North Korea’s ballistic-missiles transfer to Russia: Operational constraints thwart objectives

Timothy Wright & Joseph Dempsey

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US officials claim that Russia has used North Korean ballistic missiles in Ukraine. While the delivery is evidence of the growing military relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, underlying issues with Russia’s ability to strike important Ukrainian targets could limit results.

United States National Security Council Coordinator John Kirby confirmed on 4 January 2024 what had been anticipated for several months: North Korea has supplied Russia with ‘several dozen’ short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The transfer signals North Korea’s increasing material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. It furthermore raises the possibility that Pyongyang – and potentially other suppliers such as Iran – may provide Russia with more missiles.

First use

The US government assesses that Russia launched a single North Korean-designed SRBM against Ukraine on 30 December 2023 with multiple missiles fired on 2 January 2024. Russia’s first use of a North Korean SRBM was apparently a failure: Kirby reported that the missile landed in a field outside of the southeastern Ukrainian city of Zaporozhye.

There are several possible reasons for the failure. The launch crew may have been unfamiliar with aspects of the missile’s targeting software and launch procedure, or a technical issue with the missile’s guidance software or solid-fuel propulsion caused it to fall short.

Alternatively, Ukrainian air defences may have intercepted the missile. Ukrainian officials had reported before details of the transfer were known that a single Russian ballistic missile was intercepted near Zaporozhye and fell into an open area. Although the missile was initially described by Ukrainian officials as a Russian 9M723 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone), the Iskander is similar to several North Korean SRBM designs, such as the KN-23, and may have been misidentified.

Ukraine estimates that Russia has launched more than 800 SRBMs during its invasion. North Korea’s transfer of several dozen SRBMs will be welcomed by Moscow, which has depleted its pre-war stockpile despite efforts to increase missile production. An unknown number of North Korean transporter erector launchers (TEL), and presumably support vehicles, have also been sent. The number of TELs transferred is likely relatively low considering that each typically carries two missiles, can be reloaded and, being mobile, is difficult to target.

Launch assessment

Though Kirby did not identify the specific missile system(s) by name, an accompanying slide presented at a press gathering featured archive images showing launches of North Korea’s road-mobile Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B (KN-24) SRBMs. It is unclear if both systems have been transferred to Russia, given the similarities in the two related designs and the potentially overlapping ranges involved. Open-source assessments of wreckage recovered from Kharkiv on 2 January indicated several internal design elements consistent with the two indicated North Korean missiles that are crucially distinct from Russia’s Iskander-M.

The KN-23 and KN-24 are a relatively new family of North Korean solid-fuel SRBMs, first test launched in 2019. The missiles represent a more responsive, more robust and seemingly more accurate successor to the country’s legacy liquid-fuel Scud derivatives. Pyongyang has invested heavily in developing the KN-23, test launching more of these than any other ballistic-missile type over the last five years.

Though the KN-23 and KN-24 are North Korean designs, their resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M extends beyond visual similarities. Both systems demonstrate similar flight characteristics, operating at depressed and quasi-ballistic trajectories. While KN-23s and KN-24s may not provide the same amount of evasive maneuverability often attributed to the Iskander-M, and reportedly lack penetration aids, they may still further complicate Ukrainian ballistic missile defenses.

Kirby’s statement that the transferred missile is capable of travelling to ‘ranges of approximately 900 kilometers’ likely refers to the KN-23. Though confirmed KN-23 launches had demonstrated ranges up to 800 km, an unattributed but likely KN-23 launch reached 900 km in June 2023. In contrast, the smaller KN-24 has only demonstrated ranges up to 410 km, though the missile has not been tested as extensively and may be capable of travelling greater distances. Given the reported range of 460 km for the 30 December launch and the roughly 275 km range for the subsequent Kharkiv strike (assuming the same launch area was used) either system could have been used.

While some technical aspects of the KN-23 and KN-24 are relatively clear from open-source assessments of test launches, other parameters such as the missiles’ accuracy are less certain. Their use in Ukraine would provide evidence of how the missiles perform in combat operations beyond the more protective lens of North Korean state propaganda. Wreckage may also shed light on suspected illicit foreign components.

With the KN-23 in Russia’s inventory, one advantage for Moscow would be the missile’s longer range over Russian equivalents. While the claimed range of the Iskander-M is 500 km, the 900 km range of the KN-23 would allow full coverage of Ukraine from deeper inside Russia’s internationally recognised borders.

Implications and potential for further proliferation

Russia’s use of SRBMs and other long-range land-attack weapons against Ukraine has not been as effective as Moscow may have hoped. Russia’s arguably lacklustre campaign to degrade Ukrainian military facilities at the war’s outset and its subsequent attempts to destroy Ukraine’s critical infrastructure point to Moscow’s failure to employ these weapons correctly, as well as to fluctuations in Moscow’s strategy for using long-range weaponry to achieve its objectives. Recent missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle strikes suggest Moscow is changing tack again by refocusing its efforts towards degrading Ukrainian defence-industrial facilities.

Even if Russia supplements its SRBM inventory with North Korean weaponry, Moscow may well still face long-standing problems with its kill-chain which prevent their effective use, including insufficient intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage to enable dynamic targeting across Ukraine. Despite this, Moscow appears to be pressing ahead with its goal of acquiring more missiles from other suppliers, including Iran, suggesting that missiles will continue to form a central component of Russia’s strategy to defeat Ukraine for the foreseeable future.