Brendon J. Cannon and Pooja Bhatt
Introduction
This policy brief reviews the aims, nature, and scope of the Quad’s response to the protection of submarine communication cables in the IndoPacific. It suggests practical policy prescriptions for the quartet’s members—Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.—to engender cooperation despite a range of differences, strategic ambits, and structural and systemic limitations within and between individual states.
Enhancing the protection of submarine communication cables (variously known as subsea, subsurface, and undersea cables) is an emerging area of concern for states. Submarine cables lie several hundred meters under the seas and serve as crucial conduits for internet lines as well as oil and gas pipelines across continents. As digital connectivity and energy transportation are growing, several countries are opting for and relying on undersea infrastructure for their development. However, recent incidents, including that involving the Chinese Newnew Polar Bear vessel, indicate that the damage to these cables, inadvertent or otherwise, can disrupt sensitive communications and economies for several days, if not weeks. Disruptions can be exacerbated depending on the capabilities available to certain states to protect this critical infrastructure. The repair of cables is both expensive and technical and involves a degree of expertise and the presence of specialized vessels in the high seas. Recognizing the nature of the problem and the growing threats to submarine cables within the context of rising global tensions, the Quad—Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.—established a framework for cooperation on the protection of cables in the Indo-Pacific.
The policy brief offers timely analysis and grapples with very real and prescient opportunities and challenges associated with the ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience.’ It identifies what the Quad can realistically, collectively achieve, given its members’ different geographies, capabilities, legal and regulatory regimes, and perception of threats. It offers policy prescriptions and courses of actions that are both possible and advisable, and highlights others that are likely inadvisable given a range of unintended consequences. In doing so, our brief on the Quad and the protection of submarine cables adds to and refines existing literature related to the quartet’s efficacy as a security grouping, its cohesiveness, its deterrent value, and its future trajectory in the Indo-Pacific.
Relevance of Submarine Cables in National Security Debate
Thin as a garden hose, there are approximately 500 operational submarine cables worldwide comprising 200 interconnected systems, extending over a million kilometers, and continually expanding. Whenever we read an email, share a video on social media, or search the internet, the information travels through these submarine fiber optic cables. So do daily online financial transactions that amount to more than $10 trillion through the SWIFT system, as well as many states’ most sensitive secrets.
Despite their crucial role in supporting the global economy and our everyday activities, cables have remained “under the surface” and “out of sight” until recently. But a combination of great power competition, securitization, and an uptick in what appears to be malicious cable sabotage has led to drastic changes. In May 2023, the Quad, in an age of heightened geopolitical competition with China, announced an initiative to protect submarine communication cables, which they see as a new and dangerous undersea battleground with China.
What has been largely the domain of private cable manufacturers and operators that supply our increasing demand for communication and information has become an object to be securitized, protected, and overseen by government ministries, regulations, and complex licensing and legal regimes. This is by no means a storm in a teacup. Nevertheless, on certain levels, it seems that the alarmist rhetoric issued by policymakers, think tanks, and governments may have outpaced the reality of the threats to and vulnerabilities of submarine communication cables.
Range of Vulnerabilities
Since submarine cables are intrinsic to our financial transactions and communications, when they go down—regardless of the cause—downtime is measured in seconds. Submarine cables face a variety of unique challenges that are proliferating with time. These include natural hazards like sharks and earthquakes, and accidental damage that comes from ship anchors. Not surprisingly, instances of damage to submarine cables are relatively common, with an estimated 100 to 150 cables being severed each year, mostly from fishing equipment or anchors.
The network is designed with a certain level of redundancy to handle such damage. Most countries are interconnected by numerous fiber-optic cables, allowing data to be rerouted seamlessly in the event of one or two cables being compromised. However, when more severe damage occurs, it can lead to significant inconveniences and financial losses, and repairing damaged cables is complex and costly, often resulting in days or weeks of downtime. The vast distances and isolation of the cable network make damage prevention and repair efforts daunting. While routine faults caused by hazards typically result in limited disruptions for advanced economies, developing economies with limited cable capacity face more severe consequences from accidental damage.2
The vulnerability of submarine cables also makes them theoretically vulnerable to attacks. Cables are often concentrated near each other, driven by cost considerations, and finding suitable landing sites. This is particularly true of “pressure points,” or the concentration of the cable landings. A malicious actor could potentially damage or destroy several cables at the same time thus rendering rerouting more difficult or impossible.3 Current satellite technology is insufficient to meet the communication needs of advanced states’ digital economies and societies.
The narrative gaining traction since the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in late September 2022 is thatgeopolitical rivals increasingly seek to exploit the importance and vulnerability of submarine cables to gain advantages over one another.4 Russia certainly thinks so when former Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated there was no reason Moscow should not destroy its enemies’ submarine cables.5 Yet, the list of ostensible submarine cable attacks is still rather thin, albeit growing. In February 2023, for instance, cables were cut between Taiwan and the Taiwan-controlled Matsu Islands that lie just off the coast of China. While Taipei refrained from accusing China of severing the cables, the fact remains that the cables have been cut 27 times since 2018, as of mid-2023.6 The only documented case of a cyber assault on submarine cables took place in April 2022 when the U.S. government disclosed its successful prevention of an attack on a submarine cable connecting Hawaii and the Pacific Region.7 In early October 2023, a Chinese-owned ship Newnew Polar Bear reportedly dragged its anchor over 100 nautical miles across the Gulf of Finland and hit gas lines and submarine cables.8 While malicious sabotage seems more likely than gross negligence, this incident highlights both the vulnerabilities of submarine cables and the difficulty of pinning blame on a specific actor or accurately identifying whether the incident was an accident or sabotage.
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