KRIS OSBORN
Island hopping warfare in the South China Sea, high-speed air-sea-land combat along the Chinese coastline or perhaps even a full scale amphibious assault to liberate Taiwan … are all likely the kinds of missions the US Marine Corps trains to be prepared for. Yet the prospect of amphibious warfare now introduces an entirely new generation of variables and threat circumstances given the advent of longer-range sensors, precision-guided anti-armor weapons, AI-enabled sensing and targeting systems and many new kinds of armed unmanned platforms.
Citing the success of anti-armor weapons in Ukraine, the text of Marine Corps Force Design 2030 roadmap for the future force makes groundbreaking observations such as …highlighting the need for a massive increase in unmanned systems, drones and manned-unmanned teaming along with agile, expeditionary, high-speed lightweight platforms, multi-domain weaponry, tactics and networking technologies designed to enable a more disaggregated, yet highly networked and lethal assault force.
Clearly the futurists, weapons developers and combat tacticians within the Corps seem to understand the increasing importance of the need for the Corps to be true to its maritime, multi-domain roots and move quickly across air, land and sea with unprecedented and unparalleled speed and lethality…yet in totally new threat environment. In a modern combat environment, it seems this would require upgraded anti-armor weapons, hand-launched drones, high-speed amphibious platforms and the ability to leverage now-operational Marine Corps 5th-generation stealth air power. What about heavy armor platforms and traditional weapons such as Howitzer artillery, tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles and helicopters? How much will they still be needed .. and what is the future role of the Corps’ famous Marine Air-Ground-Task-Force (MAGTF)?
Part of the impetus behind Corps cutting edge thinking is likely related to new technologies such as the growing ability to attack from stand-off ranges with precision weaponry, paradigm-changing developments with AI, autonomy and unmanned systems, an ability to operate in more dispersed, disaggregated formations and leverage the best available multi-domain transport layer networking technology … At the same time, the text of the Corps’ future plan (Marine Corps Force Design 2030) carves out a special, enduring place for what it calls “stand-in” combat forces, a term quite close to the Marine Corps ethos and fundamental spirit.. Referring to an ability to “close” with and destroy an enemy in the “close-in” fight.
Therefore, Marine Corps Force Design 2030 embraces the importance of preparing the force with “stand-in” close range attack and combat capability. While there are elements of Close Quarter Battle likely to seem similar and timeless through generations of warfare, today’s requirements and tactical possibilities are indeed quite different. For example, winning a close-in fight in today’s threat environment likely requires the use of a lot of small, hand-launched drones, dismounted, yet highly networked infantry and next-generation precision anti-armor weapons.
These kinds of technologies are increasingly being blended into a more modern tactical equation inspiring newer thinking about traditional Combined Arms Maneuver strategy. This is extremely critical, and perhaps one reason why Force Design did call for a decrease in heavy armor and the eventual removal of tanks from the force. Subsequent thinking appears to have modified this somewhat, as the Corps also seems to understand the lasting tactical significance of heavy armor and mechanized formations .. particularly as they pertain to amphibious assault and ship-to-shore operations. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps is divesting its tanks and scaling back the amount of heavier platforms in favor of a lighter, faster, more agile, lethal and expeditionary force. What about both? Wouldn’t some measure heavy armor still be critical in a major amphibious assault? Heavier platforms are now much more deployable than they have been in previous years .. so what should the future role of the MAGTF be? Surely it needs to adapt … but it can’t fully dissolve either.
Marine Corps: Do Not Fully Lose Tanks & Heavy Armor
Certainly many of the tactical, conceptual and doctrinal aims of Marine Corps Force Design 2030 can and should be both advanced and preserved, and maneuver formations now need to be quite different given the advent of new weaponry, sensing and networking technologies, yet there is still a critical, even essential, role which needs to be played by heavier armor and key elements of classic Combined Arms Maneuver.
Should the Corps be fully without tanks? Maybe not, as the Corps need to close with an enemy ashore, breach a perimeter and advance into position to secure territory for follow-on forces. Should they be transportable, would tanks prove extremely critical to this kind of endeavor? Of course the Marine Corps does not want to merely replicate the Army, yet it seems a successful amphibious assault would need to “fight” its way through initial enemy fortifications.
While they can be difficult to sustain and require extensive logistical support, tanks and other heavy systems might prove critical in a modern amphibious assault, particularly if supported by 5th-generation air support, dismounted groups of soldiers with advanced anti-armor weapons and fast-moving air and land drones conducting forward reconnaissance or even firing weapons when directed by a human.
Keep the Marine Air Ground Task Force
One former Marine and retired 2-star Director of Expeditionary Warfare for the Navy Ret. Maj. Gen. David Coffman is a strong advocate for the Corps’ foundational Marine Air Ground Task Force, called the MAGTF. They are multi-domain, integrated armored units intended to support amphibious operations, including heavy artillery, armored vehicles, mortars, armed amphibious assault vehicles, helicopters logistics support and what the Corps calls a Battalion Landing Team. A Marine Expeditionary Unit is a core element of a MAGTF, as it consists of a 2,200-strong multi-domain crisis response force designed to be the first to fight. This integrated heavy, yet fast and lethal multi-domain combat MAGTF unit ...designed for rapid forcible entry ..does need to keep modernizing … but needs to stay, Coffman believes.
“If you read the history of every major war. The most frightening thing for enemy soldiers to be under artillery fire…a barrage of artillery fire. It will wreck them, body, mind, and soul. We have a whole thing about it, don't we? Shell shock. So to not be able to deliver cheap volume fire would be a critical mistake…..to not be able to support assaults with our armored vehicles, armor, et cetera, would be a critical mistake,” Coffman said in an interview with Warrior about the future of amphibious warfare.
Coffman said the idea is to “get all your crap from a sovereign US territory afloat, across a beach, friendly or unfriendly, and into the fight….. so I'm a believer in combined arms. I fear that we’re in dangerous territory with the premise of the MAGTF and the core competency of Marine Combined Arms…..I believe Marines have become experts over the many generations at the application of combined arms, including their secret weapon, of that aviation combat element, and at integrating that with the Navy as their senior partner.”
The foundation of the MEU, a defining element of the MAGTF, does consist of heavy armor and weapons; most MEUs include 155 Howitzers, M777 mobile artillery weapons, M252 81mm Mortar, TOW and Javelin anti-tank missiles and armored platforms such as amphibious assault vehicles and a full complement of helicopters. These include the AH-1Z Viper Attack helicopters, CH-53 heavy lift helicopters and the increasingly critical V-22 Osprey. The primary rationale informing the MAGTF concept is integration and the benefits of operating air-and-surface operations under a single commander.
The MAGTAF supports the doctrinal belief in the value of a small, fast, expeditionary, high-speed, self-sustaining integrated air-ground assault formation, and while Coffman argues it should be continuously updated, upgraded and modernized, he is a strong advocate for the enduring value of Combined Arms in amphibious warfare.
Coffman’s belief about the continued importance of adapted forms of Combined Arms Maneuver in amphibious assault operations aligns with an interesting recent essay in the Marine Corps University Journal called “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assaults.” The essay makes the point that modern applications of Combined Arms still have a key role to play in a modern anti-access/area denial kind of combat environment. If even just an initial penetration force designed to secure a beachhead, a MAGTF unit might have much better progress if it is at least in part composed of some heavy platforms and standard attack weapons.
“A target such as a small island in the South China Sea or the Arctic Ocean may require not only a capability to assault a defended beach but also a diverse combined-arms team. Unless any action the enemy takes to avoid one threat makes them more vulnerable to another, an amphibious assault may fail to achieve overmatch and suffer defeat. Additionally, an amphibious assault should take advantage of the element of surprise as much and as early as possible by employing a diverse combined-arms force from the start,” the essay states. (Stephen A. Yeadon, Marine Corps University Press)
Tanks and Heavy Artillery Can Now Transit the Ocean
Several key technologies and tactical realities have changed in recent years in a manner that impacts the question of the value of heavy armor in multi-domain, sea-air-land combat circumstances. One of the principal hesitations regarding the Abrams tank, for instance, is simply the fact that it weighs 70-tons. Tanks are hard to move and hard to deploy. They require pre-positioning and preparation and have massive logistical requirements making mobility more challenged. Their weight can make it difficult for them to cross bridges, pass through narrow passageways or operate in more condensed urban environments …. These are all key reasons why tanks for the future are now being developed to be faster, lighter and more deployable and futurists are heavily emphasizing unmanned systems and manned-unmanned teaming.
Alongside these variables, there is also now a vastly improved ability to deploy and transport tanks in a maritime and amphibious warfare environment. These are developments of enormous tactical significance in several key respects. The Navy’s new amphibious assault landing craft replacing the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) called Ship-to-Shore connector is built with the capability to transport tanks from ship to shore.
“One tank, which weighs 70 to 80 tons. So we built a landing craft around the idea that there would still be a requirement for the Navy-Marine team to put tanks on ships, take them somewhere, and then send them across the shoreline,” Coffman told Warrior in the interview.
This capability, which will spread throughout the Corps’ entire set of amphibious formations, introduces new tactical possibilities for highly-lethal and heavily armored amphibious ship-to-shore assault. Added to this equation, the Navy now operates a growing fleet of Expeditionary Fast Transport platforms, high-speed force, equipment and supply transport vessels formerly called Joint High Speed Vessels. These ships, more of which are now being built, are engineered to travel at high speeds carrying as much as 600 tons. This means a single Expeditionary Fast Transport vessel is positioned to fast-track at least five tanks across miles of ocean at high speeds. Finally, joint operations are now increasingly being emphasized and enabled across the military services, and the Army is itself fast becoming more expeditionary. This includes many things, one of which is a fast Army effort to add new vehicle-transporting Army watercraft. Therefore, with the Ship-to-Shore connector, Expeditionary Fast Transport ship and Army watercraft … It is now much more possible to quickly get tanks, artillery and heavy armor across land-sea combat environments.
The Corps seems to recognize this, which is one reason why they are developing a new, island-hopping capable medium class Amphibious Assault Ship and also testing a land-fired variant of the highly lethal ship-launched Naval Strike Missile. The Corps is increasingly multi-domain and likely pursuing more joint maneuver training with the Army. While the Corps does not intend or need to be a smaller Army, the two services will need to operate in joint, close coordination in support of a Marine Corps “tip-of-the-spear” ship-to-shore attack campaign.
A critical and easily overlooked element of the MAGTF, as described by Coffman, is the need to leverage the now available 5th-generation stealth air support capability. Coffman explained how a US Navy America-class amphibious assault ship can operate with as many as 20 vertical take-off-and-landing F-35Bs, and said air-ground coordination is fundamental to the success of a MAGTF, cohesive units which should not be stripped of heavy armor, artillery or other key traditional elements of mechanized warfare.
It should be mentioned here that Coffman, while a continued proponent of the classic and defining MAGTF, is very much a forward thinker, innovator and modernization-minded military leader. When serving as the Director of Expeditionary Warfare for the Navy, Coffman gave a speech roughly five years ago at the famous Surface Navy Association Symposium which seems to have anticipated critical elements of modern amphibious warfare strategic thinking. He talked about how big-deck amphibs and platforms will still be needed but can increasingly function as “motherships” performing Command and Control in support of thousands of unmanned systems, air-surface-and-land drones and disaggregated, highly networked and increasingly autonomous formations. Coffman argued for this more than five years ago, and sure enough since that time the US Marine Corps and Navy “drone explosion” has only continued to grow. An unprecedented, paradigm-changing number of air-surface-and-undersea unmanned platforms are now being fast-tracked by Navy weapons developers, and AI-enabled computing increasingly enables breakthrough measures of autonomy. Groups of Unmanned Surface Vehicles, Large and Medium USVs and even swarms of small boats can operate with growing levels of autonomy, information sharing and an AI-enabled ability to respond autonomously to changing circumstances and network with other manned and unmanned nodes.
Therefore, Coffman seemed ahead of the curve in terms of anticipating that the future of amphibious warfare is not likely to be as “linear” in terms of mechanized formations as was the case in Iwo Jima in WWII. Instead, future amphibious warfare is and will be extremely different, a reality which Coffman seemed to anticipate and something which correctly seems to have informed Marine Corps Force Design 2030. Despite these changes in the threat landscape and the advent of new technologies and tactics, heavier platforms and some kinds of Combined Arms Maneuver need to form a lasting resting place in the minds of Marine Corps tacticians, futurists and amphibious assault experts.
No comments:
Post a Comment