Keith B. Richburg
What seemed plausible two months ago is now undeniable: Myanmar’s awful ruling military junta is in retreat against the country’s anti-regime insurgents. The rebels include regional militias and self-styled “People’s Defense Forces” or PDFs, the ad hoc armed resistance groups that sprung up in response to the military’s February 2021 coup.
Ethnic armies have been a feature of Myanmar’s fractious political landscape since its independence in 1948. Along with the PDFs, the insurgents have seized hundreds of townships and military outposts since launching an Oct. 27 offensive. In January, the military suffered its most humiliating defeat yet, when soldiers surrendered Laukkaing, a key city and regional command center in Shan state to the rebels. There were conflicting reports as to the fate of six brigadier-generals responsible for the debacle. Local media outlets reported they had been sentenced to death, which the junta denied.
Myanmar’s military is finding its number of troops depleted by battlefield losses, surrenders and desertions. In a sign of its desperation, the junta has announced plans to begin conscripting young people into military service for at least two years. The announcement prompted thousands of people to attempt to flee over the border into Thailand, or to line up for visas outside Western diplomatic missions in Yangon.
But the surprisingly rapid retreat of the military’s forces from key areas doesn’t mean it is on the verge of collapse. By withdrawing to more defensible positions, including to the major cities and the capital, Naypyidaw, the military appears to be digging in for the long haul. While stymied on the ground, the armed forces continue to deploy devastating airstrikes against civilians — likely a war crime. The insurgents’ widespread use of drones, though effective, has not erased the regime’s battlefield advantage. Myanmar’s military is battle-hardened, well-armed and close-knit, living largely isolated from the population. Its soldiers have a reputation for brutality against civilians.
The rebels, by contrast, are splintered along ethnic and regional lines. There are about 20 ethnic armies in Myanmar, also known as Burma, totaling around 135,000 soldiers. And there are some 65,000 fighters in the People’s Defense Forces, which were formed after the 2021 coup that toppled the government of Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi (who remains in prison). The PDFs are the armed wing of the National Unity Government, which is made up of figures from the legitimate deposed government. Many of its fighters are former students who took to the mountains and jungles — guerrillas who lack heavy equipment, formal training and a unified command structure.
The military’s recent defeats have come at the hands of the ethnic armies, not the PDFs. The recent success in Shan state was carried out by three separate insurgent groups, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army operating jointly since 2019 as the Three Brotherhood Alliance — a rare instance of cooperation among the ethnic groups. The PDFs, meanwhile, may lack weapons, ammunition and battlefield experience. But they bring the imprimatur of the government in exile.
For those who want to see an end to this conflict and a return to a democratic Myanmar, an outright victory by the rebels still seems a long way off. A prolonged period of strife — and more suffering for Myanmar’s people — is unfortunately more likely. By latest estimates, some 2.6 million people have been driven from their homes, 660,000 since the October offensive. And more than 95,000 refugees have fled into neighboring countries. More than 18 million people, one-third of the population, are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance.
The world response to this crisis has been mostly nonexistent, with wars in Gaza and Ukraine sucking up all the diplomatic oxygen. Myanmar’s Southeast Asian neighbors have vacillated between indifference and maintaining ties with the junta. For its part, China has been playing both sides, keeping close ties with the junta while backing the ethnic armies on its border. The success of the rebels in Shan state is believed to be because of Beijing’s tacit support. China is mainly interested in exercising control in Myanmar’s lawless border regions which have become havens for sprawling internet scam centers, slavery and various other illicit activities.
The United States should be doing a lot more to bring a decent end to the war. The Biden administration already has the tools at its disposal to make a difference. Congress in 2022 passed the Burma Act, which was reauthorized in a watered down form late last year as part of the defense authorization bill. The Burma Act calls for the delivery of humanitarian aid, support for federalism and democracy, and nonlethal aid to the ethnic armies and the PDFs. But the Burma Act hasn’t come with any funding allocation, and U.S. support so far is scant.
The Myanmar civil war is at a turning point, and more U.S. help now can make a difference. The Biden administration needs to open dialogue with all the armed rebel groups and the National Unity Government, helping to bring them together around a common agenda of federalism and democracy. And it should listen to what else the rebels say they need to win the war — from cutting the junta’s revenue sources to more weapons. President Biden should also revive the idea of appointing a special coordinator for Burmese democracy, a provision that was inexplicably dropped from the modified Burma Act.
This all might seem like a big ask, given that Congress is unable to agree on funding for Ukraine and Israel. But we are looking at this hated regime’s eventual demise. Planning for what comes next — and ensuring the country has a chance for a democratic future — needs to start now.
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