Egypt border.
• A strip of up to 20 km wide (that will be easy to cut off if necessary), from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean Sea and connected to the Gaza Strip.
• Israel and Egypt will provide the land along its borders, by which Egypt will provide most of the land required.
• Wealthy Arab states (with Qatar contributing the most) will finance the buildup of the said Palestinian State.
• Economic, industrial, agriculture, water desalination and job opportunities developments – like never seen before for the Palestinians – will be provided by the Western Axis.
• Sea ports at both seas and 2 international airports (north and south, 1 each) will be permitted.
• Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project will open its doors for job opportunities (quick access via southern air and seaports and possibly a tunnel under the Gulf of Aqaba).
• Land exchange incentives will be at a ratio of 1:3 for the initial 5 years of the initiative, 1:2 from year 6 to year 10 and 1:1 from year 11 to year 15.
• Monetary incentives will also be on a sliding scale and will follow ratios that will be determined by all parties involved.
• To ease up demographic pressure on Jordan, allow Palestinians from Jordan to move into the new Palestinian territory as well.
• Revival of the Red Sea–Dead Sea project. Economically at first it may not be sensible, but the geopolitical gains will outweigh these early deficiencies.
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